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ABSTRACT 
COUNTERPOSSIBLES 
FEBRUARY 2012 
BARAK KRAKAUER, B.A., BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
Directed by: Professor Phillip Bricker 
 
 Counterpossibles are counterfactuals with necessarily false antecedents. The problem 
of counterpossibles is easiest to state within the “nearest possible world” framework for 
counterfactuals: on this approach, a counterfactual is true (roughly) when the consequent is 
true in the “nearest” possible world where the antecedent is true.  Since counterpossibles 
have necessarily false antecedents, there is no possible world where the antecedent is true.  
On the approach favored by Lewis, Stalnaker, Williamson, and others, counterpossibles are 
all trivially true.   
 I introduce several arguments against the trivial approach.  First, it is counter-
intuitive to think that all counterpossibles are true.  Second, if all counterpossibles were true, 
then we could not make sense of their use in logical, philosophical, or mathematical 
arguments.  Making sense of the role of sentences like these requires that they not have 
vacuous truth conditions.     
vii 
 
The account of counterpossibles I ultimately favor is an extension of the “nearest 
possible world” semantics discussed above.  The Lewis/Stalnaker account is supplemented 
with the addition of impossible worlds, and the nearness metric is extended to range over 
these impossible worlds as well as possible worlds.  Thus, a counterfactual is true when its 
consequent is true in the nearest world where the antecedent is true; if the counterfactual’s 
antecedent is impossible, then the nearest world in question will be an impossible world.  
Once the framework of impossible worlds and similarity is in place, we can put it to use in 
the analysis of other philosophical phenomena.  I examine one proposal that makes use of a 
theory of counterpossibles to develop an analysis of the notion of metaphysical dependence.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 Counterpossibles are counterfactuals with impossible antecedents.  The aim of this 
dissertation is to provide an analysis of counterpossibles that makes sense of their use in 
natural language as well as philosophical practice.  Below is a summary of the various 
chapters of this dissertation.  In the remainder of this introduction, I explain what kinds of 
statements are properly called ‘counterfactuals,’ and briefly discuss some different kinds of 
ways in which a statement is impossible.   
 
1. Summary 
 In chapter 1, I discuss the “nearest possible world” analysis of counterfactuals 
developed by Lewis and Stalnaker: a counterfactual is true (roughly) if the consequent is true 
in the “nearest” or “most similar” possible worlds where the antecedent is true.  While I am 
sympathetic with the “nearest possible world” account, and assume that such an account is 
appropriate for at least most counterfactuals, it cannot straightforwardly accommodate 
counterpossibles.  The problem of counterpossibles can be seen clearly enough: how can we 
determine whether a counterpossible is true if there is no possible world where the 
antecedent is true, and thus no possible world at which we may evaluate the truth of the 
conditional? 
 According to the approach favored by Lewis, Stalnaker, and others, all 
counterpossibles are true; they are said to be vacuous, since they all express the necessary 
truth.  There is no difference in content among counterpossibles, or even between 
counterpossibles and other necessary truths. 
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 I introduce several of arguments against the vacuous approach.  First, it is simply 
counter-intuitive to think that all counterpossibles are true; consider, for example, ‘If nine 
were prime, then there would be fewer kangaroos.’  Second, if all counterpossibles were true, 
then we could not make sense of their (non-vacuous) use in logical, mathematical, or 
philosophical arguments.  Consider counterpossibles such ‘If Platonism were true in 
mathematics, then we would have no way of knowing about numbers,’ or ‘If there were 
finitely many prime numbers, then there would be some number n equal to the product of 
every prime number + 1.’  Making sense of the role of sentences such as these requires that 
they not be vacuous. 
 The behavior of ‘might’ counterpossibles is also problematic for the defender of the 
vacuous approach.  According to Lewis, ‘might’ counterpossibles are all false.  In addition to 
introducing a new family of counterpossibles with counter-intuitive truth values, the falsity 
of ‘might’ counterpossibles undercuts many of the defenses of the truth of all ‘would’ 
counterpossibles.  The falsity of ‘might’ counterpossibles also introduces widespread 
violations of some plausible principles about the behavior of counterfactuals, such as the 
principle that a ‘would’ counterfactual entails its corresponding ‘might’ counterfactuals.  
Ultimately, only a non-vacuous account of counterpossibles is capable of making sense of 
our linguistic intuitions and philosophical practice, and only a non-vacuous account of 
counterpossibles is capable of explaining the failure of the logical principle related to the 
behavior of ‘might’ and ‘would’ counterfactuals.   
 In chapter 2, I attempt to formulate several versions of a non-vacuous approach to 
counterpossibles that addresses at least some of the worries presented above in chapter 1, 
without the addition of impossible worlds.  
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 One such approach is the “nearest possible proposition” account of 
counterpossibles.  On such an account, a counterpossible is evaluated not at the nearest 
possible world where the antecedent is true, but at the nearest possible world where the 
nearest possible antecedent is true.  That is, a similarity metric is applied not only to possible 
worlds, but to propositions as well; the impossible antecedent of some counterpossible is 
nearby to some possible proposition that could serve as the antecedent of some 
counterfactual.  We then evaluate whether the counterpossible is true by evaluating whether 
this counterfactual (whose antecedent is this relevantly similar, possible proposition) is true.  
Of course, it is difficult to say just what the nearest possible proposition might look like, and 
it is difficult to see why we will get the intuitively correct truth conditions for 
counterpossibles by making use of other, nearby counterfactuals. 
 Another such approach is to analyze a counterpossible such that it is true when its 
consequent can be derived, in some non-classical logic, from the antecedent and other 
background propositions.  Such an approach, however, faces embarrassing questions related 
to how one chooses the logical system, and whether one could ever make sense of 
counterpossibles whose antecedent express some impossibility relative to the logic of the 
counterfactual conditional. 
 In chapter 3, I present my favored account of counterpossibles, which is an 
extension of the “nearest possible world” semantics discussed above in chapter 1.  The 
Lewis and Stalnaker account is supplemented with the addition of impossible worlds, or 
worlds where logical, mathematical, or metaphysical impossibilities obtain (and do not 
necessarily result in absurdity).  The similarity metric between worlds is extended to range 
over these impossible worlds as well as possible worlds.  Thus, a counterfactual is true when 
its consequent is true in the nearest world (possible or impossible) where the antecedent is 
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true; if the counterfactual’s antecedent is impossible, then the nearest world in question will 
be an impossible world.   
 One advantage of this approach is that it is a straightforward extension of semantics 
of counterfactuals that has been highly influential.  In particular, the similarity metric is one 
based on the “default” similarity metric Lewis discusses in his [1979].  On this view, we take 
Lewis’s dictum that we should avoid widespread violations of law while maximizing the 
region of perfect match of fact to apply to logical law.  We can determine the logical, 
mathematical, and metaphysical laws of a world in a manner analogous to how we determine 
the nomological laws of a world: we try to fit the world into a deductive system that best 
makes sense of what is true at the world.  A world is similar, then, to the extent that it 
minimizes changes in law and maximizes matches of matters of fact. 
 In chapter 4, I discuss the nature of impossible worlds.  Since the proposed solution 
makes use impossible worlds, a controversial extension of an already-controversial 
apparatus, it is necessary to explain what impossible worlds are and why they are 
ontologically cheap.  
Possible worlds can be used to build structured propositions, which can in turn be 
used to build “structured worlds.”  An impossible world is simply a structured world: a set of 
structured propositions.  Such a set need not be complete or consistent, so impossibilities 
can be represented straightforwardly by these worlds. Furthermore, these worlds are 
ontologically cheap, requiring belief merely in possible worlds and set-theoretic 
constructions of those worlds.  In this chapter, I also discuss Lewis’s argument against 
impossible worlds, and how to best understand what is true and false at these worlds. 
 In chapter 5, I apply the theory of counterpossibles defended in chapter 3 to the 
problem of metaphysical dependence.  I hold that dependence is best understood in terms of 
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explanation and counterpossible exclusion.  That is, A depends on B iff A explains B, and the 
following counterpossible is true: if one of A or B were to be false, then A would be false.  
The counterpossible exclusion claim adds the requisite hyperintensionality and asymmetry 
required to make the supervenience account plausible; it also suggests the right kind of 
modal relation between the grounding and grounded entities. 
 One can then use this analysis to evaluate claims of metaphysical dependence.  I 
argue that this approach gives the intuitively correct results, albeit with a complication 
related to subject matters.  In cases where the counterpossible is more difficult to evaluate, 
the analysis at least points toward where the difficulty comes from: evaluating these 
counterpossibles will ultimately be a matter of determining the logical and metaphysical laws 
of various impossible worlds, which in turn is a matter of determining what the best way of 
systematizing these worlds are.  Cases where the dependence claims are more controversial 
are cases where we are less sure about how to understand facts related to explanation or the 
structure of the impossible worlds in question. 
 
2. Counterfactuals 
 I have described counterpossibles as a kind of counterfactuals.  Unfortunately, it is 
not entirely clear what counterfactuals are.  They are often glossed along lines such as 
‘conditional sentences in the subjunctive mood.’  If this is correct, then there is a clear 
syntactic test to determine whether a statement is a counterfactual: we can determine 
whether a sentence expressed a counterfactual by looking at its form. 
These kinds of tests might be a guide for some cases, but it seems highly implausible 
to say that counterfactuals are usually expressed in this form.  Philosophers and prescriptive 
grammarians often express counterfactuals in the subjunctive mood, but ordinary speech 
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generally eschews the subjunctive mood.  Indeed, there are questions about what the 
subjunctive mood comes to, and whether this test would work across languages that do not 
seem to have anything rightly called a subjunctive mood or tense. 
Indeed, many counterfactuals are not even expressed as conditionals.  Consider 
Lewis’s example, ‘No Hitler, no atom bomb,’ which expresses a counterfactual, even though 
one could not guess this merely by looking at the form of the sentence.  One could multiply 
cases: ‘Sure, but then they’d topple over,’ is a counterfactual whose antecedent is not 
expressed, but is rather (presumably) anaphoric on some previous sentence in the discourse; 
‘Had you cut off their tails, they’d have toppled over’ is a counterfactual that lacks the 
‘if/then’ structure.  Looking to surface syntax as a guide could be misleading.  
A semantic account of counterfactuals seems far more fruitful than a syntactic 
account.  A statement need not include words such as ‘if’ and ‘would’ (or their correlates in 
other natural languages) to be a counterfactual, but rather needs to express the right kind of 
proposition.  That is, a counterfactual is a kind of statement that expresses what would 
occur, given some state of affairs.  Counterfactuals are so-called because the state of affairs 
in question does not actually obtain; evaluating a counterfactual is a process of determining 
what would happen if the antecedent were true (though it is not).  If the antecedent of some 
counterfactual is true, then the utterance of the counterfactual is infelicitous; this does not, 
however, mean that the utterance is not a counterfactual in the relevant sense. 
But what would happen if the antecedent conditions were impossible? 
 
3. Impossibility 
 The other part of our definition of counterpossibles that needs unpacking is the 
notion of impossibility.  We say that a counterpossible is a counterfactual when its 
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antecedent is impossible, but when is something impossible?  The nature of impossibility is 
itself a thorny issue, so here I will merely highlight different kinds of impossibility that might 
be employed in some counterpossibles.  
 It is important to note that words we use to express possibility and impossibility, 
such as ‘can’ and ‘must’ and so on, are themselves highly context-dependant with respect to 
their application (see, for example, Kratzer [1977]).  We might truly say that it is not possible 
for me to run a mile in six minutes, but we are not thereby committed to the claim that there 
is no possible world where I can run a six-minute mile.  Rather, we deem those worlds to be 
irrelevant in the given context.  If we change the context, perhaps by bringing up the 
possibility of having devoted some time to training and practice, we would no longer be 
inclined to say that I couldn’t run a six-minute mile.  We also sometimes restrict the set of 
worlds in question when discussing belief (‘John must be in Boston by now’), physical laws 
(‘The bowling ball can’t float in mid-air’), and normativity (‘You cannot torture children for 
fun.’)  But these are not the modal notions of interest here; the notion of impossibility in 
play is grounded by the ways things might turn out, not what we believe, or what the best 
physical theory of this world is, or what we should do.   
 The notion of possibility relevant to a study of counterpossibles is unrestricted 
possibility.  When I say that something is impossible unrestrictedly, I do not mean merely 
that it is impractical, or would violate some law (but see below); rather, I mean that it is 
absolutely impossible.  I mean that there is no possible world where it is true; I mean that the 
scenario described is not a genuine possibility.  Once we have decided that something is 
metaphysically impossible, we cannot then change the context in such a way that it would 
then seem possible after all.  One could attempt to get a better understanding of what is 
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meant by impossibility, in the relevant sense, by examining some different ways in which the 
antecedent of a counterfactual could be impossible. 
 A conditional whose antecedent is not logically possible could be called a 
counterlogical.  I assume the truth of classical logic, so the antecedents of counterlogicals would 
express a formal contradiction.  This could be some statement of the form P and not-P, or 
some statement that entails something of the form P and not-P.  This formulation could be 
modified, however, to apply to any logical theory as long as it admits of valid and invalid 
rules of inference.   
A conditional whose antecedent is impossible with respect to a correct philosophical 
theory is a countermetaphysical.  This occurs when the antecedent asserts the truth of a false 
philosophical theory whose truth value is a matter of necessity.  ‘If properties were 
universals, then redness would be repeatable’ expresses a countermetaphysical. 
A conditional whose antecedent is analytically false is a counteranalytical.  This occurs 
when the antecedent expresses something that is semantically or conceptually false.  ‘If some 
bachelors were married, then they’d have wedding rings’ is a counteranalytical. 
A conditional whose antecedent is not mathematically possible is a countermathematical.  
This occurs when the antecedent is false according to arithmetic, set theory, geometry, and 
so on.  ‘If 9 were prime, then it would not be divisible by 3’ expresses a 
countermathematical.   
There are also other notions of impossibility in the literature, such as the proposal 
that laws of nature are genuinely necessary, as in Shoemaker [1998], and that what has 
occurred in the past is genuinely necessary, as in Prior [1957].  These proposals could be 
understood as kinds of metaphysical necessity in the sense of countermetaphysicals, or as 
some sui generis kind of unrestricted necessity.     
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 Perhaps some of these categories collapse into others.  If the logicist or neo-logicist 
project is successful, for example countermathematicals will reduce to counterlogicals.  If 
false theories in metaphysics and ethics somehow entail contradictions, then they will reduce 
to counterlogicals.  If these false theories are conceptually or linguistically defective in such a 
way that the phenomena they analyze fail to match our initial concepts of them – perhaps it 
is constitutive of properties that they be repeatable, or constitutive of rightness that the 
organ harvest cannot be right – then countermetaphysicals will reduce to counteranalyticals.    
 This discussion, of course, is quite inconclusive.  Determining which kinds of 
necessities reduce to other kinds of necessities is a project beyond the scope of this 
dissertation.  Nonetheless, it may be helpful, as one is attempting to evaluate analyses of 
counterpossibles, to keep in mind the various kinds of counterpossibles, and how they might 
relate to each other.  If a non-trivial account of these conditionals is possible, it must be able 
to account for these various kinds of counterpossibles.  A theory should be judged on how 
well it matches our intuitive judgments about the truth of these sentences, as well make 
sense of how these sentences are used in math, logic, and philosophy. 
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CHAPTER 1  
COUNTERPOSSIBLES ARE NOT VACUOUS 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Counterfactuals with necessarily false antecedents, or counterpossibles, pose problems 
for standard treatments of counterfactual conditionals.   We seem to have robust intuitions, 
at least in many cases, about the truth of counterpossibles.  Consider, for example:   
(1) If mereological nihilism were true, then there would be no tables. 
(2) If mereological nihilism were true, then there would be tables. 
(3) If I were a horse, then I would have hooves. 
(4) If I were you, I wouldn’t eat that. 
(5) If wishes were horses, beggars would ride. 
(6) If Hume had squared the circle in secret, then giraffes would have wings. 
(7) If some bachelor were married, then it would be false that some bachelor were 
married.1 
These sentences seem natural enough, either in philosophical or ordinary contexts.  Indeed, 
(5) is in at least somewhat common usage as a proverb.  We have fairly firm intuitions that 
(1) and (3) are true, that (4) is can be asserted in some contexts, and that (2), (6), and (7) are 
false.  But the standard account of counterfactuals, from Lewis [1973] and Stalnaker [1968], 
                                                        
1 Perhaps some of these examples are not counterpossibles.  For a conditional to be counterpossible, 
the antecedent must be impossible, but determining which antecedents are possible and which are 
impossible requires a fully-developed account of possibility, as well as a settling certain logical, 
mathematical, and metaphysical questions.  Clearly, (1) and (2) are not counterpossibles if 
mereological nihilism is true; (3) and (4) need not counterpossibles if Kripkean essentialism is false; 
(4) is not a counterpossible if the proper analysis of ‘If I were you’ is by relevant properties and roles 
instead of identity, and so on.  I do not intend to take a stand on such issues presently.  If these 
examples are not counterpossibles, they may be replaced with other examples whose antecedents are 
impossible.   
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does not deliver these results.  For reasons discussed below, Lewis and Stalnaker hold that 
counterpossibles are vacuous.  Such a view, however, is wrong for several reasons.  First, it 
does not respect our linguistic intuitions, and any adequate theory of counterfactuals must 
respect our firm intuitions about their truth.  Second, such a view does not respect 
philosophical practice, insofar as these sentences are used to draw out the consequences of 
various philosophical, logical, or mathematical theories.  Third, a more careful consideration 
of the use of ‘might’ and ‘would’ counterfactuals shows that the reasons Lewis and Stalnaker 
give for treating counterpossibles vacuously are in tension with their treatment of the logic 
of ‘might’ and ‘would.’  Indeed, only an account of counterpossibles according to which they 
are non-vacuous has the tools to explain the behavior of counterpossibles with respect 
various plausible logical principles. 
   
1.2 Lewis, Stalnaker, and Counterfactuals 
 At least in English, counterfactuals are generally expressed as conditionals in the 
subjunctive mood.  Yet this is obviously not a definition of what it is to be a counterfactual; 
as discussed in the introduction, the most obvious problem is that not all counterfactuals are 
expressed as subjunctive conditionals, even in English.  Consider, for example, the bumper 
sticker that reads ‘No farms, no food:’ even if it does not look like a conditional, it is clearly 
meant to be evaluated as a claim about what would happen if there were no farms.  It is not 
helpful to think of counterfactuals in purely syntactic terms.  Rather, counterfactuals are 
propositions that express a certain kind of modal condition between the antecedent and 
consequent; they make the claim that, at least in some relevant space of possibility, the 
consequent of the conditional is true where the antecedent is.  Because of this modal 
connection, counterfactuals are often written as A  C, where A and C are propositions 
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(intuitively, the antecedent and consequent, respectively) and the connective  stands for 
the counterfactual conditional. 
 Counterfactuals generally carry the presupposition that the antecedent is false.  If I 
were to utter, ‘If I had missed the bus, then I would be late to class,’ one would generally 
assume that I had, in fact, caught the bus.  If the antecedent of a counterfactual is true – if, 
for example, I utter the above sentence even though I did miss the bus – then what I said 
was infelicitous.  What I had said is not necessarily false, however, and it is not clearly no 
longer a counterfactual. 
 There is, of course, more to say about these issues, but they need not be settled for 
our present purposes.  One could take nearly any view of what a counterfactual is and still 
face the problem of how to evaluate counterpossibles.  Whether a counterfactual is best 
construed syntactically or semantically or whether its antecedent must be false for it to be a 
genuine counterfactual is a question that should be settled in giving a complete account of 
counterfactuals.  However these questions are answered, one can still formulate 
counterfactuals with necessarily false antecedents.   
 According to Lewis and Stalnaker, a counterfactual is true (roughly) iff its 
consequent is true in the most similar, or “nearest” possible world or worlds where the 
antecedent is true.  According to Lewis [1973], a counterfactual is true iff no world where 
the antecedent is true and the consequent is false is “closer” to the base world than any 
world where the antecedent and consequent are both true.  A world is “closeby” to the 
degree that the world is, in some contextually relevant sense, similar to the base world.  
Lewis gives some of the logical properties of similarity in his [1973], and discusses a 
particular metric of similarity in his [1979].  The truth conditions are stated in the way that 
they are in order to allow for the falsity of both the limit assumption, according to which there 
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is at least one possible world where the antecedent is true that is closest to the actual world, 
as well as the uniqueness assumption, according to which there is at most one possible world 
where the antecedent is true that is closest to the actual world.  Since Stalnaker [1968] 
accepts both of these assumptions, his statement of the truth conditions of counterfactuals is 
simpler: a counterfactual is true iff the consequent is true in the selected world where the 
antecedent is true.  For Stalnaker, a selection function determines the world of evaluation, 
and if the consequent is true in that world of evaluation, then the counterfactual is true. 
 I will assume that the limit assumption is true, but that the uniqueness assumption is 
false.  Not much hangs on this choice, and nothing discussed herein depends on these 
assumptions; one could easily translate the analyses to be given to include or exclude either 
of these assumptions.  I make this choice largely because the uniqueness assumption seems 
so implausible,2 and because stating the truth conditions of counterfactuals is far easier with 
the limit assumption.  Thus, when I discuss the ‘Lewis-Stalnaker’ view, I really mean a view 
that neither of them had: a counterfactual is true iff the consequent is true in all the closest 
possible worlds where the antecedent is true.      
 What if the antecedent of the conditional is impossible?  When there are no possible 
worlds where the antecedent is true, there are obviously no “nearby” or “selected” possible 
worlds where the antecedent is true at which we might attempt to determine the truth of the 
consequent.  For Lewis and Stalnaker, all counterpossibles are vacuously true.  In light of the 
previous examples, this seems quite unintuitive.  Sentences such as (1)-(7) seem to be 
meaningful, and capable of being true or false; indeed, some of them are false!  Our project, 
then, is to motivate, describe, and defend an account of counterpossibles according to which 
their truth conditions are not vacuous.   
                                                        
2 But see Stalnaker [1980] 
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1.3 Counterpossibles, Language, and Philosophical Practice 
 The examples above are meant to provide intuitive evidence for the view that 
counterpossibles cannot all be trivially true.  Many of these kinds of sentences are used in 
natural language, and would not strike a speaker as being vacuous.  These sentences clearly 
have content, both in the sense that they seem to be genuinely meaningful and in the sense 
that they could be either true or false.  Analyzing these sentences as vacuous is a mistake, 
even if there is a pragmatic story at hand to explain why they seem non-vacuous.  Ignoring 
our intuitions about truth conditions in a wide range of cases undercuts our original project 
of providing plausible truth conditions for conditionals in general.      
 Furthermore, counterpossibles are regularly used in philosophy, math, and logic: we 
judge the adequacy of necessarily true or necessarily false theories in metaphysics, ethics, and 
epistemology by what follows from their truth.  Sentences such as (1) could be used in part 
of an argument against a particular philosophical view; we might also have reason to accept 
sentences such as ‘If Platonism were true, then we would have no way of knowing about 
numbers’ or ‘If Utilitarianism were true, then the organ harvest would be morally obligatory’ 
or ‘If intuitionism were true, then the law of double negation elimination would fail.’  We are 
invited to accept sentences such as these as (non-vacuously) true, and take their truth as 
having some force with respect to how we understand and evaluate certain theories.  That is, 
counterpossibles are used to express the commitments of theories, even in cases where these 
theories are acknowledged to be necessarily false.  A necessarily false theory is not 
committed to everything, but it might be committed to certain unacceptable consequences.  
Insofar as these consequences are deemed unwelcome, we are inclined to reject the theory in 
question.  Even if arguments about the commitments of various necessarily false theories are 
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not conclusive, counterpossibles whose antecedents suppose their truth cannot be vacuous 
without rendering meaningless broad swaths of philosophical discussion.  Since the 
meaningfulness of counterpossibles is so important to philosophical and mathematical 
practice, it would be a mistake to offer an analysis according to which counterpossibles are 
vacuous.3 
 The view that counterpossibles are all trivially true leads to some rather strange 
results when we form counterpossibles about the semantics of counterpossibles.  Consider 
the following example:  
(8) If some counterpossibles were false, then Lewis would be right about 
counterpossibles. 
For Lewis, (8) is a counterpossible, and therefore (trivially) true.  The proper analysis of 
conditionals in a language, after all, is a necessary truth, even if the facts about natural 
language are contingent.  But (8) is obviously false – Lewis’s theory of counterpossibles, after 
all, would be wrong if there were false counterpossibles!  The antecedent of (8) gives the 
very condition that would falsify Lewis’ account, so it would be bizarre to think that (8) is 
true.4 
                                                        
3 These considerations might also be related to the question of how to understand arguments by 
reductio ad absurdum.  In such arguments, we reason from assumptions that are (at least in conjunction 
with other premises) contradictory.  Nonetheless, we are able to reason from these inconsistent 
propositions in a fairly robust fashion; certain reductio deductions are licit, but others are not.  To be 
sure, however, at least formal arguments that make use of reductio ad absurdum function in a very 
syntactic fashion: we can make an assumption, use known rules of inference to show that the 
assumption (and possibly other premises) lead to a formal contradiction, and then accept the negated 
assumption.  It is not clear that counterpossibles in general behave in such a fashion.  There is 
further discussion of this point in chapter 2.   
4 There is also another kind of argument we could use against Lewis and Stalnaker that is more 
clearly ad hominem.  Lewis and Stalnaker clearly understand counterpossibles in a non-vacuous fashion 
because they make use of them!  Consider, for example, Lewis in his [1986:25]: “If, per impossibile, the 
method of dominance had succeeded in ranking some false theories above others, it could still have 
been challenged by those who care little for truth.”  The details of this particular argument are not 
important, but it does seem that Lewis thinks he can reason about what would happen if some 
impossible condition were to hold. 
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Furthermore, we cannot lay the blame for this problem simply at the feet of Lewis 
and Stalnaker’s approach to counterfactuals, and use this as an argument against possible 
worlds approach to counterfactuals in general.  Other approaches to counterfactuals deliver 
the same result.  Non-worlds-based accounts, such as [Goodman 1947], hold that a 
counterfactual is true whenever the antecedent, along with other background propositions, 
entails the consequent.  Whether or not this approach is ultimately preferable to the possible 
worlds account as a treatment of counterfactuals, it too is unable to deliver our intuitive 
judgments about counterpossibles.  If the antecedent is impossible, then (presumably) it 
entails some contradiction, a statement of the form P and not-P.5 And if the antecedent and 
other statements entailed by it include a formal contradiction, then, by the principle of 
explosion, any consequent will come out true.  For example, if our antecedent is ‘I am a 
horse,’ then it, as well as certain other metaphysical theses, such as that ‘I’ is a rigid 
designator, and that in every world where I exist, I am a human and not a horse, entail that 
both I am a horse and I am not a horse.  And from this, we can deduce any consequence we 
would like.  Thus, for logical entailment-based approaches, counterpossibles will be trivially 
true, since any consequent is entailed by a contradiction.6   
Of course, this does not mean that any theory of counterfactuals will make 
counterpossibles trivially true; nonetheless, since the other approaches to counterfactuals 
face the same difficulties with respect to impossible antecedents, we cannot merely take the 
problem of counterpossibles as an argument against Lewis and Stalnaker’s views in 
particular.  Indeed, the fact that both worlds-based approaches and entailment-based 
                                                        
5 This may conflate the distinction between logically and metaphysically impossible antecedents.  In 
either case, this argument certainly holds for counterpossibles with logically impossible antecedents. 
6 The same argument can be lodged against more complex versions of the entailment account, such 
as that of Kvart [1986].   
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approaches are incapable of giving non-vacuous truth conditions to counterpossibles 
suggests that the problem is more general than it might have seemed.   
  
1.4 ‘Might’ Counterpossibles 
 There are now several reasons to reject a vacuous analysis of counterpossibles on the 
table.  But the problem is even worse than this: given their treatment of ‘might’ 
counterfactuals, Lewis in particular is in an especially poor position to claim that 
counterpossibles are vacuous. 
 Lewis and Stalnaker differ with respect to their treatment of ‘might’ counterpossibles 
(represented as A C, and read as ‘If A were the case, then C might be the case.’).  For 
Lewis, the ‘might’ counterfactual is defined as the dual of the ‘would’ counterfactual: A  
C is equivalent to (A  C).  Intuitively, a ‘might’ counterfactual is true when the 
consequent is true in some of the nearest worlds where the antecedent is true; if there are no 
possible worlds where the antecedent is true, the conditional is false.  Since all ‘would’ 
counterpossibles are true for Lewis, all ‘might’ counterpossibles are false. 
According to Stalnaker [1980] , ‘might’ counterfactuals are to be analyzed as ‘would’ 
counterfactuals embedded in an epistemic modal.  A  C is roughly equivalent to ‘For all 
I know, A  C.’  Since A  C is always true whenever A is impossible, it cannot be 
ruled out by anything that I know.  Nothing that any agent knows can be incompatible with 
something that must be true, so nothing any agent knows could ever rule out the truth of a 
‘would’ counterpossible.  Since ‘might’ counterpossibles are epistemic modals applied to 
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necessarily true propositions, ‘might’ counterpossibles will be vacuously true on Stalnaker’s 
account.7 
 Stalnaker’s analysis of ‘might’ counterfactuals introduces a somewhat surprising 
asymmetry between ‘might’ and ‘would’ counterfactuals.  A ‘would’ counterfactual is 
analyzed by determining which possible world is closest to the actual world (in his terms, 
‘selected’), so a ‘would’ counterfactual could be true or false regardless of what is known by 
the speaker or evaluator.  A ‘might’ counterfactual, on the other hand, uses an epistemic 
modal, so the truth conditions of ‘might’ counterfactuals always rely on what is known by 
one or more participants in a conversation.  While uses of ‘might’ often suggest a kind of 
epistemic modality, there are many cases where they do not: consider, for example, ‘I am a 
philosopher, but I might have been a lawyer instead.’  Insofar as we think that ‘might’ and 
‘would’ counterfactuals are closely related, we should be hesitant to adopt an approach that 
treats them differently.    
 
1.4.1 ‘Might’ Counterpossibles and Entailment 
Lewis [1973] , Williamson [2007], and others worry that our judgments about the 
truth values of counterpossibles, such as those mentioned above, do not stand up to 
scrutiny. When we consider counterpossible situations in the proper way, perhaps, we realize 
that “anything goes” when we reason about impossible antecedents.  Consider (6), for 
example.  We are inclined to judge (6) to be false, and take this judgment as evidence against 
Lewis’s account.  But what would it take for Hume to have squared the circle?  A priori 
truths about Euclidean geometry would have to be vastly different!  And if we waive certain 
                                                        
7 To be sure, Stalnaker does have some tools at his disposal to explain away some of the discomfort 
associated with the view that that we believe all necessary truths, as in his [1987]. The second chapter 
discusses an approach to the truth conditions of counterpossibles that is inspired by some of these 
views. 
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fundamental truths about Euclidean geometry, who knows what might follow?  Perhaps (6) 
is true after all (though not in any interesting way), since in these worlds, anything at all is 
true!  Once we consider what things would be like if mathematical or logical truths differ, it 
seems hard to sustain our initial reading of the counterpossible over the vacuous reading. 
Indeed, the vacuous approach would then get the truth conditions right after all: when we 
consider what the world would be like if something impossible were to happen, anything at 
all would be true!   
This response is unsatisfying for several reasons.  First, it is not at all clear that these 
considerations compel us to abandon our intuitions about the truth conditions of 
counterpossibles; instead, we should hold that these considerations compel us to accept that 
‘anything goes’ in some contexts of evaluation. All that the defender of the trivial account of 
counterpossibles has shown is that there is at least one reading of (6) according to which we 
are hesitant to assert that it is false.  But it is no surprise that counterpossibles have more 
than one admissible reading.  Consider an example from [Jackson 1977]:  
 (9) If I had jumped out the window, I would have injured myself. 
We take (9) to be true in most contexts.  The nearest world where I jump out the window is 
a world where I land on the concrete and injure myself.  But another reader might balk at 
this conclusion: I am a reasonable person, and I would not jump out the window if I thought 
I might injure myself.  I would only jump out a window if I had (say) placed a net beneath it 
beforehand.  Now, (9) seems to be false, since the nearest world where I jump out the 
window is a world where I place a net beneath the window and land safely.  We need not let 
these considerations drive us into a deep skepticism about the status of counterfactuals; 
rather, we merely realize that how we evaluate counterfactuals depends on context.  On the 
first pass, we sort worlds in a manner that places importance on the height of the window 
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and the ground, and thus in the nearby worlds, I injure myself.  On the second pass, my 
cautious nature has become salient, and thus we sort worlds in a manner that places greater 
importance on my fear of injury, and find that in these nearby worlds, I am uninjured 
because I have taken precautions.8  Neither reading is the correct analysis of (9); our 
judgment of the truth of (9) varies depending on what kinds of considerations have been 
brought to our attention.  
Something very similar occurs in (6).  At first pass, (6) seems false, since Hume’s 
squaring of the circle in secret has no obvious effect on the anatomy of giraffes.  We sort 
worlds in a manner that places importance on a match of facts about the world.  On the 
second pass, however, we re-sort worlds, and now place importance on the deductive 
closure of geometry.  Once we are forced to admit that something impossible has happened, 
we are simply not sure what to think.  Perhaps now, the nearest antecedent world is the 
“explosion” world where every proposition is true.  Neither way of sorting is the correct way 
to sort worlds, and neither of these is the correct analysis of the counterpossible absent of 
any contextually salient considerations; different contexts merely establish different similarity 
metrics, and so the non-vacuous reading of (6) remains licit in the context in which it was 
presented. A counterpossible is a kind of counterfactual, and thus our judgments of the truth 
values of counterpossibles are similarly malleable and sensitive to context.  There are, no 
doubt, contexts in which we might say that ‘anything goes’ in a counterpossible situation, but 
this does not mean that anything goes in counterpossible situations tout court, or even in 
some ‘standard’ context.  We need not conclude that counterfactuals are vacuous because of 
this shiftiness, and we need not conclude that counterpossibles are vacuous because of this 
                                                        
8 Indeed, on this reading of (9), the salience of my fear of injury is great enough to allow 
“backtracking” in the analysis of the counterfactual.  We change some facts about the past (viz., my 
placing a net beneath the window) in order to get the proper reading of the counterfactual.  What’s 
important for this example is merely the ease with which we re-order the similarity of worlds. 
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shiftiness.  Since Lewis’ analysis of counterpossibles never allows counterpossibles to have 
non-vacuous truth-values, we have reason to doubt Lewis’ analysis.     
Consideration of ‘might’ counterpossibles, however, gives us a second reason to 
reject this argument.  Lewis and Williamson claim that careful consideration of 
counterpossibles suggests that anything follows from an impossibility.  Recall, however, that 
at least for Lewis, all ‘might’ counterpossibles are false.  If we think that all ‘would’ 
counterpossibles are true because we are inclined to shrug our shoulders in the face of an 
impossibility, how can we account for the falsity of ‘might’ counterpossibles?  There may be 
contexts where it seems plausible to say that anything at all would be true if Hume had 
squared the circle, but it seems harder to imagine any context where nothing at all might be 
true if Hume had squared the circle.  If the strangeness of ‘would’ counterfactuals inclines us 
to say that anything at all would be true in these cases, how could it also incline us to say 
nothing at all might be true in these cases? 
Defenders of the vacuous approach sometimes claim that the result that all 
counterpossibles are trivial is not as bad as it seems.  The counterpossibles that we want to 
assert (such as (1)) will be true and assertible, while the counterpossibles we don’t want to 
assert (such as (2)) may be true, but some pragmatic strategy could explain why they are not 
assertible (see Lewis [1973]).  Of course, such a pragmatic strategy would need much more 
detail to be plausible, and it seems difficult to say what kind of Gricean mechanisms would 
deliver the desired result.  Even leaving the details of this strategy aside, it does not account 
for the falsity of ‘might’ counterpossibles.  ‘Might’ counterpossibles that we want to assert 
(such as, ‘If mereological nihilism were true, then we might never find out’) will be false.  To 
be sure, we could attempt to develop some additional pragmatic account for why sentences 
such as these are false but nevertheless assertible, but this would be still more difficult than 
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accounting for why some sentences are true but not assertible.  The vacuous approach as 
advanced by Lewis and others requires not only a pragmatic theory according to which 
‘would’ counterpossibles that are intuitively false are actually true but not assertible, but also 
an error theory according to which ‘might’ counterpossibles that are intuitively true are 
actually false but assertible.  These considerations, of course, are not decisive, and it is 
possible that some elegant pragmatic strategy could explain the patterns of assertibility in a 
satisfying fashion.  Nonetheless, such a view would still be an error theory, and would still 
require significant pragmatic machinery in order to account for intuitive judgments.  Other 
things being equal, it would be far better to get the semantics of the conditionals right, rather 
than have the heavy lifting done by poorly-understood pragmatic processes. 
A further argument offered in defense of the vacuous approach is also in tension 
with the falsity of ‘might’ counterpossibles.  Lewis [1973] and Wierenga [1998]  argue that if 
A logically entails C, the counterfactual A  C is true.  Call this principle Entailment: 
(Entailment)  If A  C, then A  C 
Given the “nearest possible worlds” semantics for counterfactuals, it seems that classical 
entailment guarantees counterfactuality: if A entails C, then all A-worlds are C-worlds, and 
so the nearest A-worlds are C-worlds.  And since, in classical logic, a contradiction entails 
anything, A  C will be true for any C as long as A is a contradiction.9   Thus, ‘would’ 
counterpossibles are all vacuously true, and the vacuous approach to counterpossibles is 
vindicated.  
                                                        
9 We need not appeal to the possible worlds semantics of counterfactuals to defend Entailment, 
though it is as a good way to illustrate the principle.  Entailment seems highly plausible, and is also 
guaranteed by other approaches to counterfactuals.  It is clearly valid on entailment approaches to 
counterfactuals, such as those offered by Chisholm [1946] and Goodman [1947], which are the 
leading contender to possible worlds accounts of counterfactuals. 
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It is important to note that not all impossible antecedents clearly entail a logical 
contradiction.  For example, counterpossibles with metaphysically impossible antecedents 
might be immune to the argument from Entailment sketched above.  It may be that a theory 
of properties according to which they are immanent universals is necessarily false, but that 
such a theory does not entail any kind of formal contradiction.  Indeed, it would be 
incredible if every false theory in metaphysics, epistemology, or ethics were such that, under 
analysis, one could derive a contradiction from a statement of the theory: Frege’s set theory 
is perhaps the only serious philosophical theory that can be shown to result in logical 
inconsistency.  It is much more plausible that the argument from Entailment is directed 
toward the proper subset of counterpossibles whose antecedents do entail a contradiction.10   
Even setting this caveat aside, the falsity of ‘might’ counterpossibles is difficult for 
the vacuous theorist to account for.  After all, it seems just as plausible to say that if A 
logically entails C, the ‘might’ counterfactual A  C is true.  Call this principle ‘Might’ 
Entailment: 
(‘Might’ Entailment)  If A  C, then A  C 
If all A-worlds are C-worlds, then some of the nearest A-worlds are C-worlds.  Since a 
contradiction entails everything, A  C should be true for any C, as long as A is a 
contradiction.  Indeed, as long as we think that the ‘might’ counterfactual is weaker than the 
‘would’ counterfactual, we should think that ‘Might’ Entailment is valid because Entailment 
is valid.  However, even though A will entail C, Lewis holds that A  C will be false in 
every instance where A is a contradiction.  Thus, it seems difficult for Lewis and Wierenga to 
appeal to Entailment to defend the vacuous approach to ‘would’ counterpossibles, when the 
                                                        
10 For further discussion of this point, see Zagzebski [1990]. 
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equally plausible ‘Might’ Entailment principle is incompatible with the vacuous approach to 
‘might’ counterpossibles under consideration. 
Such a tu quoque argument, however, exposes an awkward tension with respect to the 
status of Entailment.  The Entailment principle was presented as quite plausible, yet the 
Lewisian is unable to accept the equally-plausible principle of ‘Might’ Entailment.  For all 
this, it is still unclear what to make of the intuitions that made Entailment seem plausible in 
the first case.  If there is tension within Lewis’s view over the status of the ‘Might’ 
Entailment, there is also tension within the non-vacuous theorist’s view over what to make 
of the plausibility of Entailment and ‘Might’ Entailment.  Of course, one could accept the 
failure of these principles with some degree of equanimity: perhaps consideration of our 
intuitions of certain examples is sufficient to reject Entailment as well as ‘Might’ Entailment.  
Yet one could also attempt to reformulate weaker, more acceptable versions of the 
principles: 
(Entailment*)  If A  C and not: A  C, then A  C 
(‘Might’ Entailment*) If A  C and not: A  C, then A  C  
Entailment* (and ‘Might’ Entailment*) allows one to reject the claim that, if some 
proposition entails everything, then if that proposition were true, everything would (might) 
be true.  Entailment* and ‘Might’ Entailment* is silent about counterfactuals if the 
antecedent entails everything; if some proposition entails something and its negation, then all 
bets are off with respect to which counterfactuals that make use of that proposition as an 
antecedent are true.  The non-vacuous counterpossible theorist can endorse these weaker 
principles and blunt the force of this version of the ‘anything goes’ argument. 
However we ultimately settle issues related to the Entailment principle, the falsity of 
‘might’ counterpossibles stands in tension with many of the defenses offered for the vacuity 
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of counterpossibles.  We may be inclined to think that ‘would’ counterpossibles are all true 
because ‘anything goes’ in counterpossible situations, or because logical entailment entails 
counterfactuality; we might think that the result that all ‘would’ counterpossibles are true is 
not as unintuitive as it seems, so long as a pragmatic account could tell us why many ‘would’ 
counterpossibles are not assertible.  But if ‘might’ counterpossibles are false, then we are at a 
loss to explain why it is also true that ‘nothing goes’ in counterpossible situations, or how 
logical entailment fails to entail ‘might’ counterfactuality, or how a pragmatic strategy could 
deliver that result that a wide range of sentences are false but assertible.   
Given these considerations, then, we might think that Stalnaker’s treatment of 
counterpossibles has a clear advantage over Lewis’s treatment.  If ‘might’ counterpossibles 
are all true, then the arguments in favor of vacuity given above remain plausible.  Given 
some impossibility, we could still hold that ‘anything goes’ (since all ‘would’ counterpossibles 
are true) and ‘anything might go’ (since all ‘might’ counterpossibles are true as well).   Since 
all ‘might’ counterpossibles are false, we need not offer some error theory about the 
assertibility of any false counterpossibles.  And, finally, Stalnaker is able to endorse both 
Entailment and ‘Might’ Entailment.  These advantages, of course, come at the cost of 
denying the duality of ‘might’ and ‘would’ counterfactuals, it is nonetheless clear that the 
replies given to the arguments that counterpossibles are vacuous target Lewis’s semantics, 
and not Stalnaker’s.  Though I have given independent reasons above for favoring a non-
vacuous account of counterpossibles, it seems that a vacuous account along Stalanker’s lines 
is at least more plausible than a vacuous account along the lines of Lewis’s. 
 
1.4.2 ‘Might’ and ‘Would’ 
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The definition of the ‘might’ counterfactual in terms of the ‘would’ counterfactual as 
described by Lewis delivers very unintuitive results when applied to counterpossibles.  
Consider, for example, the following counterpossibles: 
(10) If mereoloigcal nihilism were true, then there would (still) be tables.  
(11) If mereoloigcal nihilism were true, then there would not be any tables. 
(12) If mereoloigcal nihilism were true, then there might (still) be tables.  
(13) If mereoloigcal nihilism were true, then there might not be any tables. 
According to Lewis (and Stalnaker), (10) and (11) are both true; according to Lewis (but not 
Stlanker) (12) and (13) are both false.  These results are unacceptable for several reasons.  
First, it seems very clear that our intuitive judgments hold that (11) and (13) are true, and 
(10) and (12) are false.  Lewis and Stalnaker cannot deliver this result.  Second, it seems odd 
that sentences of the form (10) and (11) could both be true; this is because even if 
mereological nihilism were true, it can’t be the case that a pair of contradictory things would 
be true.  Third, it seems odd that sentences of the form (12) and (13) could both be false; 
this is because even if mereological nihilism were true, it can’t be that there is nothing true to 
say about what might be the case.  Finally, it seems odd that sentences of the form (10) 
could be true while (12) is false, or (11) true and (13) false.  This is because it seems odd to 
say that something would happen under certain counterfactual conditions, but also hold that 
it’s not the case that it might happen under those conditions.  We will examine each of these 
claims below. 
 
1.4.3 Would Law of Non-Contradiction (WLNC) 
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 One plausible principle for counterfactuals is the would law of non-contradiction 
(WLNC).  According to this law, there cannot be a pair of ‘would’ counterfactuals with the 
same antecedent, but contradictory consequents.   
 (WLNC)  Not: A  C and A  C 
Intuitively, given some antecedent condition, it cannot be the case that some pair of 
contradictory things will be the case.  Possible worlds, after all, are consistent.  It cannot be 
the case that both C and not-C are true in any world, and therefore C and not-C cannot be 
true in all nearby A-worlds.  WLNC, then, is valid on Lewsis’s account of counterfactuals 
with possible antecedents.11   
 Counterfactuals with impossible antecedents, however, will introduce widespread 
failures of WLNC for Lewis and Stalnaker.  Since all ‘would’ counterfactuals with impossible 
antecedents are true, both members of some pair of counterpossibles of the form A  C 
and A  C will be true when A is impossible.  Thus, WLNC will fail for every such pair 
of counterpossibles. 
 
1.4.4 Might Law of Excluded Middle (MLEM) 
 Another plausible principle for a logic of counterfactuals is the might law of excluded 
middle (MLEM).  According to this law, for any pair of ‘might’ counterfactuals with the same 
antecedent and contradictory consequents, at least one counterfactual of the pair is true. 
 (MLEM)  A  C or A  C is true 
                                                        
11 I assume throughout that the set of nearby possible worlds is held fixed in a pair of 
counterfactuals.  There are apparent failures of WLNC in pairs of counterfactuals such as, ‘If Caesar 
were in charge in Korea, he would have used catapults’ and ‘If Caesar were in charge in Korea, he 
would have used nuclear weapons (and not catapults).’  But, presumably, we switch contexts between 
these two sentences, and thus the set of worlds that are deemed to be the nearest worlds changes.  
This kind of case does not represent a genuine failure of WLNC.   
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Intuitively, some antecedent condition might give rise to the truth of some proposition, and 
it might give rise to its negation, but it can’t be the case that it might lead to neither.  Given 
some antecedent condition, we should expect that some proposition might follow, or the 
negation of that proposition might follow, but it would be odd if neither of a pair of mutually 
exhaustive possibilities might be obtain.  Possible worlds, after all, are complete: MLEM will 
be valid for Lewis whenever the antecedent is possible, since either C or not-C will be true in 
any world, and therefore C or not-C will be true in any of the nearby A-worlds. 
 According to Lewis’s semantics, MLEM is not valid for counterfactuals with 
impossible antecedents.  Since all ‘might’ counterfactuals with impossible antecedents are 
false, both members of some pair of counterpossibles of the form A  C and A  
C will be false whenever A is impossible.  Thus, MLEM will fail for every such pair of 
counterpossibles. 
 
1.4.5 Would Implies Might Principle (WIMP) 
 Another highly plausible principle concerns the relation between ‘might’ and ‘would’ 
counterfactuals.  Specifically, a ‘would’ counterfactual implies its corresponding ‘might’ 
counterfactual.  
 (WIMP)  If A  C, then A  C12 
It follows from the fact that if some antecedent conditions obtained, then some consequent 
would be true that if those antecedent conditions obtained, then that consequent might be 
true.  That is, if something would happen given some counterfactual circumstance, it follows 
that it might happen given those circumstances.  It seems obvious that if it were true that 
kangaroos would topple over if they lacked tails, we could infer that kangaroos might topple 
                                                        
12 WIMP is also discussed in Vander Laan [2007]. 
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over if they lacked tails.  This principle is also valid for Lewis, at least when the antecedent is 
possible: if all nearby A-worlds are C-worlds, then some nearby A-worlds are C-worlds.   
According to Lewis’s approach, WIMP is never true when the antecedent is 
impossible.  All ‘would’ counterpossibles are true, and all ‘might’ counterpossibles are false.  
This means that any counterpossible of the form A  C will be true when A is 
impossible, regardless of the content of C, since ‘would’ counterpossibles are all true.  
However, the corresponding ‘might’ counterfactual of the form A  C will never be true, 
since might counterpossibles are all false.  Thus, on this view, WIMP will never hold when 
the antecedent of the pair of conditionals is impossible.13   
 
1.4.6 True Mights and False Woulds 
 According to Lewis’s analysis, all ‘would’ counterpossibles are vacuously true and all 
‘might’ counterpossibles are vacuously false, but this choice is somewhat arbitrary.  We could 
also hold that all counterpossibles are true, as Stalnaker and Wierenga do14, or that all 
counterpossibles are false.  Doing so, however, would not get us out of the problems 
discussed above.  If all counterpossibles were true, then we would still have to contend with 
                                                        
13 One might think that this discussion is less compelling when the modal operators are understood 
as quantifiers over worlds.  We can, for example, restate WIMP in terms of quantifiers and possible 
worlds by saying that if all of the nearest A-worlds are C-worlds, then some of the nearest A-worlds 
are C-worlds.  Yet when there are no A-worlds at all, as will be the case in counterpossibles, this 
principle simply fails.  After all, it can be true that all A-worlds are C-worlds if there are no A-worlds, 
but it cannot be true that some A-worlds are C-worlds if there are no A-worlds; the universal 
quantifier does not have existential import, but the existential quantifier does.  But it seems like this 
response simply avoids the intuition behind WIMP in favor of a particular formalism of modal logic: 
WIMP is plausible quite apart from any understanding of necessity as a universal quantifier or the 
question of the existential import of the universal quantifier.  WIMP is plausible because, in natural 
language, ‘would’ is stronger than ‘might.’  It would be absurd for a ‘might’ claim to be true and a 
‘would’ claim to be false.  If this is correct, then the modal operators in this kind of context are not 
best captured as classical quantifiers over worlds.  Perhaps they are not quantifiers at all, or perhaps 
the ‘would’ is a universal quantifier with existential import.  
14 Wierenga [1998] entertains a might operator that would make WIMP and MLEM valid.  According 
to him, A  C =df  (A  C) or A  C.  
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violations of WLNC.  If all counterpossibles were false, we would still have to contend with 
violations of MLEM, Entailment, and ‘Might’ Entailment.   In both cases, we would also 
have to reject the duality of ‘might’ and ‘would’ counterfactuals. 
We could, however, preserve the duality of the two counterfactuals while answering 
most of the logical issues raised above by making ‘would’ counterpossibles false, and ‘might’ 
counterpossibles true.15  If this is the case, worries about WLNC, MLEM, and WIMP vanish.  
If ‘would’ counterpossibles are all false, then there will be no violations of WLNC in the case 
of impossible antecedents.  For any impossible antecedent A and consequent C, neither A 
 C nor A  C will be true.  Similarly, if ‘might’ counterpossibles are all true, then 
there will be no violations of MLEM in the case of impossible antecedents.  For any 
impossible antecedent A and any consequent C, both A  C and A  C will be true. 
Furthermore, there will not be violations of WIMP when the antecedent is impossible.  Since 
every ‘would’ counterpossible is false, we need not worry about cases where some ‘would’ 
counterfactual is true, but its corresponding ‘might’ counterfactual is false.  And, of course, 
we can make these changes without threatening the duality of the ‘might’ and ‘would’ 
counterfactual operators: regardless of whether or not the antecedent is possible, the 
operators will be such that A  C =df (A  C).16    
                                                        
15 Lewis briefly considers such operators in his [1973], though he does not consider them as a pair.  
He rejects them as being intuitively inferior to his preferred ‘might’ and ‘would’ counterfactual 
operators, but as we have seen, it is unclear what to make of his judgments about the plausibility of 
these operators.  
16 It should be noted that making all would-couterpossibles false would commit us to massive 
violations of what we might call the would law of excluded middle (WLEM).  But, pace Stalnaker, the 
WLEM is not plausible.  It does not seem true to say either ‘If I were to flip this coin, it would land 
heads’ or ‘If I were to flip this coin, it would not land heads.’16  And making all ‘might’ 
counterpossibles false would commit us to massive violations of the might law of non-contradiction 
(MLNC).  But MLNC clearly is not plausible.  It seems true to say both, ‘If I were to flip this coin, it 
might land heads’ and ‘If I were to flip this coin, it might not land heads.’ 
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Note that, unlike the other vacuous approaches on offer, the ‘true mights and false 
woulds’ approach is not capable of endorsing Entailment.  The defender of such an 
approach would need to endorse the weaker notion of Entailment that the non-vacuous 
theorist is committed to. 
 Making all ‘would’ counterpossibles false and all ‘might’ counterpossibles true allows 
us to treat the most of the logical principles discussed above as valid.  If we are to accept a 
vacuous approach for counterpossibles, this is the approach we should accept.  
 
1.5 Counterpossibles and Negation 
 There are, however, further worries that face the principle discussed above.  For 
example, it seems true to say, ‘If France were a monarchy and France were not a monarchy, 
then France would be a monarchy’ and also true to say, ‘If France were a monarchy and 
France were not a monarchy, then France would not be a monarchy.’  It seems false to say, 
‘If France were a monarchy and France were not a monarchy, then there would be fewer 
kangaroos.’  For ease of exposition, I will replace a proposition such as that France is a 
monarchy below with P: 
 (14) P & P  P 
 (15) P & P  P 
At least arguably, (14) and (15) are both true: if P and not-P were both true, then P 
would be true, and not-P would be true. If there were a truth value glut with respect to some 
proposition P, we should expect that both P and not-P to obtain.   Taken together, however, 
these counterpossibles violate WLNC, since (14) and (15) are a pair of counterpossibles with 
the same antecedent, but contradictory consequents. 
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The fault is not merely with WLNC, since it is not difficult to make trouble for the 
other putative principles as well.  MLEM, for example, fails when we consider pairs of 
counterfactuals whose antecedents express that there is some truth value gap:  
(16) (P  P)  P  
(17) (P  P)  P 
Intuitively, both of these sentences are false: if neither P nor not-P were the case, then it is 
false that P might be true, and false that not-P might be true.  If this is correct, however, 
then we cannot endorse MLEM. 
 The truth of WIMP is also in question.  According to WIMP, (14) and (15) imply the 
following sentences, respectively: 
(18) P & P  P 
 (19) P & P  P  
At least according to Lewis’s definition of the ‘might’ counterfactual, however, (18) and (19) 
are equivalent to: 
(18’)  (P & P  P) 
 (19’)  ( P & P  P) 
Yet (15) and (18’) cannot be true together, and (14) and (19’) cannot be true together.  
One potential response to this worry would be to rephrase our various logical 
principles in terms of truth and non-truth, and hold that such reformulated principles could 
accommodate the kinds of cases discussed above.17  We can understand what is happening in 
these cases by introducing a new kind of negation, built from classical negation, represented 
by the symbol ~.  I will continue to use the symbol  for classical negation, and read P as 
                                                        
17 This kind of proposal is also discussed in a somewhat different context by Goodman [2004]. 
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‘P is false.’  By contrast, ~P can be read as ‘P is not true’; the ‘not’ here is understood as the 
‘not’ of classical negation.18  This ~-negation, then, is a generalization of classical negation, 
since whenever propositions are “only” true or false, ~-negation behaves just like -
negation.  In the non-classical cases, however, ~-negation is a kind of glut- and gap-closing 
negation, since even in counterfactual cases where, for some proposition P, P and P are 
both true (or both false), P and ~P will remain mutually exclusive and exhaustive.  Consider, 
then, a replacement principle such as: 
(WLNC*) Not: A  C and A  ~C 
Note that (14) and (15) make no trouble for WLNC*.  This is because if P and P were 
true, then obviously P would be true, but we would not be inclined to think that ~P were 
true.  After all, ~P is the claim that P is not true, and since P is true, ~P would not obtain in 
the scenario described in these counterpossibles.   
 Use of this kind of negation can also be of use in amending the other principles 
discussed above: 
 (MLEM*)  A  C or A  ~C is true 
If MLEM* is true of ‘might’ counterfactuals, then (16) and (17) are not problematic.  The 
falsity of these sentences is compatible with the truth of MLEM*; if (P  P) were true, 
then it would not be the case that P might be true, but it does not follow that ~P might not 
be true.  Indeed, it seems that ~P is true if neither P nor P were true, since ~P is 
equivalent to the claim that P fails to be true.  If there were a truth value gap with respect to 
P, then it would follow that P is not true.   
                                                        
18 This kind of negation is similar to Meyer’s Boolean negation and Sainsbury’s option negation.  See Meyer 
[1974] and Sainsbury [2007].  Unlike these kinds of negation, however, ~-negation is not related to 
choosing or options, and it is constructed from classical negation, rather than being a kind of sui 
generis operator. 
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What can we say about the failure of WIMP?  This problem can also be solved by 
making use of ~-negation.  We had previously defined the ‘might’ counterfactual from the 
‘would’ counterfactual and -negation.  Instead, we could define the ‘might’ counterfactual 
in the following way:  
(Might*) A  C is equivalent to (A  ~C).19  
If this is how ‘might’ counterfactuals are to be understood, sentences such as (18) and (19) 
are no longer problematic, since they are not equivalent to (18’) and (19’).  Rather, they are 
equivalent to the following ‘would’ counterfactuals: 
 (18’’)  (P & P  ~P) 
 (19’’)  (P & P  ~P) 
These sentences state that it is false that, if P and not-P were true, then P would fail to be 
true, and it would be false that, if P and not-P were true, then it would be untrue that P is 
false.  These sentences are compatible with (14) and (15), so long as we are careful about not 
conflating the two notions of negation.  
 
1.5.1  Many Negations 
Such a proposal faces problems, however, since it is just as easy to formulate 
counterpossibles that make claims about what would follow from propositions that are true 
and not true, rather than true and false.  WLNC*, then, will face problems when we consider 
what would be true if some proposition P were true and not true.  Consider, for example: 
 (22) P & ~P  P 
 (23) P & ~P  ~P 
                                                        
19 See Vander Laan [2007] for further discussion of this treatment of the relation of ‘might’ and 
‘would’ counterfactuals. 
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Just as the pair of (14) and (15) are a counterexample to WLNC, the pair of (22) and (23) are 
a counterexample to WLNC*.  After all, if P were true and not true, then P would be true, 
and P would be not true.  The challenge, then, becomes how to handle counterpossibles 
whose antecedents express the failure of ~-negation.  The same challenge can also be raised 
against MLEM* and WIMP that make use of Might*.  
Perhaps we could respond to this worry by formulating a new principle that 
generalizes WLNC*.  We could consider a third kind of negation, built from ~-negation: –P 
is true whenever P is not true, where the ‘not’ is read as the ‘not’ of ~-negation.  That is, –P 
is true whenever ~P is “only” true, or where neither P nor ~P is true; it is false in cases 
where P and ~P are both true, or where P is “only” true.  This negation closes truth value 
gluts (and gaps) such as those opened by sentences (16) and (17).  This allows us to state a 
different principle about the behavior of counterfactuals: 
(WLNC**) Not: A  C and A  –C 
Sentences (22) and (23) make no trouble for WLNC**.  Even if P and ~P were true, we 
would not be inclined to think that –P were true.  Similar changes could be made to shore up 
MLEM* and Might*.20  It is easy, however, to see here how we could create trouble for 
WLNC** by formulating counterpossibles whose antecedents assert that both P and –P are 
both true.  For any kind of negation we could imagine, there will be counterpossibles about 
some contradiction stated in terms of that negation.  
We could create a hierarchy of laws that deal with the logical behavior of 
counterpossibles, each new kind of negation defined from a previous negation operator.  
                                                        
20 Of course, Might* is not a logical principle, but rather a proposed definition for the ‘might’ 
counterfactual in terms of the ‘would’ counterfactual.  If there is no stable definition for the ‘might’ 
counterfactual – if any proposed definition of the ‘might’ counterfactual cannot make sense of all 
uses of the counterfactual – then we might worry about how we are even to think of the ‘might’ 
counterfactual. 
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Nonetheless, we should not mistake one of these laws for a statement of the behavior of all 
counterfactuals.  Each step of the hierarchy only explains the behavior of counterfactuals at 
the level “below” it.  As soon as some principle is formulated, there is a recipe to create a 
pair of conditionals that serves as a counterexample.  Thus, rather than finding a principle 
for the behavior of counterfactuals with respect to contradictions, we have found a family of 
such principles.  We can now start to see the beginnings of a response to these logical 
problems that is at least open to the defender of a non-vacuous account of counterpossibles: 
even if there are exceptions to principles that at first seemed plausible, there may be nearby 
replacements for these principles that can be made sense of on non-classical grounds.
 One lesson of the above considerations is that the failure of the vacuous theory of 
counterpossibles to make sense of laws such as WLNC, MLEM, and WIMP does not 
constitute a straightforward argument against the vacuous theory.  After all, Lewis or 
Stalnaker might not be able to endorse some or all of these principles, but neither can the 
non-vacuous theories!  Indeed, even reformulating these principles only puts off the 
problem, since there will be problematic pairs of counterlogicals that make use of the same 
kind of negation that is used to reformulate the principle.  Nonetheless, there is some reason 
to think that the non-vacuous theorist is at least somewhat better off than the vacuous 
theorist of counterpossibles, since she is able to at least endorse this family of logical 
principles.  That is, Lewis’s semantics for counterpossibles hold that WLNC is violated for 
every relevant pair of counterpossibles, while successful non-vacuous semantics for 
counterpossibles can endorse WLNC in most cases, and offer a revised principle (such as 
WLNC*) in the cases where it fails. 
 
1.6 Conclusion 
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 Vacuous approaches to counterpossibles face various problems.  They do not make 
sense of our linguistic behavior or philosophical practice, and their treatment of ‘might’ 
counterpossibles is in tension with the very arguments that are used to support the view. 
Indeed, no available approach is capable of endorsing all of the plausible principles of the 
behavior of counterfactuals discussed above.  Of the vacuous approaches, we can do best by 
making all ‘might’ counterpossibles true and all ‘would’ counterpossibles false; nonetheless, 
such an approach is unmotivated in light of arguments from philosophical and linguistic 
practice.  A non-vacuous approach to counterpossibles cannot endorse the above putative 
principles, either, but it can endorse a family of logical principles that capture the intuitions 
that make the original versions seem plausible.  Doing so requires that we endorse a kind of 
‘gap-or-glut filling’ negation that makes sense of what is ruled out in certain impossible 
situations. 
 I am not suggesting that classical logic is not valid at this world with respect to 
negation, or that we cannot consider impossibilities within some classical framework.  
Indeed, the theory of counterpossibles that I ultimately endorse is classical, in the sense that 
we can use classical logic to determine what is true at a world and to determine the logical 
laws of impossible worlds.  However, what makes a world impossible is that its propositions 
are not closed under classical entailment; these worlds will contain contradictions.  
Reasoning about what would happen if a contradiction were true involves ignoring certain 
classical rules of logic if we are to avoid absurdity.  To expect counterpossibles to respect 
principles like Entailment or WLNC is to misunderstand what the antecedents of these 
conditionals express. 
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CHAPTER 2 
COUNTERPOSSIBLES WITHOUT IMPOSSIBLE WORLDS 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter contained a collection of arguments that suggest that 
counterpossibles cannot be vacuous.  If we are to make sense of linguistic intuitions as well 
as philosophical and mathematical practice, we should admit that counterpossibles are 
meaningful, and can be either true or false.  Furthermore, the view that all ‘might’ 
counterpossibles are false stands in tension with some of the motivation for the view that 
counterpossibles are vacuous, and the vacuous view of counterpossibles is in tension with 
several plausible logical principles for the behavior of ‘might’ and ‘would’ counterfactuals.  A 
non-vacuous view of counterpossibles is better able to make sense of our linguistic intuitions 
and philosophical practice, and is capable of accounting for the failure of these logical 
principles and offering suitable alternatives. 
The analysis of counterpossibles that will ultimately be endorsed is one that expands 
the Lewis-Stalnaker semantics of counterfactuals in such a way as to allow impossible worlds 
into the similarity metric; such an approach is also discussed by Nolan [1997], Yagisawa 
[1987], Vander Laan [2004], Priest [2006], Mares [2004], and others. These impossible worlds 
are worlds that contain true contradictions, but need not be worlds where, pace classical logic, 
every proposition is true. Since there are now worlds that contain contradictions, evaluating 
counterpossibles poses no special difficulty on this approach.  A counterfactual is true, then, 
iff the consequent is true in all of the nearest worlds – possible or otherwise – in which the 
antecedent is true.   
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Yet before such a view can be discussed in more detail, it should be noted that there 
is some space between the view that counterpossibles are not vacuous and the view that 
impossible worlds are required to give truth conditions to counterpossibles. This chapter 
explores a family of options that attempt to give plausible truth conditions to 
counterpossibles without any kind of commitment to the existence of impossible worlds.  
Why might such a view be attractive?  First, countenancing the existence of impossible 
worlds, alongside the possible worlds, might be ontologically profligate.  Believing in 
possible worlds is, at least in some circles, already a large pill to swallow; adding impossible 
worlds to the mix might be too much to bear.  Not only are we adding many more mysterious 
entities to our ontology, but these new entities are chaotic and unruly in a way that the 
possible worlds are not.  Second, it is not entirely clear in what ways these worlds would be 
similar to our world, or similar to each other.  How can we adjudicate the similarity of 
worlds with contradictions?  Which kinds of contradictions are more acceptable than others?  
Can some world with a contradiction be more similar to the actual world than some world 
without a contradiction?   
Of course, these considerations are not decisive, and they will be addressed in later 
chapters.  Nonetheless, an alternate account that would provide non-trivial truth conditions 
for counterpossibles, while avoiding the complications associated with the countenancing 
impossible worlds would certainly be worth pursuing. 
 
2.2 The consistent revisions approach 
The first proposal relies on an analogy between the treatment of inconsistent belief 
and counterpossibes.  Insofar as we understand (and can reason from) the inconsistent 
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antecedents of counterpossibles, we do so by construing them in a somewhat special 
fashion.  
 One method of linking the analysis of counterfactuals to a treatment of belief is to 
couch the antecedent and consequent of the counterfactual in belief reports.  Rather than 
attempting to determine what would follow from the truth of that I am a horse, we could 
determine what would follow from that I believe that I am a horse.  To get the proper truth 
conditions for the counterpossible, we would couch the consequent under a belief operator 
as well: if I were to believe that I am a horse, then I would believe that I have hooves.  But 
there are several serious problems with this approach.  First, it is unclear whose beliefs are 
relevant for determining the truth of the counterpossible: the utterer? the evaluator? an ideal 
epistemic agent of some sort? 
   Even if we could settle this question, we would be holding the truth of these 
counterpossibles hostage to broadly psychological considerations of what kinds of things 
agents would believe given certain other, contradictory beliefs.  Who knows what I (or even 
some ideal agent) would believe if I were to actually believe that I am a horse?  Maybe I’d 
believe that I were a special hoof-less horse, or maybe my set of beliefs would be too 
irrational and bizarre to make any real predictions about.  And the problem is far worse if we 
consider metaphysical theses: after all, determining what follows from necessarily false 
philosophical theories is an important and substantive project, and one that we can be wrong 
about.  I could easily have false beliefs about what would follow from mereological nihilism 
or Platonism that should not affect the truth or falsity of counterpossibles. 
Rather than construing the antecedent and consequent of counterpossibles as 
operating under belief operators, we could rather construe them as being comprehensible in 
the fashion suggested by the compartmentalization approach to contradictory belief.  Lewis 
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[1982], Varzi [1997], Stalnaker [1987], and others suggest a strategy for giving content to 
inconsistent beliefs within a possible worlds framework.  Inconsistent beliefs pose a problem 
for possible worlds theories of belief content, since an agent’s belief state is often taken to be 
the set of possible worlds that are not ruled out by how the agent takes the world to be.21  If 
the agent has contradictory beliefs, however, all possible worlds are ruled out, since no 
possible world can represent the contradiction.  On Lewis and Varzi’s approach, 
contradictions are not accepted tout court, but are rather compartmentalized into consistent 
sets of beliefs.  An agent’s beliefs exist in these segregated compartments, such that she 
believes different propositions in these separate compartments.  No compartment contains a 
belief of the form P-and-not-P, though one compartment may contain P, while another 
compartment contains not-P.  A proposition is believed by an agent when it is contained in 
at least one compartment,22 though perhaps we might prefer to relativize what is believed to 
a particular compartment or a particular situation; this matter need not be settled for present 
purposes.  Even when some agent has contradictory beliefs, then, we can give content to his 
or her beliefs without resorting to impossible worlds; collections of possible worlds alone 
can suffice.  
The inconsistent antecedents of counterpossibles can be evaluated within a classical 
framework by creating consistent revisions of the antecedent analogous to the consistent 
revisions of belief states.  We would thereby divide the counterpossible into two 
counterfactuals, one for each revision of the antecedent.23  A counterpossible under 
consideration would then be true when one of the resulting counterfactuals is true, just as a 
                                                        
21 See Hintikka [1962] 
22 It should be noted that, on this approach, beliefs aren’t closed under conjunction.  An agent may 
believe P (since P exists in one compartment) and not-P (since not-P exists in another compartment), 
but not P-and-not-P, since the contradiction isn’t present in any compartment. 
23 If the consequent is also impossible (e.g., ‘If Graham Priest is right about logic, then there would 
be true contradictions’), we would divide the consequent as well.  
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proposition is believed by an agent if it exists in one of the belief compartments. Call such 
an account of counterpossibles the consistent revision account. 
The consistent revision account of counterpossibles is plausible for the same reasons 
that the consistent revisions account of belief is plausible.  Insofar as we are capable of 
grasping contradictions, we do so by grasping some part of the contradiction.  We believe in 
contradictions by believing in something of the form P and something of the form P, and 
are reduced to cognitive dissonance when we consider P & P at once.  Similarly, we are 
able to evaluate a counterpossible by determining whether some logical part of its antecedent 
would result in the truth of the consequent, but are reduced to cognitive dissonance when 
we attempt to evaluate what would result from the antecedent of the counterpossible taken 
as a whole. 
Before the consistent revisions account can get off the ground, an important 
question must be addressed: how do we generate the revisions of the antecedent?  The 
obvious strategy is to construe the antecedent of the counterfactual as some conjunction of 
the form P-and-not-P, and then make one revision of the counterpossible that takes P to be 
the antecedent, and another revision that takes not-P to be the antecedent.  But this will not 
do.  First, many counterpossibles do not seem to have antecedents that are conjunctive in 
form; consider most of the examples that have motivated this project, such as ‘If Platonism 
were true, then we would have no way of knowing about numbers.’  If there is something of 
the form P-and-not-P “in” the antecedents of counterpossibles such as these, it would be hard 
to find.  This is not to say that it would be impossible to convert those counterpossibles into 
conjunctions, but it does not seem plausible that there would be some principled way of 
doing so.  Second, many counterpossibles that do have explicitly conjunctive antecedents do 
not seem to be amenable to this treatment; consider: 
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(1) If I were to discover that the number of stars were even and odd, then I’d be 
surprised. 
The counterpossible should not divide into ‘If I were to discover that the number of stars 
were even, I’d be surprised’ and ‘If I were to discover that the number of stars were odd, I’d 
be surprised,’ since neither of these counterfactuals are true.  I would not be surprised if the 
number of stars were even, and I would not be surprised if the number of stars were odd; 
I’m surprised only when the number is even and odd.  The contradictory nature of the 
antecedent is required to get the intuitive reading of the counterpossible.  How can the 
consistent revision account deliver the intuitively correct result?  
 
2.3 The Best Revision Account 
We might still think that the right approach to counterpossibles is one in which a 
counterpossible is true if some related counterfactual is true.  Perhaps the relevant 
counterfactual is not one in which the antecedent is some conjunct of the counterpossible’s 
antecedent, but rather some other related proposition.  Such a related proposition would be 
some related proposition from which we can recover the meaning of the contradictory 
antecedent.  We can find a “best revision” for some impossible antecedent such that it is 
consistent (and thus amenable to the standard treatment of counterfactuals) while retaining 
as much of the content of the original antecedent as possible.  If this best revision 
counterfactual is true, then the original counterpossible is true; if it’s false, then the 
counterpossible is false. 
44 
 
Take R(x) to be a function from propositions to propositions that results in the best 
revision for the antecedent in question.24  If A is the antecedent of a counterpossible to be 
evaluated, how do we determine the resulting proposition R(A)?  Generally speaking, we 
need to consider the context of utterance (or the context of evaluation) as well as the 
antecedent itself to determine which proposition best captures the content of the antecedent.  
Indeed, the same considerations used to evaluate the truth or falsity of ordinary 
counterfactuals are in play here.  When evaluating counterfactuals, we determine which 
antecedent-world is most similar to the actual world in the relevant context, and then 
determine whether the consequent holds in this world.  Similarly, we use the context of the 
counterpossible to determine what content can be gleaned from its antecedent.  Replacing 
the original antecedent with this consistent part of it will result in a counterfactual that can 
be evaluated in the ordinary way.   
However the consistent revisions of counterpossibles are derived, it should be noted 
that this account gives a unified treatment to counterfactuals and counterpossibles.  
Intuitively, when evaluating subjunctive conditionals, we grasp the antecedent by taking the 
consistent revision of the antecedent that retains most of its content.  If the antecedent is 
already possible, then there need be no revision of the antecedent.  The best revision of the 
                                                        
24 Note that, for this approach, we need some way of individuating propositions that is more fine-
grained than functions from possible worlds to truth-values.  If propositions are merely these kinds 
of functions, then all inconsistent propositions will be identical to each other; they will all be the 
function that returns false for every possible world.  This will mean that, however the “best revision” 
function works, it will assign the same consistent revision to any inconsistent antecedent, since every 
inconsistent antecedent is the same proposition. More fine-grained approaches to propositions are 
required.  Accounts of structured propositions such as that of [King 2007], or the interpreted logical 
forms discussed in [Ludlow 2000] could suffice.  The kind of structured propositions discussed in 
this work in chapter 4 would suffice for this purpose as well, if our task is to individuate propositions 
such as that 2 + 2 = 4 from that all bachelors are male.  Note, however, that the kinds of structured 
propositions discussed in chapter 4 are not as fine-grained as some other accounts, and thus cannot 
differentiate a proposition such as that Superman flies from that Clark Kent flies, since Superman and 
Clark Kent will be picked out by the same set of individuals across worlds.  Intuitively, these 
propositions ought to be differentiated, since one could believe one without believing the other, but 
the kinds of impossible worlds described here are not the proper tool for that job. 
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antecedent in such a case is the antecedent itself; if A is consistent, then R(A) = A.  In this 
fashion, we evaluate all subjunctive conditionals using the same method; the “best revisions” 
approach need not be a separate analysis invoked only when the antecedent is impossible.  
Furthermore, this method guarantees that our original judgments about counterfactuals are 
unchanged; as long as the antecedent of the conditional is possible, the best revision of the 
antecedent is the antecedent itself, so there would be no change to our analysis of 
counterfactuals. 
Of course, this is still just the outline of a theory of counterpossibles; more must be 
said about how this function operates before the view can be evaluated.   
 
2.3.1 The Best Revision and Similarity 
 One means of determining the best revision of the antecedent is to posit similarity 
relations that hold between propositions; these similarity relations are analogous to the 
similarity relations that hold between worlds.  On such an approach, we determine which 
consistent proposition is, in the contextually appropriate sense, most similar to the 
counterpossible’s antecedent.  Relying on the similarity of propositions to find the best 
revision should not be seen as ad hoc; indeed, we already have a notion of comparative 
similarity with respect to propositions that we employ in discussions about (imperfect) 
translations or synonymy.  A sentence can be very nearly the same as some other sentence, in 
virtue of meaning very nearly the same thing.  We can cash out such talk in terms of the 
comparative similarity of the propositions that these sentences express. 
Though we might have some intuitions about the comparative similarity of 
propositions, such intuitions by themselves are not adequate to develop a general account.  I 
have no such general account of similarity to offer, but we should not expect any such 
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account to match all of our intuitions about which propositions seem more similar to others, 
any more than intuitive views of the similarity of worlds will be of use in determining which 
possible worlds are closest to the actual world. 
The proposal, then, is to take the similarity of propositions as unanalyzed, and use 
that notion to determine how the function R(x) works.  That is, given some context, R(A) 
will be the possibly-true proposition that is most similar to the antecedent of the 
counterfactual.  We then evaluate the counterfactual R(A) C for truth; A  C is true 
iff R(A)  C is true.  If there is a tie for the proposition most similar to the antecedent, 
then we could either say that the counterpossible is true when all of these nearby 
propositions are such that the resulting counterfactuals are true, or we could say that the 
counterpossible is true when at least some of the nearby propositions result in true 
counterfactuals.  
This view, however, is still disappointingly vague unless we can determine what 
makes some proposition more or less similar to another.  Perhaps one could hope to attach a 
theory of the closeness of propositions to an extant theory of the closeness of worlds.  One 
proposition is similar to another if, by some measure, the possible worlds where the first 
proposition is true are nearby, in logical space, to the possible worlds where the second 
proposition is true.  Of course, it would be very difficult to determine the degree to which 
one collection of possible worlds is nearby to some other collection of possible worlds, but 
we need not even attempt to address this.  For our present purposes, we need to locate some 
possibly-true proposition that is nearby to some necessarily-false proposition.  Since there 
are no possible worlds where the necessarily-false proposition is true, such an approach 
could not even get off the ground.  Some alternate approach is required. 
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2.3.2 Qualitative Similarity and Counterparts 
One approach for determining when some proposition is similar to another is the 
qualitative similarity approach: a proposition is similar to another proposition to the extent 
that the objects referred to by one proposition are qualitatively similar in relevant respects to 
the objects referred to by the second proposition.25  Call the objects referred to in the revised 
proposition the counterparts of the objects referred to in the antecedent of the 
counterpossible.  The counterpart of an object in this sense is one that is qualitatively similar 
to it in relevant respects; these counterparts must share as many of these qualitative features 
as possible, yet be such that the proposition that results from replacing the subject of the 
antecedent with its counterpart is possibly true.  In this sense, my counterpart can “play my 
role” in some other world, even if in some worlds, my counterpart has properties that I 
could not have.  According to the current proposal, then, we determine which possible 
proposition is most similar to the impossible antecedent by determining which possible 
proposition ascribes the properties and relations in question to the object or objects most 
qualitatively similar (in relevant respects) to those expressed by the counterpossible’s 
antecedent.  Thus, when we evaluate counterpossibles, we do not consider what would 
happen if some object possessed a property that it could not possess, but rather consider 
what would happen if some similar object bore the properties ascribed to it by the 
counterpossible’s antecedent.   
Of course, counterpart theory is nothing new with respect to understanding the 
modal properties of objects.26  Yet its application here is quite independent of any theory of 
the representation of de re modal properties.  If one is a counterpart theorist already, then 
one could accept this proposal as a kind of natural extension of the theory: this theory is an 
                                                        
25 Assume that a proposition is a structured entity comprised of objects, properties, and relations. 
26 See, for example, Lewis [1968] and Lewis [1973]. 
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attempt to exploit the kinds of relations of qualitative similarity that are used to explain how 
objects can be represented as existing at other world to explain how objects can be 
represented as having properties that they could not have.27  Of course, one need not be a 
counterpart theorist with respect to transworld identity to accept such an analysis of 
counterpossibles: one could hold any view about how objects exist across worlds, but still 
think that counterpossibles present a special case that require thinking about the objects in 
question in a somewhat different way.   
According to the counterpart theory of counterpossibles, when we grasp the 
antecedent of a counterfactual such as 
(2) If I were a horse, then I would have hooves. 
we do not somehow imagine something that is essentially not a horse (viz., me) being a 
horse; rather, we imagine something that is a counterpart of me as a horse.  On such an 
approach, then, we consider my qualitative properties and relations to determine the 
appropriate counterparts of myself, and determine whether the counterfactual that results in 
replacing me with such a counterpart is true.  A counterpart of me that could be a horse 
would be an object that has as many of the qualitative features that I have as possible, yet 
could be a horse.  Of course, specifying just what these features are is difficult, and much of 
the discussion would hinge on what kinds of properties one thinks is essential to being a 
horse or being a human.  However this is to be spelled out, it should not be that my 
counterpart has the same modal properties that I have: that is, we can assume for the sake of 
the example that I am necessarily human, and my counterpart is not.   
                                                        
27 Assuming, of course, that there is no admissible counterpart relation according to which the object 
in question has counterparts with the property ascribed by the antecedent.  If counterpart relations 
are tolerant enough to rule out all essential properties, then these kinds of conditionals will not be 
counterpossibles. 
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On this approach, to determine the truth of (2), we determine the truth of (2’): 
 (2’) If my counterpart were a horse, then it would have hooves. 
In the nearest world where my counterpart, or something that plays my role, is a horse, that 
thing has hooves; after all, if we assume that the counterpart in question is a horse at some 
world, it would have the kinds of features we ordinarily associate with horses at that world.  
Therefore, the revised counterfactual is true, and thus the counterpossible is true.  Of 
course, if such an approach were to be developed and defended, more would have to be said 
about how we locate these counterparts and what their modal properties would be like.     
Yet, however these questions are answered, this approach does not seem applicable 
to cases of counterpossibles with antecedents that are logically or mathematically impossible.  
It is unclear how to understand counterpossibles such as 
(1) If I were to discover that the number of stars were even and odd, I’d be 
surprised. 
What are we supposed to find counterparts of?  Presumably, not myself: there is no 
counterpart of myself whatsoever that could discover that the number of stars were even 
and odd, since ‘discover’ is factive: nothing could discover the impossible.  It seems we 
would have to find some counterpart for the number of stars that could be both even and 
odd.  What would this counterpart be?  Clearly not some other number: no number could 
possibly be both even and odd.  Yet if the counterpart is not a number, then how could it be 
even or odd at all?  More generally, it seems difficult to imagine how this approach is 
supposed to find the relevant kinds of qualitatively similar entities that could have collections 
of properties that are logically or mathematically impossible. 
It seems that the qualitative similarity approach is not capable of determining the 
relevantly similar, revised antecedent for a wide range of counterpossibles.  Of course, one 
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could endorse some other “best revision” approach which attempts to determine the 
relevantly similar proposition by some other means, but it is unclear what other strategy 
could be plausible.  Nonetheless, a more general argument against “best revision” 
approaches could forestall an attempt to come up with a more plausible method of 
determining how to revise the antecedent of counterpossibles. 
 
2.4 Some objections: Surrogate Propositions and Inconsistency 
At this point, one might object: perhaps this approach has merely avoided the 
difficult problem by changing the subject, since we are no longer dealing with the truth 
conditions of the counterpossibles, but rather with the truth conditions of counterfactuals 
that are somehow similar to the counterpossibles with which we began.  Instead of 
evaluating conditionals with antecedents such as I am a horse or I have squared the circle we 
evaluate conditionals with antecedents such as Something like me is a horse or, I come to believe that 
I have squared the circle, and so on.  The conditionals that we analyze for truth are, by design, 
distinct from the original counterpossibles.  By analyzing these surrogate conditionals, one 
might complain, I have merely ducked the hard question of how we can deal with impossible 
propositions in a Lewisian framework.  But this objection misunderstands the enterprise.  
This approach is merely an attempt to give non-vacuous truth conditions to 
counterpossibles, and we have done so by identifying them with the truth conditions of 
counterfactuals.  The surrogates provided are not arbitrary conditionals unrelated to the 
original counterpossibles; rather, they are selected to capture the cognitive content of the 
impossibilities expressed by the impossible antecedents.  A counterpossible has the truth 
conditions it does in virtue of the nearby counterfactual.  This does not mean that the 
counterpossible is identical with the content of the counterfactual, or that we can never 
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properly express counterpossible propositions.  The claim is merely that counterpossibles are 
true whenever their associated counterfactuals are true.  
But there is a more serious worry in the neighborhood that does not have as easy an 
answer.  Perhaps some counterpossibles have the truth conditions that they do in virtue of 
the contradiction expressed in the antecedent, and any attempt to avoid this contradiction by 
way of replacing the antecedent with some possible proposition is bound to give us the 
wrong results.  That is, this entire family of approaches attempt to give the truth conditions 
of the counterpossible in terms of the some counterfactual with a possible antecedent.  
These approaches, then, are unable to give intuitively correct truth conditions to a 
counterpossible whose truth depends on the impossibility of its antecedent.   
At least one kind of case where the impossibility of the antecedent is salient to the 
truth of the conditional does have an adequate response. Recall the ‘anything goes’ argument 
discussed in chapter 1: on at least some ways of understanding the contradictory antecedents 
of counterogicals, making the contradictory nature of the antecedent salient makes the result 
that all counterpossibles are trivially true far more plausible.  When we start to consider what 
would happen if some contradiction were true, the argument goes, it becomes unclear just 
what else would be true; indeed, given some impossible antecedent, maybe anything at all is 
true.  Yet this kind of special case is impossible according to the best revision approach, 
since the antecedent will always be logically possible, and explosion will never result.  
Furthermore, this trivial reading of the counterpossible is exactly what we require to make 
sense of proofs by reductio.  In such a proof, we can show that some assumption leads to a 
contradiction, and thus the assumption must be false and its negation true.  It is the 
contradiction itself that gives us this result, and not some consistent revision of it that allows 
us to draw this conclusion.  Any form of the best revision approach to counterpossibles 
52 
 
replaces the contradictory antecedent with something consistent, but in the case of an 
“anything goes” context or a proof by reductio, it is precisely this inconsistency that is 
required to derive the desired consequent.    
The response is that presenting a proof by reductio must set a special kind of context 
that is similar to the context set by the ‘anything goes’ argument.  In this special case, the 
consistent revision function will return an impossible proposition after all, such that 
everything follows from it.  Thus, reductios will be treated as a special context where R(A) is a 
contradiction after all, but the contradiction will behave in a classical fashion, and explosion 
will (rightly) result. 
There is a more serious objection to this family of proposals, however.  Consider a 
counterpossible such as the following: 
(3) If the number of stars were both even and odd, then some contradiction would 
be true. 
First, note that the consequent expresses an impossibility; if the analysis is to work, we must 
also find some nearby contingent proposition for the consequent to express.  The solution, 
then, is to apply the revision function sketched above to the consequent in order to give (2) 
the desired truth value.  A counterpossible of the form A  C, then, would be true 
whenever R(A)  R(C) is true.   
 It is not clear that moving toward some revision of the consequent will solve the 
problem, however. In (3), it seems that any attempt to make the antecedent logically possible 
will be inadequate to account for its content in such a way as to guarantee the truth of the 
conditional.  After all, intuitively, there would be a contradiction in the world of evaluation 
because the antecedent is contradictory.  That is, the link between the antecedent and 
consequent of (3) that makes it seem (non-vacuously) true depends on the antecedent being 
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impossible, and an analysis that treats the antecedent (and consequent) as possible would 
miss this connection.  This points toward a more general problem: however it is that we 
decide what the best revision is, whether it be an approach that considers the beliefs of the 
speaker, the counterparts of various objects, or some unanalyzed notion of a relevantly 
similar proposition, it will be possible to come up with a counterpossible which cannot be 
successfully analyzed by that approach.  This is because the ‘best revision’ approach will 
always leave some gap between the meaning of the antecedent and the meaning of the 
revised antecedent, and this gap in meaning can be exploited in such a way as to produce a 
counterexample. 
 In the case of (3), if we apply the consistent revision strategy to both the antecedent 
and consequent, we will have no guarantee that the resulting counterfactual will have the 
correct truth value.  It seems implausible that a ‘best revision’ for the antecedent of a 
conditional such as (3) would have much to do with our beliefs, or anything about the 
counterparts of mathematical or logical objects.  After all, it is difficult to say what I would 
believe if I were to come to believe that the number of stars were even and odd, and as we 
have seen, it is difficult to make sense of what the relevant counterpart relations in this case.  
The best hope is to understand the best revision of the antecedent of this conditional in 
terms of some unanalyzed “nearby” proposition. 
 One complaint, of course, is that there simply is not enough information about 
propositional similarity to go on.  What might this proposition “nearby” to the antecedent 
be?  My complaint is not that similarity in this notion of similarity is unanalyzed; everyone is 
entitled to his or her primitives.  Rather, the complaint is that it is difficult to imagine what 
the most similar, logically possible proposition to some given impossibility could even look 
like.  It is difficult to make the case that a sentence such as (3) is analyzed correctly or not if 
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we have no intuitive grasp of what the corresponding counterfactual would be.  Thus, the 
theory is completely untestable.  Any attempt to elucidate the similarity relation for 
propositions will open it up to easily generated counterexamples.   
 
2.5 Counterfactuals and Logic 
 There is one further family of non-trivial analyses of counterpossibles to be 
considered in this chapter.  We might think that the counterfactual conditional is some kind 
of entailment operator after all, and that Goodman-Chisholm analysis, according to which 
we evaluate a counterfactual by determining whether the antecedent (as well as relevant 
background information) entails the consequent, is nearly correct after all.  One could then 
argue that a counterpossible is true whenever its consequent can be formally derived from 
the antecedent in the proper way.  Since avoiding triviality is important, however, the notion 
of entailment in such a theory cannot be classical, lest any consequent be true when the 
antecedent is inconsistent.  The entailment relation must in question must, at least, reject the 
principle of explosion, according to which everything follows from a contradiction.  
According to such an analysis, A  C is true whenever A L C, where L represents the 
entailment operator of some language L. 
 Which language could we fill in for L?  We need not commit ourselves to a particular 
logic here, but it seems plausible that a relevance logic28 would be a strong candidate.  Such 
logics avoid explosion, and thus would not result in triviality; they also enforce a requirement 
that the premises of an argument be “relevant” to its conclusion; the information contained 
in the premises must be used in deriving the conclusion.  There are various ways to enforce 
this requirement, either syntactically (by marking premises in such a way that one must make 
                                                        
28 See, for example, Anderson and Belnap [1975] and Restall [2000]. 
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use of them in a derivation) or semantically (by using a so-called ternary accessibility 
relation,29 which would hold that worlds can only be accessible to one another in such a way 
that the information contained in the premises is present in the worlds where the conclusion 
is true).  What is important for our purposes is that there are plausible logical systems that 
could be used in such a way as to give counterpossibles non-trivial truth conditions without 
the use of impossible worlds.30 
 In order to accept such a view, one need not endorse some non-classical logic per se.  
This view does not claim that, for example, the principle of explosion is invalid.  One could 
endorse this view as a classical logician and a non-pluralist, claiming that classical entailment 
is the only game in town.  Perhaps non-classical logics describe some other relation between 
propositions, perhaps they are merely syntactic games.  Yet so long as they describe some 
kind of intelligible system, we can use that system to determine when counterpossibles are 
true. 
 A more serious problem is that, even if we could decide on a plausible logical system, 
it would never be adequate to describe the truth conditions of all counterpossibles.  For any 
choice of L, there will be some weaker logic, L’, such that we could use counterpossibles to 
discuss the behavior of L’.  Yet using the entailment relation of L to describe what follows 
from L’ would clearly be mistaken.  If, for example, we used relevant implication to 
determine what would follow from intuitionistic logic, we would find that all the theorems 
of relevance logic would be true.  Clearly, any choice of L for counterpossible entailment will 
not allow one to determine what would follow if other languages were true. 
                                                        
29 Due to Routley and Meyer [1983]. 
30 One might object that logical approaches do require the use of impossible worlds, since most of 
the semantics for these logics makes use of worlds that are inconsistent or incomplete.  But the 
possible worlds of logical systems are set-theoretic entities, not worlds in the sense that (for example) 
Lewis discusses in [1986]. 
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 Perhaps there is a more modest kind of logical analysis of counterpossibles.  Rather 
than make use of some specific non-classical logic, one might hold that a counterpossible is 
true if its consequent can be derived in classical logic, in some “reasonably direct” way.  Of 
course, what it is for a proof to be “reasonably direct” is quite vague, but it surely must avoid 
use of principles such as explosion, lest the theory of counterpossibles be vacuous.  Yet we 
cannot merely rule out this rule of inference on its own, since explosion can be derived from 
disjunction introduction and disjunctive syllogism, both of which seem to be unimpeachable, 
even for paradigmatically “reasonably direct” proofs; a reasonably direct derivation could 
easily include one or both of these principles and not lead to triviality.  Furthermore, it 
seems, sometimes the principle of explosion is an important part of reasoning, as in certain 
proofs by reductio and in certain “anything goes” contexts.  Thus, it seems quite hard to know 
just what a “reasonably direct” proof would and would not rule out.  Clearly, there are no 
particular rules of inference to be denied, nor some number of steps of a formal derivation 
that one is entitled to use.  The notion of a reasonably direct proof simply seems too vague 
to be of much use. 
 Of course, these arguments are not decisive; the defender of some logical account of 
counterpossibles could attempt to come up with some theory of what a “reasonably direct 
derivation” is in such a way that makes it at least as precise as counterpossibles, and at least 
in theory testable.  Yet as it stands, there seems to be no way to avoid the principle of 
explosion without adopting a non-classical logic, and adopting any particular non-classical 
logic will leave the theory incapable of dealing with all counterpossibles.  
  
2.6 Conclusion 
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An analysis of counterpossibles that aims to provide correct, non-trivial truth 
conditions without countenancing the existence of impossible worlds is worth exploring.  
Since such a theory does not rely on impossible worlds, it would not need not answer 
uncomfortable questions about ontology or similarity among logically impossible worlds.  
Rather, such an account offers an ontologically cheaper picture of how we reason about 
counterpossibles that gives us intuitively plausible truth conditions by relying on less 
problematic, nearby propositions in place of impossible antecedents.  
These approaches, unfortunately, are ultimately inadequate to the task.  If the 
analysis of counterpossibles proceeds in such a way that ignores the inconsistent nature of 
their antecedents, then it will be possible to find counterexamples to the theory that trade on 
this gap between the impossible antecedent and the possible revision of it.  After all, many 
counterpossibles are true because the antecedent is impossible, and if that counterpossible is 
to be analyzed in terms of some counterfactual with a possible antecedent, there is simply no 
reason to assume that this counterfactual will have the appropriate truth value.  If, on the 
other hand, the analysis relies on some particular choice of a non-classical entailment 
relation, one must be faced with the choice of which entailment relation to make use of, 
which would close off the analysis to a large family of counterlogicals.   
 
 
 
58 
 
CHAPTER 3  
IMPOSSIBLE WORLDS AND SIMILARITY 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 The aim of this chapter is to provide an account of what makes a world – possible or 
impossible – more or less similar to the actual world, so that truth conditions for 
counterpossibles can be given in such a way as to extend the Lewis/Stalnaker semantics of 
counterfactuals.  According to the Lewis/Stalnaker account, a counterfactual is true iff its 
consequent is true in the “closest” or “most similar” possible worlds where the antecedent is 
true.31  That is, a counterfactual is true when the consequent of that counterfactual is true in 
those possible worlds at which the “minimal changes” necessary are made to smoothly 
accommodate the truth of the antecedent.  A sentence such as, ‘If dinosaurs were to still 
exist, then there would be fewer people’ is true, as there are fewer people in a world much 
like this one (in relevant respects), yet where dinosaurs still exist.  It would seem plausible 
that such a “nearby” world is one where we change facts about how the dinosaurs actually 
went extinct, as well as various facts about history and the environment that would have 
been affected by the presence of dinosaurs; plausibly, we would change facts about 
evolutionary development or predation that would affect the human population in this 
world.  Other facts that are not relevantly related to the presence of dinosaurs, such as the 
color of snow or the shape of our planetary orbit, are not changed at such a possible world.   
                                                        
31 The Lewis/Stalnaker account of counterfactuals is developed in Lewis [1973] and Stalnaker [1968] 
and discussed in more detail in chapter 1.  There are, of courses, differences between the way that 
Lewis and Stalnaker analyze counterfactuals, such as the analysis of ‘might’ counterfactuals and 
whether, given some counterfactual, there is a unique “closest” possible world or set of worlds.  
These differences will not affect how the account of counterfactuals is developed here; I assume, for 
the sake of exposition, that there may be “ties” with respect to which worlds where the antecedent of 
the counterfactual are true are closest, but that there will always be at least one closest antecedent 
world. 
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Much of the disagreement about the analysis of counterfactuals, then, lies in determining 
which facts vary and which facts are held fixed in the “most similar,” “closest,” or “nearby” 
possible worlds.32  What kind of changes must be made in order to properly alter what is true 
at a world so as to locate the nearest possible world where the antecedent of the 
counterfactual is true? 
 As Lewis argues, it is possible to come up with a kind of “standard” similarity metric 
that would allow one to determine how a world is minimally altered in this fashion.  With 
some minor refinements, Lewis’s analysis is capable of explaining the truth conditions of 
counterfactuals and meeting some of the challenges that have been leveled against it.  
Furthermore, with these refinements in hand, it also becomes clear how to extend Lewis’s 
treatment in such a way as to give truth conditions to counterpossibles.  
 
3.2 Lewis and Counterfactuals 
 It is clear that offhand intuitions about how similar some possible world is to the 
actual world will not count for much.  Lewis said this as early as his [1973:95], although 
much of the early discussion of his account nevertheless relied on such judgments about 
similarity. Of course, noting that our intuitions about the similarity of worlds are a poor 
guide to transworld similarity does not bring us much closer to developing an account of the 
phenomenon.  The challenge of explicating this notion remains; indeed, it is exacerbated if 
we think that our intuitions about similarity will play little if any role in determining the 
comparative nearness of worlds.33 
                                                        
32 I will use locutions such as “similarity,” “nearness,” and “closeness” synonymously. 
33 The kind of similarity that holds between worlds should not be confused with a notion of 
“objective similarity” that holds between objects.  When we say that two objects are similar in such a 
way as to underwrite claims about counterpart theory, for example, we are not appealing to the same 
notion of similarity that underwrites trans-world identity.  There are, however, some common 
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 Consider the case of Fine’s Bomb, discussed in his [1975].  Imagine that, at some 
time t, the President’s finger is poised over the button that would launch nuclear weapons at 
Russia.  Thankfully, she thinks better of it, and decides not to press the button.  Intuitively, 
the following counterfactual is true: 
 (1) If the President had pressed the button at t, there would have been nuclear war. 
But how can we get this result with something like the view of counterfactuals sketched 
above?  If we think that the nearest possible world where the President presses the button is 
like this world in relevant respects, then we should think that it is a world that is, at least as 
much as possible, very much like the actual world.  Yet, consider a few possible worlds.  In 
w1, the President presses the button, the mechanism works as designed, and there is nuclear 
war.  In w2, the President presses the button, but the firing mechanism fizzles in such a way 
that no missiles are launched, and there is no nuclear war.  If we are to rely on intuitions 
about similarity, it seems clear that w2 is closer to the actual world than w1: after all, a world 
with nuclear war is a world that develops in vastly different ways after t, and would look very 
different from the actual world.  A world without a nuclear war such as w2 deviates from the 
actual world only in matters of comparatively little importance.  The button may have the 
President’s fingerprints, and she may have memories of pressing the button, but such 
differences seem inconsequential compared to the nuclear holocaust present in w1. 
 As Lewis explains in his [1979], only certain kinds of matches of facts count toward 
the closeness of worlds; not all such matches are created equal. Lewis presents a list of 
desiderata in determining which kinds of matches are important:34 
                                                                                                                                                                     
threads: for example, the requirement that there be a “perfect match” of matters of fact resembles 
the requirement that the appropriately natural properties be duplicated. 
34 For the purposes of this discussion, Lewis assumes that determinism is true.  If the actual world is 
indeterministic, then the picture will be at least somewhat more complicated; one must understand 
the notion of ‘miracle’ that Lewis deploys in a somewhat different fashion, so as to count events that 
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1) It is of first importance to avoid big, widespread diverse violations of law. 
2) It is of second importance to maximize the spatiotemporal region throughout 
which perfect match of particular fact prevails 
3) It is of third importance to avoid even small, localized, simple violations of law 
4) It is of little or no importance to secure approximate similarity of particular fact 
A world that contains a widespread and diverse violation of nomological law (or “large 
miracles”) will never be as closeby as a world that does not contain such a violation.  Second, 
a world will be closeby to the extent that it has a large region of perfect match of matters of 
fact, unless such a match comes at the expense of a large miracle; it is not important that a 
world like w2 has approximately the same kind of history as the actual world, but it should 
rather match the actual world perfectly.  Third, a closeby world should minimize the 
occurrence of “small miracles,” or more localized violations of nomological law.35  In some 
contexts, it is at least somewhat important to achieve an “approximate” match of matters of 
fact, but not in other contexts; we can ignore this complication for present purposes.     
 In light of this, Lewis’s response to Fine is now clear: we can imagine two ways in 
which the nuclear-holocaust-free world could seem nearby to the actual world, but on either 
way of understanding w2, a world such as w1 will end up as closer to the actual world 
according to Lewis’s analysis.  Both worlds will, of course, require a “small miracle” in order 
to make it true that the President presses the button; there must, somehow, be an exception 
to the laws of physics, perhaps localized in some region of the President’s brain, which 
                                                                                                                                                                     
are nomically possible but are coincidental to the point of seeming to be conspiratorial.  See his 
discussion of ‘quasi-miracles’ in the postscript to [1979]. 
35 When a possible world is said to contain some violation of law, this should be understood as a 
violation of our laws.  If some miracle occurs that causes some possible world to deviate from our 
word, then our laws of physics were violated; presumably, the possible world that contains this 
miracle either has different laws, so as to account for this change, or no laws that apply to the 
phenomenon in discussion. 
62 
 
causes her to press the button that launches the nuclear weapons.  But worlds like w2 will 
either not perfectly match the future of the actual world, or they will also require a “large 
miracle” so as to achieve this match.  
 Imagine a world w2A at which there is no nuclear war, but the myriad effects of the 
President’s button-pressing still spread out into the future.  Maybe that moment is recorded 
in her memoirs; maybe her decisions later in life are profoundly affected by this dark 
moment in her past.  There will certainly be a great many mundane effects as well: the 
President’s fingerprints will be on the button, the sound waves will emanate from the click 
of the button, the heat will dissipate from the wire, the air will be disturbed, and so.  Various 
changes in the world will propagate from the button-pressing.  The development of this 
world after t will not perfectly match what happens in the actual world: while the past of the 
actual world and w2A will be perfectly alike, the future of the two worlds will not be perfectly 
alike, as the traces of the President’s actions spread through the world after t.  Since this 
match of fact in the future is not perfect, it will not count toward its similarity to the actual 
world.  World w1, then, is closer to the actual world than w2A.  Both possible worlds match 
the history of the actual world just prior to t perfectly, and neither matches the history of the 
actual world after t.  However, w1 requires only one small miracle (which causes the President 
to press the button), while w2A requires two small miracles (one causes the President to press 
the button, and the second causes the firing mechanism to fail.)   
 We could also imagine a world w2B at which the various traces of the President’s 
button-pressing – the memories, fingerprints, sound waves, and so on – are all wiped clean 
from the world.  In worlds such as these, some diverse and widespread violation of law 
would be required to eliminate all of the myriad traces of the President’s button-pressing; the 
world would have to conspire to remove the memories, the sound waves, the heat from the 
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wire, the disturbances in the air, and so on.  Note that w2B does match the actual world 
perfectly after t, but it does so at the cost of a large miracle.  Thus, neither of these worlds 
will be as nearby as w1, where there is nuclear war, but no large miracle. 
 It is important to note that Lewis does not offer this approach as some kind of 
analysis of our intuitive notion of trans-world closeness.  As Fine has shown, our intuitions 
about the similarity of worlds will land us in trouble if they are used to evaluate the truth of 
counterfactuals.  A more technical conception of transworld closeness, divorced to at least 
some degree from our intuitions, can be judged adequate to the extent that it is capable of 
being deployed in such a way as to make sense of our intuitions about the truth values of 
counterfactuals.  If Lewis’s desiderata for the closeness of worlds does not seem intuitive, it 
is merely because a theory of the closeness of worlds must ultimately answer to our 
intuitions about counterfactuals such as (1).   
 
3.3 Complications 
 Nonetheless, the account given by Lewis in his [1979] cannot be the last word on the 
matter.  The first kind worry for Lewis’s account is that, in at least some cases, there are 
“deviant” possible worlds that contain a perfect match in matters of fact without requiring 
some large miracle; in these cases, Lewis’s desiderata would give us the wrong truth values.  
 Consider a process that results in a “deviant” match of matters of fact, such that the 
kind of analysis suggested in Lewis’s [1979] will get the wrong result.  One such case is 
presented by Elga in his [2001].  Imagine that, at the actual world, Greta cracks an egg on a 
pan at 8:00; by 8:05, a fried egg sits on the pan.  Consider the following counterfactual: 
 (2) If Greta had not cracked an egg at 8:00, there would be no fried egg at 8:05. 
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This counterfactual is presumably true: the nearest worlds where Greta does not crack an 
egg in the pan are worlds where there is no subsequent fried egg.  At such worlds, a small 
miracle occurs, perhaps isolated in Greta’s brain, which results in her deciding not to crack 
an egg in the pan, and thus, no fried egg results; call a world such as this w3.  There are, to be 
sure, possible worlds where Greta does not crack the egg, but a fried egg miraculously 
appears in the pan at 8:05, but Lewis would claim that these worlds would either not match 
the actual world’s history after 8:00 perfectly (if, for example, there are differences in Greta’s 
memory or in the heat distribution in the kitchen), or would require a large miracle (so as to 
ensure that all traces of Greta’s decision not to crack the egg are wiped from the world).   
 Consider, however, a world such as w4, where a fried egg appears on the pan at 8:05; 
the history of w4 and the actual world match perfectly after 8:05, complete with all of the 
apparent traces of Greta’s decision to crack the egg.  Yet the fried egg that appears at 8:05 is 
not the result of Greta having cracked the egg, or some large miracle that conspires to make 
the world seem like Greta had cracked the egg, but is rather the result of a more lawful, anti-
entropic process: prior to 8:05, the fried egg “unrotted” on the pan, forming in some 
improbable-seeming way out of organic material around the pan. Prior to 8:00, the history of 
a world like w4 will look quite different from the history of the actual world, yet at 8:05, the 
worlds perfectly converge without the kind of large miracle that Lewis would object to.  
 Worlds such as w3 and w4 both match the actual world in an analogous way, since w3 
perfectly matches the actual world from before 8:00 and w4 perfectly matches the actual 
world after 8:05.  It is clear why w3 requires only a small miracle: we require only some small 
change in some region of Greta’s brain in order to make Greta decide not to crack the egg, 
and the rest of the world evolves in some predictable way from there.  But why think that w4 
also requires only a small miracle, when the world contains some incredibly improbable 
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event that results in a conspiracy of false memories and other seeming traces of Greta’s 
decision? 
  Elga asks us to imagine the process that occurs in the actual world from 8:00 to 8:05, 
in which Greta cracks an egg, the egg heats in the pan, and a fried egg results.  Consider now 
this process run backwards in time, from 8:05 to 8:00, in which a fried egg cools in a pan, 
and eventually flies back into its shell; such a process is possible according to the dynamic 
laws, but is fabulously improbable.  Such a process is also fragile, in the sense that a small 
change to some of the particles in the system will result in a wildly different result, in which 
the egg will not return to its shell, but rather remain in the pan and continue to cool and rot 
(albeit in reverse).  Such a small change would constitute a small miracle; thus, a small 
miracle change to the 8:05 to 8:00 process results in a very different world in which there is a 
fried egg, but no egg-cracking.  If we take the actual world, then, and make a small, localized 
change to the particles in the pan at around 8:05, and then run the dynamic laws backwards, 
the result will be a possible world w4 which differs from the actual world by a small miracle, 
and in which there is a fried egg at 8:05, but no egg-cracking at 8:00.  Since w3 and w4 are tied 
according to Lewis’s metric, the defender of such an approach would not be able to claim 
that a counterfactual such as (2) is true.36  A modification of Lewis’s account is required to 
meet Elga’s challenge.   
  
3.4 Causation and Explanation 
There are, to be sure, other proposals that seek to modify Lewis’s account of the 
similarity of worlds in such a way as to handle the kinds of objections that Elga and others 
                                                        
36 Elga’s example is a particularly persuasive case where reconvergence does not seem to require a 
‘large miracle.’  Bennett discusses other such cases in [1984].  For other putative counterexamples to 
the similarity metric described in Lewis [1979], see Wasserman [2006], Kment [2006a], and 
Hawthorne [2005]. 
66 
 
advance against Lewis.  The strategy is to locate some feature of the kind of match of 
matters fact that is deviant; the kinds of match of matters of fact that Elga and others rely on 
to formulate their counterexamples could then be ruled out in our similarity metric of 
possible worlds.   
According to Schaffer [2004], the only facts that count toward the comparative 
nearness of possible worlds are those facts that are causally independent of the antecedent.  
In the case of Elga’s egg, we should not consider w4 to be as nearby as w3, because while w4 
perfectly matches the history of the actual world after the appearance of the fried egg, such a 
match is not causally independent of the antecedent: whether or not there is a fried egg (in 
the actual world) depends on the result of a causal chain that is anchored in the Greta’s egg-
cracking.  Since, in the actual world, the fried egg is caused by Greta’s cracking of the egg, 
any kind of match related to the existence of the egg (which includes much of the match that 
exists between the actual world and w4 after 8:05) simply does not count toward trans-world 
similarity.  Thus, w3 will be closer to the actual world after all.  
We might not be content, however, to accept Schaffer’s account of counterfactuals.  
First, as Schaffer notes, it does not allow us to reduce causation to counterfactuals in some 
clearly non-circular fashion.  To be sure, the counterfactual account of causation faces some 
trouble,37 but it seems premature to rule out such an account by building causation into our 
notion of counterfactual analysis.  This is no refutation of Schaffer’s analysis, but there is at 
least some reason to look for some analysis of counterfactuals that does not rely on 
causation, so as not to close off hope of any such analysis. 
Another reason not to accept Schaffer’s analysis is that it does not seem general 
enough for our purposes.  Ultimately, our approach should be capable of making sense of 
                                                        
37 See, for example, Lewis [2000], Schaffer [2000], and Hall [2003]. 
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conditionals whose antecedents express nomological, metaphysical, or logical impossibilities.  
But Schaffer’s account is concerned only with avoiding a certain kind of deviant match of 
matters of fact that arises in cases such as Elga’s; it is not of much help when evaluating 
counterfactuals whose antecedents express nomological impossibilities, since it gives no 
explicit guidance with respect to how to measure the comparative similarity of worlds with 
different laws.  And, of course, it is not clear how such an approach can be extended to give 
an analysis of when counterpossibles are true. 
 Perhaps causation is the wrong notion to hang our analysis on.  According to Kment 
[2006], the only facts that count toward the comparative nearness of possible worlds are 
those that have the same explanation in both worlds.  Thus, in the case of Elga’s egg, world 
w4 will not be closer to the actual world than w3, since the presence of the fried egg has 
different explanations in w4 and the actual world: in the actual world, there is a fried egg 
because of Greta’s actions, and in w4, there is a fried egg because of some anti-entropic 
process.38  Thus, the presence of the fried egg, and indeed the rest of the history that follows 
from the existence of that fried egg, simply does not contribute towards the closeness of a 
world like w4 to the actual world; worlds such as w3 will match the history of the actual world 
perfectly prior to 8:00, but worlds such as w4 will not match the history of the actual world 
after 8:05, since the events after that time have a different explanation than they do in the 
actual world.  The two worlds, then, are not tied for similarity to the actual world. 
 Kment’s approach places a lot of weight on the notion of explanation, so more must 
be said about the notion of explanation that is capable of doing the work required.  If the 
kind of explanation is epistemic, then Kment’s analysis of counterfactuals is hostage to how 
                                                        
38 One could argue that we cannot explain the existence of an egg by some probabilistic mechanical 
process, especially if the probability of that phenomenon is close to zero.  Perhaps it would be better 
to say that the fried egg has no explanation in w4.  In either case, though, it is clear that it does not 
have the same explanation that it does in the actual world. 
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well we understand (or can understand) the world.  Yet it seems that what would happen 
under counterfactual circumstances does not depend on our knowledge or our cognitive 
abilities.  There is a fact of the matter about what would happen if I were to press a button 
or crack an egg, and what would happen does not depend on whether we know how the 
button is wired or what our present beliefs about of the laws of statistical mechanics are.  
The notion of explanation, then, should be ontic; explanations should be understood in such 
a way that they are somehow part of the structure of the world.  Kment suggests as much, 
proposing that we should understand explanation as Salmon does in his [1984].  Yet 
Salmon’s account of explanation relies both on causation, since for him explanation is an 
attempt at fitting the phenomenon to be explained into a causal structure, as well as 
counterfactual analysis, since this causal structure is understood in terms of the ability of 
objects to transfer “marks.”  The possession of some ability seems to be a counterfactual 
notion: something possesses the ability to transfer a mark if it would transfer a mark under 
certain (generally) counterfactual conditions.   
Insofar as the proposed account of explanation makes use of causation, it will inherit 
the charges against Schaffer.  More importantly, we cannot adopt Salmon’s account of 
explanation in the analysis of counterfactuals without courting blatant circularity as long as 
explanation is understood in counterfactual terms.  Finally, it would seem that such an 
account would leave us no closer to understanding the truth conditions of counterfactuals 
with nomically or metaphysically impossible antecedents. Perhaps a proposal along the lines 
offered by Kment and Schaffer could be made to work: one could attempt to reformulate 
such an account of the similarity of worlds if one is able to elucidate a notion of explanation 
(or causation) adequate for the project.  The moral to be drawn for the purposes of the 
present analysis, however, is that, even if laws and explanation can play a role in the 
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similarity metric for counterfactuals, they cannot be used in the way that Schaffer and 
Kment suggest. 
 
3.5 Special Science Laws 
Dunn [2010] suggests a different kind of way of amending Lewis’s similarity metric 
in response to Elga.  According to Dunn, the similarity metric should be changed by adding 
a requirement that it is important to avoid violation of special science laws.  This 
requirement is inserted into Lewis’s desiderata after the third requirement, that it is 
important to avoid “small miracles.”  Dunn’s revised similarity metric, in full, is as follows: 
1) It is of first importance to avoid big, widespread diverse violations of 
fundamental, nomological law. 
2) It is of second importance to maximize the spatiotemporal region throughout 
which perfect match of particular fact prevails 
3) It is of third importance to avoid even small, localized, simple violations of 
fundamental, nomological law 
3.5) It is of fourth importance to avoid violation of special science laws. 
4) It is of little or no importance to secure approximate similarity of particular fact. 
Note that, in the first and third requirements, we have made clear that Lewis seeks to avoid 
violations of fundamental law, so as to differentiate these requirements from the kind of match 
of special science laws that Dunn recommends.   
This approach to the comparative similarity of possible worlds offers a 
straightforward response to Elga’s challenge: a world such as w3 will be closer to the actual 
world than a world such as w4, since w3 does not violate special science laws in the way that 
w4 does.  The anti-entropic process that occurs at w4 violates the second law of 
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thermodynamics, and even though the laws of thermodynamics are not fundamental or 
without exception, such a violation of law results in w4 being farther away from the actual 
world than w3.  Thus, even though w3 and w4 are tied with respect to violations of 
fundamental law and tied with respect to the size of the region of perfect match of matters 
of fact, w3 matches the laws of thermodynamics in a way that w4 does not.  
 Perhaps there is also another, related way of responding to Elga’s objection.  Assume 
that we can determine the laws of a world in a broadly Humean fashion, according to which 
a world is associated with an ideal system that can be used to derive what is true at the world.  
As Lewis describes the project: 
 “Take all deductive systems whose theorems are true. Some are simpler, better 
 systematized than others. Some are stronger, more informative than others. These 
 virtues compete: An uninformative system can be very simple, an unsystematized 
 compendium of miscellaneous information can be very informative. The best 
 system is the one that strikes as good a balance as truth will allow between 
 simplicity and strength. How good a balance that is will depend on how kind  nature 
 is. A regularity is a law iff it is a theorem of the best system.” (1994: 231) 
On such an approach, we distinguish between laws and accidental generalizations by 
determining whether the generalization in question is a theorem of the system that achieves 
the best balance of simplicity and strength. The strength of a system is a measure of its 
informativeness, or the number of possibilities it rules out.  Determining the simplicity of 
the system is a somewhat more delicate matter: we certainly do not want an account of 
simplicity that relies on the psychology of a collection of individuals, or on the syntax of 
some language used by these individuals, lest the account of laws be too subjective.  Yet we 
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need not admit defeat so easily: there must be some notion of simplicity that supports the 
judgment that, for example, “a linear function is simpler than a quartic function” (ibid). 
 The best system account is often favored by those with Humean scruples: we can use 
such an approach, it is argued, to describe the laws of a world without appeal to any 
“spooky” unanalyzed modality, either by way of counterfactuals are nomic necessities.  The 
fabric of the world is merely a collection of objects and their properties, and the laws of the 
world are merely collections of generalizations about those objects.  An account of laws 
along these lines could make for good ideology.  If these kinds of generalizations are to play 
a role in a theory of counterfactuals, however, then a non-modal account of them is essential 
to our theory: after all, if the analysis of counterfactuals contains an important role for laws, 
then laws cannot be understood in counterfactual (or otherwise problematically modal) 
terms on pain of circularity.    
 According to such an approach, the laws are the generalizations of this “best 
system.”  But what about the other theorems that comprise the system?  Other kinds of facts 
about the state of the word might earn a place in the best system, even if we would not want 
to call these kinds of propositions laws.  These facts are useful with respect to determining 
what the world is like, even if they are not generalizations in the best system of the world.  
Consider, for example, the past hypothesis, according to which the universe began in a state 
of low entropy.39  The past hypothesis, along with the laws of statistical mechanics, can 
explain why the entropy of large systems increases over time.40  Such a fact is necessary to 
                                                        
39 See Albert [2000] for a discussion of the past hypothesis. 
40 The reduction of such laws to statistical mechanics by determining the comparative volume of 
paths through phase space, along the lines of Boltzmann is not by itself sufficient to explain the 
development of macroscopic systems.  These paths through phase space are themselves governed by 
the dynamic laws of motion, and are themselves time-reversible.  It is true that the vast majority of 
paths through phase space that begin in a region of low entropy wander into regions of high entropy 
(and ultimately equilibrium), and that once a path is in a region of high entropy, it is highly likely to 
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explain why systems evolve in the way that they do, and can be stated in a way that is quite 
simple.  It is likely, then, that the past hypothesis earns a place in the best system, given its 
simplicity and its ability to explain the behavior of macroscopic systems.41     
The idea, then, is to add the class of statements like the past hypothesis into the 
similarity metric.  Such claims are not laws, but rather theorems about the nature of the 
world.  Even though such theorems are not laws, they are still special kinds of claims about 
the nature of the world, and thus worlds in which these theorems are false are worlds that 
are importantly different from the actual world.  Our revised similarity metric, then, would 
be as follows: 
1) It is of first importance to avoid big, widespread diverse violations of 
nomological law. 
2) It is of second importance to maximize the spatiotemporal region throughout 
which perfect match of particular fact prevails 
3) It is of third importance to avoid even small, localized, simple violations of 
nomological law 
                                                                                                                                                                     
remain there.  Noting this, however, does not give us anything like an arrow of time, since these 
paths run both forwards and backwards through time.  A low entropy state will probably be in a state 
of higher entropy in the future, but it will have also probably have been in a state of higher entropy in 
the past, if we can only judge how a system is likely to evolve by the comparative volume of these 
paths. 
41 One might argue that the past hypothesis would not be part of the best system of the world, since 
even if it plays an important role in the reduction of the laws of thermodynamics, it is redundant if 
the initial conditions of the world are also a part of the best system.  Yet I would not want to be 
committed to the claim that the initial conditions are part of the best system.  First, they may score 
poorly enough on the simplicity requirement that gains made in informativeness will not be 
sufficient.  Second, it may not be the initial conditions that are so highly predictive, but rather the 
conditions of the universe at any time, if the fundamental laws are time-reversible.  Nonetheless, even 
if we concede that claims such as the past hypothesis would not be part of a “best system,” we could 
still hold that such claims are important with respect to the evaluation of counterfactuals; that is, 
there could be a category of sufficiently informative, sufficiently simple sentences that are “useful 
hypotheses” even if they are not contained in the ideal system, and these useful hypotheses could be 
used to evaluate the nearness of worlds.  
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3.5) It is of fourth importance to avoid violations of the theorems of the best system   
       that are not laws. 
4)  It is of little or no importance to secure approximate similarity of particular fact. 
This would let us see why w4 is more distant than w3: at w4, the past hypothesis is not true.  A 
world such as w4 did not begin in a state of low entropy, but rather a state of high entropy (at 
least in the “infected region”).  Thus, even though this world has the same laws as the actual 
world, w4 contains other conditions that are quite different, and would therefore be judged as 
farther away from the actual world than w3.   
 Ultimately, either the addition of a requirement to match special science laws or a 
requirement to match the theorems of the best system that are not generalizations could 
provide the requisite response to Elga.  Dunn’s proposal has the advantage of being able to 
avoid difficult questions about which propositions at a world are part of its “best system,” 
while my proposal has the advantage of avoiding difficult questions about how a Humean 
ought to accommodate the special sciences into a “best system” of the world.  Both 
approaches, it should be noted, threaten Lewis’s project of locating the “arrow of time” in 
counterfactuals: in the case of Dunn’s approach, this is because the arrow of time could be 
embedded in the laws of the special sciences, and in my approach, this is because the arrow 
of time is stipulated by the past hypothesis.  Nonetheless, the strategy of adding 
requirements to Lewis’s standard similarity metric in light of putative counterexamples 
suggests that we could also add requirements to Lewis’s metric in such a way as to 
accommodate counterpossibles.  Furthermore, thinking of laws in Humean terms gives us 
some insight into how to understand the different kinds of logical or metaphysical laws of 
impossible worlds. 
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3.6 Counterpossibles 
 The discussion so far has been concerned with the truth conditions of counterfactuals 
with metaphysically possible antecedents; it has merely been an assumption that a plausible 
account of such counterfactuals could be generalized so as to make sense of the truth 
conditions of counterpossibles.  Modifying the account to respond to Elga’s objection is 
necessary in the course of giving a complete account of counterfactuals, but we must also 
make good on the promise of providing a similarity metric that makes sense of 
counterfactuals with necessarily false antecedents. We have seen that a proposal in the spirit 
of Lewis’s similarity metric is capable of meeting an array of challenges leveled against it.  
Nonetheless, our ultimate goal is not to defend Lewis’s proposal for counterfactuals per se, 
but to offer an analysis that can accommodate counterfactuals with metaphysically 
impossible antecedents.   
 There have been few worked-out accounts of how transworld similarity might work 
in light of the existence of impossible worlds.  Nolan [1997], for example, seems to 
alternately assume that Lewis’s account of ‘similarity-in-relevant-respects’ carries over more 
or less straightforwardly in the case of impossible worlds at some points, and relies on 
intuitive judgments about the similarity of worlds at other points.  Brogaard and Salerno 
[2008] hold that a world is nearby to the extent that it holds fixed “background facts” and 
preserves “relevant” a priori consequences, which are relativized to a speaker and a context.  
Yet even if this notion of a relevant a priori consequence can be made sense of, the resulting 
account of counterpossibles is too speaker-relative to make sense of counterlogicals, or to be 
of much use in discussions of metaphysical dependence (see chapter 5).  The proper way to 
see how we could expand Lewis’s account is to look at an example and see what kinds of 
considerations may be in play.  
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 Consider, for example, a counterfactual whose antecedent is metaphysically 
impossible.  Consider an example from chapter 1: 
 (3) If mereological nihilism were true, then there would be no tables. 
Presumably, this counterpossible is true.  On a ‘nearest worlds’ approach of counterfactuals, 
this would mean that the nearest worlds where mereological nihilism is true are impossible 
worlds where tables do not exist.   
 A few assumptions for the sake of this example: first, if we are to take (3) as a 
counterpossible, we should assume that mereological nihilism is false in all possible worlds.  
This is a substantive claim, of course: not only does composition occur, but it occurs in all 
possible worlds that contain conditions favorable to how composition actually occurs.  
Furthermore, we should assume that the antecedent of (3) does not entail a contradiction.  It 
is obviously not a formal contradiction, but we should also assume that no formal 
contradiction could be derived from a statement of the theory, so as to separate (3) from the 
class of counterlogicals. 
 Why should we think that the nearest worlds where mereological nihilism is true are 
worlds without tables?  There are, after all, impossible worlds where mereological nihilism is 
true, but tables exist.  One kind of world is w5: such a world is very much like our own, and 
everything that is true in the actual world is true in w5 as well.  But w5 is an impossible world 
where we add the proposition that mereological nihilism is true to the set of truths of the actual 
world.  Such a world is, at least on one measure, very similar to the actual world: it differs 
from the actual world by the truth of only one proposition!   
 Clearly, this kind of similarity cannot be a guide to the nearness of worlds.  That is, the 
kind of match of facts that a world such as w5 bears to the actual world does not make it 
appropriately nearby because such a match comes at the expense of a violation of logical law.  
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Recall that a world such as w5 contains all the truths of the actual world, with the addition of 
the proposition that mereological nihilism is true.  Since mereological nihilism is both true and 
false, w5 contains a logical contradiction; any match of matters of fact it bears to the actual 
world are not important, given this contradiction.   
 Of course, worlds such as w5 are not the only worlds at which mereological nihilism is 
true, but where tables exist.  Consider a world such as w6, which contains all the truths of the 
actual world, with the exception of the proposition that mereological nihilism is false, and instead 
contains the proposition that mereological nihilism is true.  This world, then, lacks the logical 
contradiction that gets us in trouble in w5, but it will have other logical inconsistencies 
instead: consider, for example, the proposition that if there are composite objects, then mereological 
nihilism is false.  This proposition is, by hypothesis, true in w6, as is the proposition that there are 
composite objects.  Yet the consequent of this proposition is false in this world; thus, world w6 
contains a clear failure of modus ponens.  Once again, the impressive match of matters of fact 
that this world bears to the actual comes at the expense of a violation of logical law.   
 It should now be clear how to approach the generalization of Lewis’s similarity metric: 
just as Lewis earlier counseled that we avoid large violations of natural law, we can also hold 
that it is important to avoid violations of logical law.  A world cannot be relevantly nearby if 
it achieves a match in matters of fact and matters of nomological law at the expense of 
violating logical laws.   
 There are other ways in which mereological nihilism might be true, and that tables 
would exist.  Perhaps, in some worlds, tables are simples; call a world such as this w6.  In 
such worlds, there need not be any logical contradictions; it is not true, for example., that in 
w6, the proposition that tables have parts is true and that tables do not have parts is true as well.  
Rather, these are worlds where tables exist in virtue of violating some metaphysical, rather 
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than logical, law.  For example, w6 may be a world where tables are extended simples,
42 or 
worlds where tables are atoms and without extension.  Nonetheless, even if a world such as 
w6 does not contain a formal contradiction, it must be less similar to the actual world than a 
world where mereological nihilism is true and tables do not exist.  That is, the match of 
matters of fact that occurs in light of there being tables in both the actual world and w6 is not 
important, because a world such as w6 contains a larger “metaphysical miracle” than the 
world where mereological nihilism is true and tables do not exist. 
 We have already seen that it is necessary that our similarity metric hold that matches of 
matters of fact should not come at the expense of some logical contradiction; it is now clear 
that such matches also should not come at the expense of larger changes in metaphysical law, 
either.  We are, then, in a position to state the revised similarity metric in full: 
1) It is of first importance to minimize the degree of violation of logical laws. 
2) It is of second importance to minimize the degree of violation of metaphysical 
laws. 
3) It is of third importance to avoid big, widespread diverse violations of 
nomological law. 
4) It is of fourth importance to maximize the spatiotemporal region throughout 
which perfect match of particular fact prevails 
5) It is of fifth importance to avoid even small, localized, simple violations of 
nomological law 
6)   It is of sixth importance to avoid violations of the theorems of the best system   
      that are not laws. 
7)  It is of little or no importance to secure approximate similarity of particular fact. 
                                                        
42 See, for example, McDaniel [2007]. 
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There is one last issue, however, that needs to be discussed: What is it for a violation of 
metaphysical or logical law to be large or small?  A violation of nomological law can be great 
or small to the degree that such a violation is “large, widespread, and diverse;” this 
formulation (at least arguably) makes sense because these violations of law occur in regions 
of spacetime.  But violations of logical or metaphysical law do not obviously have any 
relation to regions of spacetime.  So how could we judge their size? 
 
3.7 Similarity and Laws 
 What counts as a greater or lesser violation of a logical or metaphysical law?  The idea 
is that a violation of law is great or small to the degree that the world in question has logical 
or metaphysical laws that are very different from the laws of the actual world.  It cannot be 
that the expressions used to describe these laws resemble each other to a greater or lesser 
degree.  How these laws are represented, in terms of natural language or some language of 
thought, is far too subjective for present purposes.  But what other way of comparing the 
similarity of laws is there?  This is a version of a problem that the defender of a Humean 
account of laws already faces, in the guise of presenting a suitably objective notion of 
simplicity.  As long as factors such as simplicity enter into the determination of what the 
laws are, there must be some reasonably objective method of determining what makes one 
candidate law more simple than another; such a determination of simplicity cannot rely on 
anything speaker-dependent and remain objective enough for these purposes.  The simplicity 
of some candidate law cannot depend on how it is formulated, since simplicity cannot 
depend on which linguistic representation we use or which (abundant) properties are used to 
formulate the theory.  In defense of a conception of simplicity that is not tied too closely to 
our interests, Lewis suggests that we formulate the laws in terms of perfectly natural 
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properties; doing so makes the simplicity problem at least tractable (see, for example Lewis 
[1983] and Loewer [1996]).  If such a suggestion can help determine how simple a law is, it 
can also be used to determined how similar two candidate laws are: once we have a kind of 
ideal language to formulate the laws, we can compare how these laws are expressed in that 
language to determine how similar they are.  Laws could be similar to the extent that they 
refer to the same kinds of objects or the same properties or relations in this privileged 
language.  On one version of the story, some objects and properties are fundamental, and it is 
the sharing of these fundamental objects, properties, and relations that make for objective 
similarity.43  
Determining the logical laws of a world, then, proceeds in a broadly Humean 
fashion: the logical laws are the generalizations that represent how the propositions of a 
world are related to one another in the best systematization of what is true at that world.  We 
can determine what the logical laws of a world are in a way analogous to how we might 
determine the physical laws of a world.  If an impossible world is a set of structured 
propositions (as in chapter 4), we can evaluate candidates for a systematization of a world by 
how well such a system accounts for the truths of that world.  A good systematization of a 
world will consist of a deductive system that derives the truth of propositions at a world 
from its other propositions in such a way that strikes a balance of informativeness and 
simplicity. The tradeoffs will look very familiar: a strong but complex system could simply 
list all the propositions true at a world; a simple but weak system could only list one (non-
maximal) truth. 
                                                        
43 I advance this theory of the similarity of laws very tentatively.  Such a theory might be problematic 
in light of chapter 5, where I discuss fundamentality in terms of counterpossibles. 
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 A world that behaves classically with respect to conjunction, for example, is a world 
such that whenever a proposition of the form    is true, so are the propositions  and ; 
similarly, whenever propositions of the form  and  are true, so is   .  Rules of 
conjunction introduction and elimination, then, would be capable of systematizing the facts 
of this world with respect to conjunction; we can account for the truth of the propositions in 
this world (at least in part) by understanding how conjunction behaves.  The (classical) 
logical rules with respect to conjunction would earn their keep in the system that makes 
sense of what is true at these worlds.  A rival law of conjunction for this world could be 
ruled out on the grounds that it is too complicated (such as, from     (  ), infer 
that   ) or not as informative (such as, from   , infer that   ). 
 One should expect ties when determining the logical laws of a world: there may be 
no way of determining which connectives to take as primitive and which to take as derived, 
and there may be no way of determining whether it is better to derive the various atomic 
truths of a world from a maximal truth, or vice versa.  Perhaps there are many equally good 
formulations of the laws of a world, or perhaps there is one proper formulation but no way 
of determining which one is correct; we need not make this choice for present purposes.  
What is important, however, is that we can determine some plausible candidates for the 
logical laws of a world, and compare those candidates to the laws of other worlds.  The 
logical laws of a world are given by the best systems of those worlds that account for all the 
logical facts; we then determine the degree of violation of logical laws in some world by 
determining the degree to which the logical laws of that world differ from the logical laws of 
our world. 
 The same approach is applied to determine the metaphysical laws of a world: the 
metaphysical laws of a world are also determined by the “best system” that properly 
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accounts for the facts of a world that relate to composition, the nature of properties, time, 
and so on.  Mereological universalism is true at a world when that theory best explains the 
facts of how objects and their parts are related at a world: in particular, mereological 
universalism is true at a world where any collection of objects compose a further object, as 
the theory of mereological universalism is an apt generalization of how composition occurs.  
Similarly, a world that contains no composite objects is a world where mereological nihilism 
is true, as that law would be an apt generalization of the mereological facts of the world in 
question.  A world that contains exactly one object may be a world where the two theories 
are tried with respect to determining the metaphysical laws of the world; perhaps both laws 
are true of this world, or exactly one law is true, but we cannot know which.  And once we 
can meaningfully determine what the metaphysical laws of a world are in such a way that 
account for all the metaphysical facts, we can determine which worlds have metaphysical 
laws that are more or less similar to the laws of the actual world.  The worlds whose 
metaphysical laws are more similar to our metaphysical laws, as expressed in some suitably 
canonical system, are worlds that contain smaller violations of metaphysical laws.  
 Even among worlds that have different metaphysical laws, there is room for these 
violations of law to be greater or smaller.  In the case of a counterpossible such as (3), we 
should expect worlds where mereological nihilism is true to be worlds with different kinds of 
objects than the actual worlds.  But we should not expect these worlds to needlessly change 
their metaphysical laws, as would be required in worlds such as w6, where metaphysical laws 
about the nature of extension must be altered as well as laws related to composition. 
 
3.8 Conclusion 
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 It is, of course, impossible to discuss every interesting counterpossible, and show 
why the intuitively correct world is more similar to the actual world than any other 
impossible world one might consider.  Nonetheless, the above discussion should provide 
sufficient guidance with respect to how the considerations of nearness discussed above 
would bear on further examples.  A world – possible or otherwise – is close to the actual 
world to the extent that, first, in minimizes violations of logical laws; second, to the extent 
that it minimizes violations of metaphysical laws; third, to the extent that it avoids large 
violations of nomological laws; fourth, to the extent that maximizes the region of perfect 
match of matters of fact; fifth, to the extent that it avoids small violations of nomological 
laws, and finally, to the extent that it avoids violations of non-lawful theorems of the best 
system (or violations of special science laws).  Counterpossibles are evaluated just as 
counterfactuals are: we determine what the laws of the world are in a broadly Humean 
fashion, and judge how different those laws are from the laws of the actual world.   
The approach to counterfactuals discussed above is unified, in the sense that there is 
a single standard similarity metric for all counterfactuals.  The similarity metric is also a 
generalization of Lewis’s similarity metric, in the sense that it does not differ from his with 
the respect to the truth of any counterfactual whose antecedent is possible, at least assuming 
we amend his similarity metric in response to Elga’s challenge as discussed above.  The 
metric is derived both from considerations about the truth values of counterpossibles as well 
as Humean approaches to law extended so as to make sense of logical and metaphysical 
laws.   
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CHAPTER 4 
WHAT ARE IMPOSSIBLE WORLDS? 
 It is well-known that the framework of possible worlds suffers from certain 
difficulties if it is to be used as an analysis of certain philosophical phenomena.  Possible 
worlds are coarse-grained, in the sense that the space of possible worlds models only what is 
logically or metaphysically possible.  Thus, analyses that make use of possible worlds face 
problems if they are to differentiate content that is logically equivalent.  The propositions 
that nine is prime and that I am a married bachelor are both impossible, but they are distinct.  I 
could, for example, believe one without believing the other; different things might be the 
case if one of these propositions were true, but not the other.  In this chapter, I address 
some of these difficulties by supplementing the possible worlds framework with impossible 
worlds, which represent ways the world could not be.  I develop an account of impossible 
worlds of a certain kind, and show how they allow us to give better analyses of philosophical 
concepts than we would be able to do with possible worlds alone. 
 In section 1, I will briefly discuss some of the limitations of possible worlds and 
potential applications of impossible worlds.  In section 2, I will develop an account of 
impossible worlds that is both ontologically innocent and robust enough to do the work 
required of these worlds.  In section 3, I respond to a version of an argument against the 
existence of impossible worlds advanced by Lewis. 
 
4.1 Uses of impossible worlds  
 Why believe in impossible worlds?  One kind of argument aims to show that we are 
already committed to the existence of impossible worlds.  In his [1973], Lewis argues that 
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possible worlds are simply ways things could have been.  We all believe that there are ways 
things could have been, and possible worlds are merely ways things could have been, so we 
all believe that there possible worlds.  Lewis backed off this argument, in least in part 
because we also all believe there are ways things couldn’t have been, as pointed out by Naylor 
in his [1986].  Since Lewis did not want to use impossible worlds to represent the ways 
things could not have been, he rejected his original argument for possible worlds.  But, we 
could also easily turn Naylor’s modus tollens into a modus ponens.  Since there are 
obviously ways things could not have been, there are obviously impossible worlds.44  
 We might also think that we are committed to impossible worlds because their 
existence is entailed by other theoretical commitments.  As King argues in [2007], depending 
on what we take possible worlds to be, we should accept the existence of impossible worlds 
as well.  If possible worlds are complete and consistent sets of sentences or propositions or 
states of affairs, there is no principled reason why we shouldn’t also believe in incomplete or 
inconsistent sets of sentences, propositions, or states of affairs.  
 The argument I want to defend here, however, does not rely on how we are to 
understand “ways,” nor does it rely on our commitment to sets and propositions.  Rather, I 
hold, with Lewis, that possible worlds earn their ontological keep by the use they can be put 
to in most fields of philosophy, playing an important role in explicating concepts in logic, 
metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics.  Yet the work done by possible worlds could be better 
done with the addition of impossible worlds.  Consider, for example, the kind of work Lewis 
puts possible worlds to in his [1986].  Lewis holds that possible worlds are extremely useful 
in explaining modality, closeness, content, and properties.  If we consider each of these 
                                                        
44 This argument is made in more detail by Vander Laan in his [1997] 
. 
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applications in turn, we can see that our understanding of each of these families of concepts 
can be improved with the addition of impossible worlds.45 
 
4.1.1 Modality 
 The most obvious application of possible worlds is to explain modality.  By 
quantifying over worlds, we can develop a much better understanding of what it is for 
something to be possible, necessary, or actual.46  We can understand the sense in which the 
laws of physics are necessary (and thus locutions such as ‘It is not possible to travel faster 
than the speed of light’) as restricted quantifications over possible worlds.  That is, ‘Nothing 
can travel faster than light’ is true because in all nomically accessible worlds (i.e., worlds which 
have the same laws of physics that our world has), nothing travels faster than the speed of 
light.  Of course, there are possible worlds that have different laws of physics, and at these 
worlds, some things travel faster than light; nonetheless, these are not the worlds we were 
quantifying over.  If we say, ‘The coin could land tails,’ we usually mean that there are 
nomically accessible possible worlds where the coin does land tails.  Similar stories can be told 
for other flavors of necessity: some worlds share our history, some worlds share facts about 
what is practical, some worlds correspond to our moral or legal obligations, and so on. 
                                                        
45 This kind of argument is similar to that of Yagisawa [1986], though I reject his account of extended 
modal realism. 
46 It is worth noting that Lewis does not think that acceptance of possible worlds is required for the 
semantics of modal and non-standard logic: we can make sense of the “possible worlds” invoked by 
the semantics of logic with set theory alone.  Nonetheless, a more robust notion of possible worlds 
could be useful to make better intuitive sense about what is being claimed about accessibility (and 
thus, modal claims) by the supporters of different logical systems in a given discussion [1986: 18-20].  
If we need “real” possible worlds to make sense of what kind accessibility relation to accept in an 
account of modal terms, then it is obvious that we need “real” impossible worlds to make sense of 
arguments about which non-classical logic to accept in an analysis of belief revision, for example.  
Most semantics of intuitionist or relevance logic, for example, make use of non-standard worlds that 
contain truth value gaps or gluts. 
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 Epistemic possibility, however, presents a challenge.  How are we to make sense of 
sentences such as ‘Goldbach’s conjecture could turn out to be false,’ or ‘relevance logic 
could be correct?’  Assuming that Goldbach’s conjecture is true and that classical logic is the 
proper analysis of the entailment relation, these are mere epistemic possibilities: for all we 
know, there could be some very large even number that is not the sum of two primes; it 
could turn out that the conclusion of some formal argument has to be relevant to its 
premises.  There is (presumably) no possible world where Goldbach’s conjecture is false, and 
no possible world where relevance logic is correct.  Nonetheless, these claims certainly seem 
to be existential quantification over worlds, in the same pattern as ‘The coin could land tails.’  
Impossible worlds would provide an attractive and straightforward way of understanding 
claims about epistemic possibility.  A logically impossible proposition could still be 
epistemically possible if we can quantify over impossible worlds.  The claim that Goldbach’s 
conjecture could be false, then, should be understood as ‘At some epistemically accessible 
world, Goldbach’s conjecture is false,’ even if there is no such possible world.  The 
epistemically possible worlds are just the worlds we think are possible.47  
   
4.1.2 Closeness 
 Possible worlds are also required to make sense of closeness.  An account of closeness 
is required to make sense of counterfactuals: when we say something like, ‘If I had missed 
the bus, then I would be late for class,’ I plausibly mean something like ‘In the closest 
                                                        
47 To be sure, impossible worlds aren’t the only way of understanding epistemic possibility, though 
they probably are the simplest.  Other accounts face various problems.  Perhaps the leading 
contender for understanding epistemic possibility is two-dimensional semantics (see, for example 
[Chalmers 2004], according to which we can make sense of some epistemic possibilities by analyzing 
the primary intensions of the propositions expressed.  This strategy is helpful in understanding some 
epistemic possibilities; two dimensions semantics is helpful in understanding how we could conceive 
of water as not being H2O.  It is less clear, however, how two dimensional semantics would help us 
understand how Goldbach’s conjecture or how some non-classical logic could be true. 
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situation where I miss the bus, I am late for class.’  The best way to make sense of such a 
‘closest situation’ is to think of possible worlds ordered by some closeness relation, as in 
[Lewis 1973].  We can then determine whether a counterfactual is true (roughly) by 
determining whether the consequent is true in the closest possible world where the 
antecedent is true.  But, it seems that there can be counterfactuals with impossible 
antecedents.  Consider ‘If nine were prime, then it would not be divisible by three.’  
Impossible worlds allow us to retain the structure of Lewis’s account of counterfactuals: we 
can say that this sentence is true because, in the nearest (impossible!) world where nine is 
prime, it is not divisible by three.48 
 Similar considerations apply to the comparative closeness of theories.  False physical 
theories can also be close to the truth to varying degrees, and we can model this in terms of 
the comparative closeness of possible worlds where these theories are true.  This seems quite 
plausible, but we might also wonder how we are to analyze our intuitions about certain 
necessarily false theories being closer to the truth than other necessarily false theories. 
Impossible worlds allow us to retain the analysis offered above: impossible worlds where 
some necessarily false theories are true are closer to the actual world than other impossible 
worlds where different necessarily false theories are true. 
 
4.1.3 Content 
 Possible worlds are also useful in discussing the content of propositional attitudes 
such as belief.  We can represent what some agent believes as the set of possible worlds that 
she thinks might be actual.  We can say that some possible worlds are doxastically accessible to 
some agent: these are the worlds that the agent think might be the actual world.  An agent 
                                                        
48 This proposal is discussed in [Nolan 1997], [Vander Laan 2007], and, of course, chapter 3 of this 
work. 
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thinks some propositions might be true iff that proposition is true in some of her 
doxastically accessible worlds; she believes some proposition iff that proposition is true in 
every doxastically accessible world.49  We then represent how an agent makes inferences by 
updating the set of doxastically accessible worlds with the acquisition of new information: as 
an agent learns something about the world, she narrows the set of worlds she takes to be 
actual.50   
 This picture, however, makes several unreasonable assumptions about the rational 
behavior of agents.  Agents are represented as being logically omniscient and perfect 
reasoners.  They believe all logical truths, since logical truths are true at every possible world, 
and therefore true at every doxastically accessible world.  The agents described in this model 
believe no contradictions, since contradictions are not true at any possible world, and 
therefore not true at any doxastically accessible world.  Finally, these agents believe the 
logical entailments of all their beliefs, since if P entails Q, and P is true at every doxastically 
accessible world, then Q is true at every doxastically accessible world as well.  Assuming we 
want these agents to be more realistic in these respects, we should look for ways to relax 
these assumptions.  Realistic agents must be permitted to believe the impossible, fail to 
believe the necessary, and fail to believe some things that follow from their other beliefs.51 
Impossible worlds provide the most straightforward remedy for this problem.  There 
are impossible worlds at which contradictions are true, impossible worlds at which not all 
                                                        
49 See, for example, [Hintikka 1962].  The model presented is a simplification of Lewis’s scheme, 
which makes better sense of belief de se. 
50 See, for example, [Stalnaker 1987]. 
51 Some might cede these points, and hold merely that the formal model described here is merely an 
epistemic ideal; the model describes perfect reasoners, and thus describes a kind of normative goal 
for reasoning.  It is certainly useful to keep the Hintikka model as a kind of ideal for rationality, but 
the extended model with impossible worlds will allow us to model more than just ideal rationality.  If 
we can describe the behavior of realistic agents, we can use it to make predictions about how people 
will behave and update beliefs, for example.    
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tautologies are true, and impossible worlds at which some propositions are true without their 
(classical) entailments.  It would, therefore, be easy to represent agents who are not logically 
perfect if we allow the doxastically accessible worlds to include impossible worlds.  If an 
agent believes in some contradiction, then all of her doxastically accessible worlds are 
impossible worlds that contain some contradiction.  If she fails to believe in some logical 
truth, then some of her doxastically accessible worlds are impossible worlds that lack this 
logical truth.  If an agent fails to believe some proposition Q that is entailed by some 
proposition P that she believes, then P is true in all of her doxastically accessible worlds, 
though some of her doxastically accessible worlds are impossible worlds where P is true but 
Q is not.  
 
4.1.4 Propositions 
 Possible worlds are also useful in providing an analysis of propositions.  Possible 
worlds also allow us to analyze propositions as functions from possible worlds to truth 
values (or, equivalently, as sets of possible worlds).  The proposition that grass is green is the 
set of all worlds according to which grass is green.  
There are, however, intuitively distinct propositions that pick out the same set of 
possible worlds: that all bachelors are unmarried and that 2 + 2 = 4 pick out the same set of 
worlds, viz. the set of all possible worlds.  Impossible worlds could differentiate these 
necessarily equivalent propositions or properties: there are, after all, impossible worlds where 
bachelors are married, and impossible worlds where 2 + 2 does not equal 4.  At some 
impossible worlds, both of these are true; at other impossible worlds, one of these 
propositions is true, but not the other.  Thus, the set of all worlds (possible and impossible) 
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where bachelors are unmarried is not the same set as the set of all worlds where 2 + 2 = 4.52  
One could then either hold that a proposition is a non-empty set of worlds, or if there were 
good theoretical reason to do so, use the empty set to represent the content of certain non-
truth evaluable expressions. 
 To be sure, the defender of a possible worlds account of properties and propositions 
has tools at her disposal to represent these entities in a more fine-grained fashion.  For 
example, one could use possible worlds to describe structured propositions, which allow us 
to individuate necessarily coextensive properties and propositions.  Though there are many 
accounts of this kind of structured entity,53 we can illustrate this strategy with the system 
Lewis sketches in [1986:56-59].  The project is to augment the possible worlds account with 
some kind of structure that mirrors the structure of the language used to express the 
proposition. On an unstructured account of propositions, for some proposition P, the 
propositions P and ~~P pick out the same set of possible worlds (viz., the set of all worlds 
where P is true).  A structured account of propositions could represent negation as a relation 
N that holds between unstructured propositions and the sets of worlds where that 
proposition does not hold.  The structured proposition ~P could then be represented as 
<N, P>, while the structured proposition ~~P could be represented as <N, <N, P>>.  On 
the structured account of propositions, P and ~~P are distinct propositions, since they pick 
out different ‘tuples. 54 
                                                        
52 Impossible worlds can also be used to distinguish necessarily coextensive properties.  We might 
think that triangularity and trilaterality are distinct properties, even though every three-angled figure is 
also a three-sided figure across all possible worlds.  Impossible worlds allow us to represent figures 
that are triangular but not trilateral, or vice versa; thus, the two properties pick out different figures in 
different impossible worlds.   
53 See, for example, King [2007] and others. 
 
54 To be sure, structured propositions will not solve every problem of hyperintensionality.  One could 
believe one, but not the other, of two necessarily equivalent and structurally isomorphic structured 
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 If structured propositions give us a fine-grained notion of properties and 
propositions, why do we need impossible worlds?  If we can come up with some entity that 
enables us to make the distinctions we need to make between properties and propositions, 
why not simply make use of them and not take on the additional ontological burden of 
impossible worlds?  Because we can do more with worlds than we can with structured 
propositions alone.  It is, of course, useful to give some perspicuous account of propositions 
in the course of metaphysics.  But we cannot simply point to some class of set-theoretic 
structures that identify and differentiate content in the right way and think that our work is 
done.  Our account of propositions must differentiate distinct propositions, but it must also 
do more: it must also pick out the objects that are able to play the role that is required of 
them by modality, counterfactuals, the content of propositional attitudes, and so on.   
Structured propositions alone cannot do this work.  As seen above, worlds are required to 
give an account of modality, content, and closeness.  It is worlds that stand in the similarity 
relations discussed in chapter 3; it is worlds that can be used to model how agents (ideal or 
otherwise) reason; it is worlds that represent ways what a believer takes to be true.  Structured 
propositions can give us fine-grained entities to individuate certain properties and 
propositions, but they cannot be put to the same use that worlds are.  
                                                                                                                                                                     
propositions.   Whether or not this is a problem for the defender of the structured proposition 
account depends on whether there is some plausible alternative treatment for such cases.  For 
example, if the equivalent and isomorphic propositions in question are that London is pretty and that 
Londres est jolie, then it is plausible that the reason that Pierre would assent to one but not the other 
are metalinguistic in nature.  Certainly, if Pierre realizes that the two sentences are equivalent (or even 
that ‘London’ and ‘Londres’ are names for the same city), then he would retract his acceptance of 
one of these propositions.  To be sure, this account is threatened if all hyperintensional content can 
be treated metalinguistically, but this does not seem to be the case.  Pierre’s confusion about 
‘London’ and ‘Londres’ is not akin to how some logicians understand non-classical entailment 
relations, and it would border on absurdity to hold that nobody grasps the meanings of their terms, 
since everyone falls short of ideal rationality. 
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 An adequate account of propositions is one on which we can put them to the kinds 
of uses argued above.   Propositions are not idle pieces of metaphysics, but rather objects 
that have modal properties, stand in entailment relations, counterfactually entail other 
propositions, are the proper targets of certain propositional attitudes, and so on.  If an 
impossible proposition is merely some ordered set, we do not have any handle on how to 
understand epistemic possibility, counterpossibles, or belief in the impossible. To say that if 
A were true, B would be true, for example, is to say (roughly) that in the nearest world where 
A is true, B is true.  It is unclear what to make of these instructions if A and B are merely 
sets: there is no theory on the table of the comparative nearness of sets.  Of course, one 
could attempt to develop such a theory, but the considerations that are generally in play with 
respect to the nearness of worlds (e.g., matching regions of matters of fact or preserving 
laws) are more naturally applied to worlds than they are to sets.  If we have impossible 
worlds, however, these questions of how to understand the work done by these propositions 
become tractable, since worlds provide the kind of framework that allows us to meaningfully 
talk about modality, entailment, counterfactuals, belief content, and the like.   
 
4.1.5 Impossible worlds and triviality 
 There is at least one serious worry about these uses of impossible worlds.  The 
reason that possible worlds play such a central role in describing modality, closeness, belief 
content, properties, and propositions is that possible worlds allow us to discuss all and only 
possible scenarios.  If impossible worlds are to play a role in our treatment of these concepts, 
we risk trivializing our analyses.  For example, we can use impossible worlds to distinguish 
the proposition that nine is prime from that some bachelor is married, since there is some 
impossible world where that nine is prime is true, but not that some bachelor is married; thus, the 
93 
 
sets of worlds are not the same.  However, it seems that we will also be forced to distinguish 
the propositions that some bachelor is married and that some bachelor is wedded since, at least 
depending how the worlds are specified, there could be impossible worlds where one is true, 
but not the other.  Intuitively, however, these are the same proposition; the content of what 
is said should not be affected merely by how we express it.  Similarly, our models of belief 
should not license outlandish inferences, and any realistic agent should be expected to make 
certain simple inferences, even if she fails to make more complex ones.  Formal 
epistemology would be trivialized if the structure provided no norm for how agents should 
reason, and provided no predictions for how agents likely will reason.  This seems true even 
if there are cases in which it is vague whether two propositions are the same, or vague 
whether some inference is outlandish or reasonable.  If the space of impossible worlds lacks 
the inferential structure of the space of possible worlds, then it is unclear what sense we can 
make of how agents update their beliefs.  The worry, then, is that impossible worlds lack the 
kind of logical structure that makes possible worlds an attractive tool for explaining many 
philosophical concepts.   
 The solution is to restrict which impossible worlds are used when giving our 
accounts of modality, properties, propositions, beliefs, and so on.  We determine which 
impossible worlds are relevant to our analysis by considering the worlds that are close to the 
actual world in some relevant sense.  For example, a proposition can be analyzed as the set 
of some restricted class of worlds where it is true; context determines whether we analyze 
the proposition as the set of all possible worlds where it is true, the set of possible worlds 
and some impossible worlds, or the set of all worlds, possible and impossible.  My response 
to the worry of triviality is that our analyses are only trivial when we allow too many 
impossible worlds into the analysis.  Rather than allow all impossible worlds to factor into 
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our analyses of modality, propositions, content, and the like, context selects the impossible 
worlds that are relevant to the task at hand.55  
 
4.2 The ontology of impossible worlds   
4.2.1 Ersatz Impossible Worlds 
 It is plausible to think of impossible worlds as ersatz constructions of some sort.  On 
pain of contradiction, they cannot be concrete.56  Perhaps they are mere fictions of some 
sort,57 but even if they are, it would be important to better characterize this fiction if it is to 
do any explanatory work.  
 If impossible worlds are constructions, what are they constructed from?  Brogaard 
and Salerno, in their [2008], argue that they are constructions out of sentences of some 
world-making language.  This kind of impossible world is intuitively plausible, since we use 
language to describe impossible scenarios in a way that cannot be done with concrete worlds 
or (perhaps) pictures.58 
 A linguistic ersatzist account of impossible worlds inherits many of the difficulties 
faced by the linguistic ersatzist program in general.  Most importantly, it is not clear that a 
world-making language would have the resources required to describe all the impossible 
worlds.  The linguistic ersatzist faces embarrassing questions about how the appropriate 
world-making language represents content related to alien individuals or alien properties.  
Furthermore, it is unclear how one could understand the meanings of the terms of the 
                                                        
55 Context could also select a relation among the structured propositions that would individuate them 
for the purposes at hand.  Perhaps the structured propositions would be divided into equivalence 
classes, but it is also likely that which propositions bear the same content will be vague, even holding 
a context fixed.  
56 See [Lewis 1986, fn 3].  I return to this argument below. 
57 See, for example [Rosen 1990]. 
58 See, for example, [Sorensen 2002] 
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world-making languages without the kind of semantic tools that already rely on possible 
worlds: the referring terms and predicates of the world-making language cannot express a 
function from possible worlds or individuals at possible worlds, as they traditionally do.  The 
ability of this language to express impossibilities would be constrained by its ability to name 
individuals and properties that do not exist in the actual world, as well as the grammar of the 
world-making language.  An account of ersatz impossible worlds that does not rely on 
language would be more fruitful. 
  
4.2.2 Worlds as simple set theoretic constructions  
 A more promising account of impossible worlds is one in which impossible worlds 
are set-theoretic constructions of possible worlds, where possible worlds are not themselves 
set-theoretic constructions.  Creating impossible worlds in this fashion has many advantages: 
it is as ontologically innocent as possible worlds, as they are merely constructions of possible 
worlds.  Furthermore, if the possible worlds remain basic in a way that the impossible worlds 
are not, then we can continue to use the possible worlds to describe metaphysical possibility 
and necessity without threat of circularity.  We can consider a few ways of constructing these 
impossible worlds to determine whether they will be able to play the role required of them in 
section 1. 
 Rescher and Brandom, in their [1979], describe what they call schematic worlds, at 
which there are truth value gaps, and inconsistent worlds, at which there are truth value gluts.  
These worlds are created from the possible worlds.  Consider two possible worlds, w1 and w2.  
Some proposition P is true at w1, and ~P is true at w2.  We can now describe a schematic 
world by a process they call schematization, or world conjunction: w1  w2 describes a world such 
that, for any proposition ,  obtains in the world iff  obtains in w1 and w2.   
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 is true at w1  w2 iff  is true at w1 and  is true at w2. 
Note that, in this schematic world, P does not obtain, since P is not true at w2 and ~P does 
not obtain, since ~P is not true at w1.  We can describe an inconsistent world by a process 
they call superposition, or world disjunction: w1  w2 describes a world such that, for any 
proposition ,  obtains in the world iff  obtains in w1 or w2.   
 is true at w1  w2 iff  is true at w1 or  is true at w2 
Note that, at this inconsistent world, P is true, since P is true in w1, and ~P is true, since ~P 
is true in w2.
59   
Not that, even though P and ~P can both be true in an inconsistent world, P  ~P 
will not be true at any world, since that conjunction is not true at any possible world; 
similarly, even though neither P nor ~P can be true in a schematic world, P  ~P will always 
be true, since that disjunction is true in all possible worlds. 
 Can Rescher-Brandom worlds do the work required of impossible worlds?  These 
inconsistent and schematic worlds describe ways things couldn’t be, since they give us 
worlds where P and ~P are both true, or where neither P nor ~P is true.  As we have seen, 
however, they do not give us worlds where contradictions are true.  This means impossible 
worlds do not describe some of the ways the world couldn’t be: namely, they don’t describe 
worlds where P  ~P obtains, or worlds where P  ~P fails to obtain.  Rescher-Brandom 
worlds, then, would conflate all of these impossibilities; if propositions are represented by 
the set of all worlds where they obtain, we would not be able to differentiate intuitively 
distinct contradictions, since they all pick out the set of no worlds.  Similarly, Rescher-
                                                        
59 Note that schematization and superposition can also be applied to the non-standard worlds, so a 
world can be both schematic and inconsistent, if we take the superposition of two schematic worlds, 
or the schematization of two inconsistent worlds. 
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Brandom worlds would be unable to represent the beliefs of logically imperfect agents who 
believe contradictions or fail to believe tautologies. 
 We could attempt to answer this problem by modifying the approach in such a way 
that the semantics given above hold only for atomic formulae, and changing our semantics 
for the evaluation of complex formulae60.  Roughly following the approach of [Restall 1997], 
we create non-standard worlds by superposing or schematizing the atomic formulae of 
possible worlds, which gives us the truth of atomic formulae, but not the complex formulae.61  
Instead, we can define how the connectives work at worlds the following way: 
~ is true at w iff  is false at w62 
   is true at w iff  is true at w and  is true at w. 
   is true at w iff  is true at w or  is true at w. 
Thus, we can have inconsistent worlds where P  ~P is true: in our original example, the 
superposed world w1  w2 describes such a case.  Since P is true at w1 and ~P is true at w2, P 
 ~P is true at w1  w2.  Analogously, at schematic worlds, P  ~P will not be true: at the 
schematized world w1  w2, P is true at w1 but not w2, and ~P is true at w2, but not w1.  Thus, 
on such a system, we are able to describe non-standard worlds where logical falsehoods are 
true and worlds where tautologies are not true. 
                                                        
60 Note that we shift here to discussion of atomic and complex formulae, rather than propositions. 
61 This is also similar to the approach of [Priest 1979]. Restall and Priest only consider worlds that are 
inconsistent. The impossible worlds described here, however, can be inconsistent or schematic. See 
also [Berto 2009], whose impossible worlds are also built from sets of possible worlds. 
62 It might seem more natural to define negation as w ~ iff w  , but this rules out the possibility 
of P and ~P being true at some world together.  If we want P and ~P to be true at some inconsistent 
world, then we cannot tie the truth of ~P to the lack of truth of P.  Rather, the model must ascribe 
falsity to some proposition independent of whether it has also ascribed truth to it.  Another strategy 
to allow P and ~P to be true at a world would be to make ~P true when P is not true at some world 
w*.  See, for example, [Dunn 1993]. 
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 This proposal still does not provide the kind of worlds required to represent all 
logical contradictions.  Our logic is weak, but it will certainly have some theorems: for 
example, the law of double negation (~~  ) is valid in this framework.  In all worlds as 
described above, ~~P is true whenever P is true.  Thus, these impossible worlds do not 
describe some ways things could not be. 
 We cannot respond to this problem simply by weakening the logic we have chosen, 
either.  We could stipulate, for example, that the law of double negation is not a theorem, 
and include in our model worlds where some proposition P can be true without ~~P being 
true, and vice versa.  But this does not address the central worry.  As long as we provide 
some system of worlds that describes some entailment relation, the theorems associated with 
that entailment relation will be true in all worlds described by the system. 
If propositions are sets of worlds as described by this kind of system, then, they 
simply will not be fine-grained enough.  Such a system will conflate the meanings of any two 
sentences that are true in the same set of worlds, given some system.  If it seemed wrong 
that all propositions that are logically true in classical logic are indistinguishable, then it 
should seem wrong that all propositions that are logically true in some weaker system are 
indistinguishable.  Thus, if impossible worlds are to let us differentiate properties and 
propositions that are necessarily coextensive, the structures provided so far are simply not 
up to the task. 
 If impossible worlds are to capture the phenomenon of epistemic possibility, these 
worlds simply do not go far enough.  As we have seen, the law of double negation is valid in 
this system.  A formula such as (~~P  P) will be true in all worlds, and thus we cannot 
make any sense of the notion that the failure of the law of double negation is epistemically 
possible in some scenario. 
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 Similarly, these impossible worlds will not solve the problem of logical omniscience.  
To be sure, since agents can now be doxastically related to Restall worlds, they can be 
represented as believing some logical falsehoods such as P  ~P.  They cannot, however, be 
represented as believing other logical falsehoods, such as ~(~~P  P).  The agents 
represented by this model will be logically omniscient with respect to the theorems of 
whatever logic is described by the worlds posited by the model: they will believe all of its 
logical truths, they will fail to believe anything that is logically impossible in the system, and 
they will accept all the relevant entailments of their beliefs.  
 A further problem with this kind of proposal is that it is not applicable to many of 
the potential applications that motivated our project.  The kinds of impossible worlds 
discussed above are all ways of representing various kinds of formal impossibilities: Rescher-
Brandom worlds give us structures where propositions such as P and ~P can be both true or 
both false, and Restall worlds give us structures where propositions such as P  ~P are true 
and P  ~P are false.  These worlds might be sufficient if our project is to provide a 
structure to represent certain logical falsehoods, but our ambitions are greater than this.  We 
are not concerned merely with formal contradictions, but impossibilities in general.   
Consider propositions such as that nine is prime or that some bachelor is married.  
Presumably, it is impossible that nine is prime, or that some bachelor is married, but we still 
want to be able to represent these propositions in a non-trivial way, if they are to serve as 
potential targets for belief (‘Bob believes that nine is prime’), antecedents of 
counterpossibles (‘If some bachelor were married, his wedding would be well-attended’) and 
so on.  But these propositions do not seem to be conjunctions of contraries.  At least on the 
surface, they attribute a property to some object.  It would be strange, then, to attempt to 
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use schematic or inconsistent worlds to describe some scenario where nine is prime: just 
what would be conjoined or disjoined to make nine prime?       
 To be sure, the proposition that some bachelor is married could be complex in a way that 
is not evident from its syntax when expressed in English.  Perhaps ‘bachelor’ is to be 
represented as ‘man’ and ‘not married,’ and thus the proposition is analyzed as that some not 
married man is married, which does seem to involve a conjunction of contraries.  Under analysis, 
all impossibilities reduce to contradictions; once we have such a formal contradiction, we can 
analyze it as the superposition of the possible worlds expressed by the contradiction’s 
conjuncts.  At some point, however, it becomes unclear how to carry out this strategy.  It is 
simply implausible that all impossibilities can be analyzed as contradictions.  How can we tell 
a similar story for that nine is prime?  If there is a formal contradiction there, it is harder to 
uncover, and it is certainly more difficult to argue for some specific formulation of this 
contradiction as the “correct” representation of the proposition. 
 
4.2.3 Worlds as complex set-theoretic constructions 
 An adequate account of impossible worlds, then, builds them not from the possible 
worlds, but rather from something capable of representing formal contradictions as well as 
impossibilities in a more general sense.  Impossible worlds are not merely set-theoretic 
constructions out of possible worlds, since the schematization or superposition of possible 
worlds does not allow us to express all the impossibilities required of a robust account of 
impossible worlds. 
 
4.2.3.1 From Possible Worlds to Structured Propositions 
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 We have already seen one method of using possible worlds to build structured 
propositions in section 1.4.  We can continue to use this system for purposes of illustration, 
though not much hangs on our choice of how we build structured propositions.  This 
system is able to differentiate intuitively distinct propositions better than the simple set-
theoretic impossible worlds.  That is, for some proposition P, P and ~~P pick out the same 
set of worlds for Restall, since the law of double negation holds at all worlds in that system.  
Lewis’s account of structured propositions, however, is able to distinguish the two: <P> and 
<N, <N, P>> are, after all, distinct ‘tuples.   
These structured propositions are also capable of representing the impossibilities that 
Restall cannot: the structured proposition that some bachelor is unmarried can be represented 
simply as the ‘tuple <E, <B, M>>, where E is a relation that holds between some property 
and the worlds where something instantiates that property; B is the unstructured property of 
being a bachelor, and M is the unstructured property of being married.     
 Of course, our work is not done yet.  For the reasons discussed above, we need 
impossible worlds if we are to make better sense of modality, closeness, and belief content.  
Nonetheless, structured propositions such as these are useful in order to describe and 
differentiate propositions in a more fine-grained way than would be otherwise available.  
Furthermore, structured propositions give us the tools necessary to construct the impossible 
worlds that are capable of giving complete accounts of epistemic possibility, the analysis of 
counterpossibles, and the contents of belief.  
   
4.2.3.2 From Structured Propositions to Impossible Worlds 
 Structured propositions are ordered sets composed of possible worlds, collections of 
entities at possible worlds, and relations between and among them.  We can then form sets 
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of these structured propositions to create worlds, which would be able to describe ways 
things could (or could not!) be.  Call these worlds structured worlds.  Structured worlds are built 
from structured propositions, rather than from worlds or superpositions or schematizations 
of worlds.  A structured proposition is true at a structured world iff that proposition is a 
member of the set that composes the world. A structured world could be complete and 
consistent, but a structured world that is not complete and consistent is an impossible world.  
If some impossible world is described by the set {A, B}, where A and B are two 
unstructured propositions, then all that is true at this world are A and B.  It does not follow, 
for example, that ~A is not true, that A  B is true, or that A  A is true, since these 
complex propositions are not members of the set {A, B}.  
 There’s little more to say about the behavior of structured worlds.   Previous 
accounts described a logic of impossible worlds, giving truth conditions for the behavior of 
logical operators and connectives, but there can be no such logic given for structured worlds 
in general.  This is because these impossible worlds are anarchic by design: any set of 
structured propositions is an impossible world.  Thus, there is no interesting logical structure 
to the space of these worlds.  Any proposition could be true at some world if that 
proposition is a member of the set that describes the world; any other proposition could fail 
to be true at that world if that proposition fails to be a member of that set.  Thus, principles 
such as the law of double negation and modus ponens will not be valid in these worlds. 
 Since there is no logic of structured worlds, they are flexible in a way that their 
competitors are not.  Impossible worlds are capable of describing any way that the world 
could not be, since structured propositions have the resources to express content in a way 
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that is arbitrarily fine-grained.  Impossible worlds will therefore be capable of representing 
epistemic possibilities that possible worlds by themselves cannot.63   
Furthermore, worlds such as these can give a formal epistemologist the structure 
required to represent agents that are not logically omniscient with respect to any logical 
system.  Since anarchic impossible worlds are arbitrary fine-grained, there are worlds that can 
represent any contradiction; an agent can be doxastically related to worlds where any logical 
principle fails; an agent can fail to be doxastically related to any world where any given 
logical truth holds; an agent can believe some proposition without believing some other 
proposition that is entailed by it in any logical system. 
If structured worlds are these kinds of set theoretic constructions, it is clear that we 
should accept them in our ontology.  They are cheap: they are merely sets composed of 
things we already accept.  We should believe in structured propositions because they are 
merely set-theoretic constructions of possible worlds, the entities in then, and relations 
between and among these things; we should believe in impossible worlds because they are 
sets of structured propositions.  Furthermore, they are useful: if we can argue from the utility 
of possible worlds to their existence, then the same kind of case can be made for structured 
worlds.  If we want to understand epistemic possibility, model the beliefs of rationally fallible 
agents, analyze propositions and properties in a more fine-grained fashion, give truth 
conditions to counterpossibles, and so on, structured impossible worlds are up to the task.   
 
4.2.3.3 Structured Worlds and Counterpossibles 
                                                        
63 As mentioned above, it is likely that a separate account will have to be given for certain other cases, 
such as the beliefs of agents who do not know the meanings of the terms they use to describe their 
beliefs. 
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Of course, if structured impossible worlds can accomplish all these tasks, they would 
be ideal vehicles to represent the impossible worlds needed for an analysis of 
counterpossibles.  Since they are merely sets of structured propositions, sets of impossible 
words could represent the impossible antecedents of counterpossibles in an appropriately 
fine-grained fashion.  Furthermore, as collections of structured propositions, they are 
capable of being systematized in the way suggested in chapter 3; we can meaningfully 
describe the logical laws of an impossible world, not because these laws are imposed by 
some logical system used to describe truth at impossible worlds, but because we can impose 
deductive systems on these worlds in such a way as to account for their facts.  It is in this 
sense that these worlds can be said to be lawful, and could therefore stand in similarity 
relations to other worlds, based on how closely their laws resemble ours and how closely the 
propositions of these worlds match the propositions true in the actual world. 
There is one further complication to discuss: an impossible world could represent 
some impossibility about modal space.  An impossible world could, for example, represent 
the claim that the structure of the space of possible worlds is best described by S3, even 
though (we can assume) it is actually described by S5; an impossible world could represent 
the claim that all worlds accessible to it are worlds where some proposition P is true, even 
though P is false in some accessible worlds; an impossible world could represent the claim 
that, if A were true, then C would be true, even if the nearest A-worlds are not C-worlds.  
But this leads to an immediate worry: earlier, I had claimed that a structured proposition is 
true at a world iff it is a member of the set that comprises that world, but now it seems that 
an impossible world can “misrepresent” the modal truths of that world. 
One kind of response to this worry is to concede that the modal truths of these 
worlds are problematic in just the way they claim to be: some counterfactual can be true at 
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an impossible world even if its consequent is not true in the nearest worlds where its 
antecedent is true.  Any attempt at giving an analysis of counterfactuals (or claims about 
necessity and possibility) assumes that the world of evaluation of these claims is a possible 
world.  Thus, questions about which counterfactuals would be true if some impossibility 
were to obtain, or questions about what would be necessary or possible from the standpoint 
of an impossible world, result in answers that are at odds with how we ordinarily understand 
our modal vocabulary.  The space of these worlds is too anarchic for us to make good sense 
of. 
A more optimistic response is that we can make sense of such modal claims in cases 
where the world of evaluation is an impossible world.  Unlike claims about matters of fact at 
these worlds, however, the truth of these claims might not depend on whether the 
appropriate structured proposition is contained in the set that comprises the world, but 
rather by the shape of modal space around that world.  Claims about whether a 
counterfactual is true or not might depend on what the closest worlds where the antecedent 
is true look like; claims about whether some proposition is necessary or possible might 
depend on what is true at the set of worlds that are accessible to the world of evaluation.  
There are, at least with respect to these modal facts, two different notions of truth, and 
whether the relevant notion of truth is that of truth qua set membership or truth qua features 
of the worlds around it depends on our interests.64  If, for example, we are interested in 
representing the beliefs of an agent that is less than ideally rational, it is important to 
determine which structured propositions are true in the set of structured world that the 
agent takes to be actual; if we are interested in representing what would actually follow from 
the truth of how this agent takes things to be, it is important to determine which impossible 
                                                        
64 Assuming that we can determine which worlds are close to an impossible world, of course; one 
such proposal is offered in chapter 3. 
106 
 
worlds are really close to (or accessible from) the worlds that the agent thinks might be 
actual.  
 
4.3 Truth and Falsity in Impossible Worlds 
4.3.1  Lewis’s Puzzle 
 In footnote 3 of his [1986], Lewis argues that impossible worlds, if they existed, would 
spread contradictions to the actual world.65  Consider a world w where both P and not-P are 
true.  It seems that both ‘In w, P’ and ‘In w, not-P’ are true. Lewis claims that ‘In w, not-P’ 
entails ‘Not: in w, P’.  The result will be that both ‘In w, P’ and ‘Not: in w, P.’ are true.  Thus, 
the contradiction is not merely contained in w, but spreads to the actual world as long as we 
are able to use an ‘in w’ operator to discuss what is true at w.  In other words, we contradict 
ourselves when we describe the goings on of impossible worlds.66   
 The solution to Lewis’ problem, as he suggests and as is discussed in more detail in 
Stalnaker [2003] and Lycan [1994], is simply to accept a less robust metaphysics of 
impossible worlds that will block the inference from ‘In w, not-P’ to ‘Not: in w, P.’  For 
Lewis, the inference is generally valid because possible worlds are concrete entities, so an 
operator such as ‘in w’ is a restrictive modifier. When we say that something is true at some 
world w, what we say is very much like what we would say if something were true in 
Massachusetts.  If it is true that, in Massachusetts, there are no Republicans, then it is not 
true that, in Massachusetts, there are any Republicans.  But impossible worlds need not be 
like Massachusetts, and operators that let us refer to the truths of impossible worlds need 
not function as restrictive modifiers.  Indeed, once we grant that impossible worlds are 
                                                        
65 Of course, putting the point this way makes it seem like Lewis is presenting some non-trivial 
counterpossible claim. 
66 Of course, not everyone would object to the threat of contradictions at the actual world.  Dialetheists 
such as Priest and Beall would not object to this result, nor might Yagisawa.  
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neither complete nor consistent, we find very little reason to hold that the ‘in w’ operator 
functions in such a way as to validate the inference in question.  
 The notion of impossible worlds here, for example, is one according to which a world 
is a set of structured propositions.  It simply does not follow from the claim that not-P is in 
some set to the claim that it is not the case that P is in that set.  Indeed, the inference clearly 
fails when both P and not-P are in that set together.  If a world fails to be consistent, then 
we should expect failures of the inference from ‘in w, not-P’ to ‘not: in w, P’; if a world fails 
to be complete, then we can expect failures of the inference from ‘not: in w, P’ to ‘in w, not-
P.’  Thus, the present conception of impossible worlds simply does not face Lewis’s threat 
that contradictions at impossible worlds will spread to the actual world.  
 
4.3.2  Dialethic Contamination 
 There is, however, another kind of contradiction contamination problem that this 
account of impossible worlds may face.  Note that we have only explicitly discussed what is 
true at an impossible world, and not what is false.  Presumably, some impossible worlds 
contain propositions that are both true and false: this is necessary in order to represent the 
beliefs of a dialetheist, or to represent the antecedents of counterpossibles that discuss 
dialethic logic.  Consider, then, an impossible world w1, at which some proposition P is both 
true and false.  What can we say about the truth of the claim, ‘in w1, P’?  Presumably, this 
claim is true: after all, P is true at w1.  But, presumably, this claim is also false, since P is false 
at w1.  Thus, it would seem that the claim ‘in w1, P’ is both true and false at the actual world, and 
thus the contradiction in w1 has spread to the actual world.  This puzzle forces us to say 
more about what it is for something to be false in a world.   
 Assuming that a proposition can be both true and false in a world, it cannot be the 
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case that a proposition is false in a world iff it fails to be a member of that world.  After all, 
set membership is classical: either a structured proposition is a member of a world or it is 
not.  Thus, if a proposition were false at a world whenever it failed to be a member of that 
world, no proposition could be both true and false at some world.  It would make more 
sense, given this system, to say that a proposition is false at a world when its negation is true.  
So, to say that some proposition is false in a world is to say that its negation is a member of 
that world. 
 Of course, this still does not give us an analysis of the ‘in w’ operator.  Inspired by 
what has been said above, we might hold that, for some proposition P and world w1, it is 
false that ‘in w1, P’ whenever ~P is true at w1.  More generally, ‘in w, ’ is false iff ‘in w, ~’ is 
true.  This allows a proposition to be both true and false at some impossible world, since a 
proposition and its negation could both be members of that world.  Yet this operator lands 
us in trouble, since the claim ‘in w1, P’ is both true and false; this is true because P is a 
member of w1, and false because ~P is a member of w1.  Thus, the contradiction within w1 
would spread to the actual world. 
 The next option, then, is to hold that some proposition is false in a world iff it is not 
true at that world.  That is, ‘in w, ’ is false iff not: (in w, ).  The negation in the 
metalanguage is ordinary, classical negation.  On this reading of the falsity conditions of the 
‘in w’ operator, a dialethia in some impossible world will not create a dialethia in the actual 
world.  Some proposition P can be both true and false in a world w1, in virtue of that world 
containing both P and ~P.  But that dialethia will not spread to the actual world, because ‘in 
w1, P’ is true (since P is a member of w1), but not false (since it is not true that it’s not the 
case that, in w1, P is true.)  The contradiction, then, would not spread to the actual world, 
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since a statement made using that operator will be false whenever it is not true.67  
 Note that it would also have been possible to define the ‘in w’ operator by first 
describing its falsity conditions (in terms of set membership), and the describing its truth 
conditions (in terms of the negation of its falsity).  These operators, of course, are not 
equivalent: if P is both true and false in w1, then ‘in w1, P’ would turn out to be only false if 
the operator were described in this second way.  What are we to make of these different 
ways of defining the ‘in w’ operator?   
 One could argue that it is better to define the operator in terms of truth, since truth is 
metaphysically or conceptually prior to falsehood.  That is, even though truth and falsity are 
duals of one another, truth is somehow privileged in the structure of the reality, and thus 
when we consider what the facts of worlds are, it is appropriate to make use of a logical 
operator that conceptually privileges the truths of a world over its falsehoods. 
 If one is not comfortable with this metaphysics, one could also keep both operators.  
A locution such as ‘in w’ is ambiguous between describing a world (roughly) in terms of its 
truth and in terms of its falsehoods.  Some contexts might favor one reading over the other; 
in other contexts, it would not matter which operator we use, and so there would be 
harmless semantic indeterminacy.   
 Regardless of how the details are filled in, it should be clear that the defender of 
impossible worlds has nothing to fear from other-worldly contradictions.  The problem 
raised by Lewis is not an issue for this account of impossible worlds, since they would not 
license the kind of inference from ‘in w, ~P’ to ‘~in w, P’ that Lewis discusses.  The modified 
problem, restated in terms of truth and falsity, would not be a problem either, since there is a 
                                                        
67 This analysis also makes sense of truth value gaps. Consider now a world w’, where P is neither true 
nor false.  This is a world of truth value gaps, rather than truth value gluts.  What are we to make of a 
statement such as ‘in w’, P’?  It is not true, since P is not a member of w’.  Since the ‘in w’ operator’s 
falsity conditions are classical, it will be only false that ‘in w’, P.’ 
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reasonable, classical reading of these operators that does not result in any contradiction at 
the actual world. 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have argued for a particular conception of impossible worlds.  We 
should accept impossible worlds so construed because they are ontologically cheap and 
theoretically useful.  We can use these worlds to describe ways the world could not be.  
Moreover, we can use these worlds to make better sense of epistemic possibility, the analysis 
of counterpossibles, the content of belief, and the analysis of properties and propositions, 
and we can use these worlds to distinguish properties and propositions that would otherwise 
be conflated. 
 This proposal is also capable of answering objections related to the “spread” of 
contradictions from impossible worlds into the actual world.  Lewis’s argument against 
impossible worlds will not work because these worlds do not allow one to reason from ‘in 
some world, not-P’ to ‘not: in some world, P.’  Furthermore, the version of the argument 
that makes use of what is true and false at impossible worlds can be met if one is careful to 
introduce operators that allow one to describe what is true and false at these worlds. 
Thus, structured impossible worlds are both adequate to the task of serving as the 
impossible worlds needed in our theory of counterpossibles, and are immune to several 
kinds of objections one might level against impossible worlds.  They are robust enough to 
represent the kinds of content they would need to represent; they are capable of standing in 
similarity relations; they do not “spread” contradictions to the actual world; and they are 
easily added to our ontology because they are merely set theoretic constructions of possible 
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worlds.  In short, this kind of impossible world should be accepted because it is serviceable, 
cheap, and logically unproblematic. 
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CHAPTER 5 
DEPENDENCE AND COUNTERPOSSIBLES 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 Discussion of grounding or metaphysical dependence is common in philosophical 
discourse, and one often invokes the notion of grounding or dependence in the course of 
giving an analysis of some class of objects, properties, or phenomena.  Moral properties 
might be said to be grounded in or depend on physical properties; the existence of some 
object might depend on the existence of its parts (or vice versa); mental properties might be 
grounded in physical properties; semantic facts might depend on facts about usage; the 
beliefs of some agent might depend on her credences, and so on.  Other cases are somewhat 
more subtle.  Sometimes, a philosopher will argue that we should countenance some entity 
in our ontology, at least in part because it is ‘nothing over and above’ things we already 
believe in.  In other cases, a philosopher will consider herself entitled to accept a certain 
collection of facts because they are true ‘in virtue of’ some other collection of facts.  In all of 
these cases, there is either an implicit or explicit appeal to the grounding relation.68 Having a 
better understanding of the grounding relation would give us a better understanding of what 
is at stake when we reduce some phenomenon to some other phenomenon, believe that 
                                                        
68 One might worry, of course, that there is more than one notion that corresponds to our 
locutions of dependence, and thus hold that talk of “the grounding relation” is misleading.  
Perhaps there is no single notion that corresponds to such a relation (see, for example, 
Hofweber [2009]), or perhaps there is a family of such relations (see, for example, Bennett 
[forthcoming] on building relations).  Nonetheless, I will optimistically assume that there is a 
notion of dependence to which we can give a unified analysis.  If attempts to give such an 
analysis falter, or seem wildly disjunctive, then we could treat that as evidence that there is 
more than one dependence relation after all. 
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some objects depend on some other objects, or accept some truths as holding ‘in virtue of’ 
other truths.   
 The grounding relation itself might also play a role in the analysis of other concepts 
in philosophy.  For example, we might hold that grounding plays a role in a developed 
theory of truthmaking (see Schaffer [2010]), if we hold that truthmakers are the fundamental 
entities that ground the truth of propositions.  Rosen [2010] and Trogdon [2010] describe 
intrinsicality in terms of grounding.  Nor is discussion of grounding new to philosophy; the 
Euthyphro dialogue, for example, seems to involve a discussion of whether piety is 
grounded in the attitudes of the gods, or whether the attitudes of the gods are grounded in 
piety.     
 Most accounts of grounding or dependence attempt to explicate it in modal terms, as 
in supervenience accounts, or merely take it as primitive.  Yet there are well-known 
problems with the supervenience account of grounding, and an attempt to take such a 
crucial notion as primitive might strike some as disappointingly unilluminating.  The 
approach favored in this chapter is a hybrid account that analyzes the notion of dependence 
in counterfactual terms as well by explanation.  A depends on B iff a) if exactly one of either 
A or B were true, then it would be B that is true, and b) A is explained by B.  Developing 
and defending this view, however, will require a discussion of the counterfactual conditional 
stated above, as well as the role to be played by explanation. 
 Some preliminaries: I will use locutions such as ‘dependence,’ ‘metaphysical 
dependence,’ and ‘grounding’ interchangeably.  I also assume that this is the same relation 
that others refer to with locutions such as ‘is true in virtue of’ or in discussions about 
metaphysical or ontological priority.  Thus, at least for present purposes, ‘A depends on B,’ 
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‘A is grounded in B,’ and ‘A is true in virtue of B,’ and ‘B is prior to A’ all mean the same 
thing.   
 I take the grounding relation to hold between propositions.  When we say that A 
depends on B (or A is grounded in B), we should construe A and B as standing for 
propositions.  Some authors with stricter ontological scruples might balk at this.  To be sure, 
nothing here hangs on any particular conception of propositions, as long as they are fine-
grained enough to represent the content of necessary truths and falsehoods; we could easily 
substitute equivalence classes of sentences for propositions.  For some purposes, one might 
prefer a grounding relation that takes the relata to be objects or properties, so as to make 
sense of claims such as, ‘The whole is grounded in its parts’ or ‘mental properties depend on 
physical properties,’ respectively.  Such claims can be construed as propositions about the 
existence of these objects or instantiation of these properties, such as that the whole exists is 
grounded in that its parts exist or that mental properties M are instantiated depends on that physical 
properties P are instantiated.69  
 
5.2 Some Theories of Dependence 
5.2.1 Against Supervenience 
                                                        
69 Claims about the dependence of one object on another might not always reduce to claims 
about the existence of one object being dependent on the existence of another.  Perhaps 
something stronger is being claimed: when we say that a house depends on its bricks, we are 
not merely saying that the existence of the house depends on the existence of its bricks.  We 
might also be claiming that the house depends on the bricks and their particular arrangement; we 
might also be claiming that any change in the house’s intrinsic properties must correspond to 
some change in the properties of the bricks.  Of course, none of this is to say that a 
reduction of object-dependence to property-dependence is impossible.  Rather, it seems that 
determining the exact properties that stand in the dependence relation might depend on 
what one means by a particular claim of object- or property-dependence.   
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 Claims about dependence were once analyzed as claims about supervenience.  One 
might claim that we can understand metaphysical dependence in terms of patterns of 
existences, or the instantiations of properties, or the truth of certain propositions across 
worlds.  Different supervenience claims will correspond to different grounding relations, to 
be sure, but assuming that the relata of the dependence relation are propositions, there is a 
very straightforward account of dependence by way of supervenience: 
(Dependence as Supervenience) A depends on B iff no two possible worlds differ 
with respect to the truth of A but agree with respect to the truth of B.  
On such an account, metaphysical dependence is the necessary co-variation of truth.  This is 
in line with a project of attempting to secure a theory of reduction without adopting any 
kind of heavy-weight or spooky notion of ontological dependence; there is no dependence 
relation apart from what is true about the various entities across worlds.     
 As pointed out by Schaffer [2009] and others, the supervenience relation has the 
wrong formal features to capture the notion of dependence in question: supervenience is 
reflexive and non-asymmetric, while metaphysical dependence is not.  Supervenience is 
reflexive because everything supervenes on itself: there can be no change in something 
without a change in that very thing; supervenience is non-asymmetric because when A and B 
co-vary necessarily, A supervenes on B and B supervenes on A.  Dependence, on the other 
hand, is irreflexive and asymmetric, since nothing depends on itself, and if A grounds B, 
then B cannot ground A.70  
 There might be an easy fix for these formal problems, however.  The spirit of a 
supervenience account, after all, is merely that we explain dependence in terms of what is 
                                                        
70 It is possible that in some cases, something can ground itself.  But we presumably do not 
want this to always be the case, nor should it be the case that something is the sole ground of 
itself. 
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true at various possible worlds.  If the simple supervenience account fails, then perhaps a 
small modification is in order: 
(Dependence as Asymmetrical Supervenience) A depends on B iff a) A supervenes 
on B (as described above), and b) B does not supervene on A.  
This account neatly solves the worries of reflexivity and symmetry.  On this account, nothing 
depends on itself, since the second clause of the analysis cannot be satisfied when A=B.  
Similarly, the relation is now asymmetric, since there must be some difference between the 
A-worlds and B-worlds for A to depend on B.   
 Even our revised account of dependence by supervenience, however, is inadequate 
as an analysis of metaphysical dependence. The grounding relation is hyperintensional in a 
way that supervenience is not.  Even though all necessary truths trivially supervene on my 
existence, it should not be the case that (say) the truth of 2 + 2 =4 depends on my existence.  
Furthermore, the null set grounds other pure sets, {Socrates} is grounded in Socrates, and 
so on.  Yet, since each of these pairs exists in the same possible worlds, (Dependence as 
Supervenience) would hold that they depend on each other, while (Dependence as 
Asymmetrical Supervenience) would hold that neither one depends on the other.  
 
5.2.2 Against Naturalness 
 According to Bricker [2006], A metaphysically depends on B if A supervenes on B, 
and B is perfectly natural.  Note that Bricker offers this as merely the basis of an analysis of 
grounding.  First, this is merely a sufficient condition for metaphysical dependence: the 
analysis requires that the more basic proposition be perfectly natural, yet this will not be the 
case in many interesting examples of metaphysical dependence.  Second, this account 
requires a notion of naturalness that is appropriate in the discussion of propositions.  
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Naturalness, after all, is generally thought of as applying to properties and relations.  A 
derived notion of naturalness that can apply to propositions must be deployed if this notion 
is to be of use in a discussion of propositions depending on other propositions.71 
 These problems are not insurmountable.  At least at a first pass, it would be quite 
easy to generalize Bricker's account so as to make sense of a great many more of the kinds of 
examples we are interested in: A depends on B iff A supervenes on B and B is more natural 
than A.  A proposition is perfectly natural if it attributes some perfectly natural property to 
some perfectly natural object; one proposition is then more natural than another if it 
contains fewer conjunctions or disjunctions of perfectly natural propositions, as in Lewis 
[1983].  As long as one can make sense of this notion of naturalness, then this analysis of 
dependence seems tempting.  If we are inclined to think that mental facts depends on 
physical facts, it is because the mental facts supervene on the physical facts, and the physical 
facts are more natural (in Lewis’s sense) than the mental facts.    
 What can be said about the Socrates/{Socrates} dilemma?  Presumably, the defender 
of the naturalness approach would want to say that the existence of {Socrates} depends on 
the existence of Socrates, and not the other way around.  This is because, in the first place, 
the existence of {Socrates} supervenes on the existence of Socrates: no two worlds differ 
with respect to the existence of {Socrates} and Socrates.  Furthermore, the proposition that 
Socrates exists is more natural than the proposition that {Socrates} exists. 
 But what licenses the naturalness theorist to claim that Socrates is more natural than 
{Socrates}?  It cannot be, of course, that {Socrates} depends on Socrates; saying this would 
blatantly court circularity.  Nor does it seem that the suggestion of counting the number of 
                                                        
71 Similarly, we would need some derived notion of fundamental objects if we are interested 
in how objects depends on other objects. 
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conjuncts or disjuncts of perfectly natural properties is appealing.  It is, after all, entirely 
unclear how to build up the property of being {Socrates} out of the perfectly natural 
properties.  It is even more difficult to see how to do this if the perfectly natural properties 
are the properties used by fundamental physics.72 
 It would be better to describe naturalness in terms of metaphysical dependence, 
rather than the other way around.  After all, the notion of naturalness in play is itself rather 
mysterious.  Indeed, the notion was mysterious enough when applied to properties and 
relations; it is only more mysterious when applied to propositions.  Once we have an analysis 
of the notion of grounding, we can use it to determine which properties are more or less 
natural; the more natural properties are those that ground the less natural properties.  One 
may well reply that the notion of metaphysical dependence is at least as mysterious as the 
notion of naturalness, and so we gain nothing by complaining about the mysteriousness of 
the notion of naturalness employed by Bricker.  This charge, however, is premature: if we are 
unable to come up with a satisfactory account of dependence in terms that are more 
tractable than naturalness, then this reply would have force.  But there are still more tools 
that we might use in our analysis, and these tools might yet give us a better understanding of 
how grounding works than we would have if we analyzed grounding in terms of naturalness.   
 Perhaps one could argue that naturalness is of use in other domains, and so we 
should accept naturalness for the sake of its usefulness: a notion of metaphysical naturalness 
                                                        
72 One could claim that Socrates is more fundamental than {Socrates} because, however 
many conjunctions and disjunctions of natural properties are required to make sense of the 
proposition that Socrates exists, one more – namely set membership – is required to make 
sense of the proposition that {Socrates} exists.  But this does not seem like the proper way of 
determining the degree of naturalness of impure sets.  First, it is a matter of some dispute 
whether {Socrates} has many of the kinds of properties that Socrates has, such as mass or 
spatial location.  Even if the set did inherit Socrates’s physical properties, this approach to 
naturalness would have the result that {Socrates} is as fundamental as Socrates-plus-some-
electron, or that {Socrates} is more fundamental than the singleton of any “simpler” entity. 
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is useful with respect to giving an answer to Kripkenstein- or Goldman-related problems of 
induction, for example, or in an account of duplication and similarity.  Yet rather than being 
an argument for accepting the notion of naturalness as is, this might rather be construed as a 
more urgent demand to explain naturalness by way of other, better-understood notions.  If 
there is an account of metaphysical dependence, and that account can be used to explain 
naturalness, then we can freely appeal to the notion of naturalness to solve these puzzles.    
    
5.2.3 Against Explanation 
 One might also attempt to analyze the dependence relation by way of explanation.  
According to the simplest version of such a view, A depends on B iff B explains A.  The 
relation of metaphysical dependence, then, is analyzed solely in terms of the relation of 
explanation.  Such an account holds some promise if we are to overcome the difficulties of 
the supervenience approach.  It is at least plausible that explanation is hyperintensional in a 
way that supervenience is not; for example, the existence of Socrates has a different 
explanation than the existence of {Socrates}, even if the two entities exist in the same set of 
possible worlds.  Furthermore, intuitions about explanation seem to capture many of the 
fundamental features of the relation of metaphysical dependence: if the truth of some 
proposition is explained by the truth of some other proposition, then it seems that the 
explananans is more fundamental than the explanandum, and perhaps the explanandum is true in 
virtue of the explanans. 
Of course, a complete defense of such a view would require saying much more about 
what it is for the truth of one proposition (or collection of propositions) to explain the truth 
of another.  Doing so would be outside the scope of this paper, but a few comments are in 
order.  The notion of explanation in question cannot be pragmatic, such as that of Van 
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Fraassen [1977], lest the account of metaphysical dependence be similarly pragmatic.  Nor 
can explanation be strictly causal, as in Lewis [1986b] or Scheffler [1957], as our account of 
explanation must be general enough to make sense of the dependence facts of propositions 
that lack causal histories, such as logical and mathematical propositions.73  This is not to say 
that many instances of explanation are not causal in nature, or that causation can play no role 
in the analysis.  Nonetheless, if our account of explanation requires that causation play some 
central role, and that logical, mathematical, and metaphysical truths do not stand in causal 
relations, then it is not clear how these necessary propositions could stand in explanatory 
relations, and thus not clear how they could stand in relations of metaphysical dependence, 
either.   
 There are, however, accounts of explanation that could meet these challenges.  One 
account of explanation that can answer these kinds of challenges is a unificationist approach, 
such as that of Friedman [1975] and Kitcher [1989].  According to such an account of 
explanation, one provides an explanation of some phenomenon by showing how it fits into a 
unified theory of the entire world, where a unified theory is one that contains relatively few 
primitives or argument types.  To be sure, our present account of dependence does not 
require a unificationist account of explanation; it merely requires that there be some theory 
of explanation that is appropriately hyperintensional and non-pragmatic. 
 How could the account of dependence as explanation function in practice?  For 
some kinds of cases, the explanation account of dependence seems to be on the right track: a 
collection of facts about some microphysical system explains the facts of the corresponding 
                                                        
73 Indeed, if causation were sufficient for dependence, then there would be many spurious 
instances of dependence.  For example, a dualist who holds that physical events can cause 
mental events could wrongly be said to hold that those mental events thereby depend on 
physical events. 
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macrophysical system, and thus the microphysical system grounds the macrophysical system.  
Depending on how our theory of explanation is ultimately formulated, we could say that the 
world as described in terms of microphysics uses a smaller vocabulary of entities and their 
properties and relations.  In the case of Socrates and his singleton, this proposal is 
committed to the claim that the existence of Socrates explains the existence of {Socrates}, 
and that the existence of {Socrates} does not explain the existence of Socrates.  Intuitions in 
this case seem somewhat less straightforward, to be sure, but one certainly could argue that 
the existence of an individual explains the existence of a set that contains that individual, and 
not vice versa.  It is more economical to describe the world in terms of individuals and their 
relations rather than it is to describe it in terms of sets and their features.  This is easiest to 
see if we assume that impure sets are not located in space and time and do not have the 
physical properties of their concrete elements such as mass: it would not be clear, for 
example, how to recover physical features of Socrates such as his location and mass and 
lineage from truths about {Socrates}, while determining the features of {Socrates} requires 
no tools that are not provided by the principles of set theory.  Thus, we could describe the 
world in terms of objects such as Socrates and derive truths about the sets that contain 
them, but we cannot describe the world in terms of objects such as {Socrates} and then 
derive truths about their members.  What if impure sets have the physical properties of their 
members?  If we allow that sets such as {Socrates} could have the physical properties of 
their members and stand in causal relations, then we lose the kind of asymmetry mentioned 
above.  But there is a different kind of asymmetry: Socrates has the property of being a 
member of {Socrates}, while {Socrates} has the property of containing Socrates as an 
element.  The question of which kind of property makes for a more economical description 
of the world would then come down to a debate over whether describing the world in set-
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theoretic facts (and then deriving the physical facts) is easier (e.g., makes use of fewer 
primitives) than describing the world in physical facts (and then deriving the set-theoretic 
facts).  I assume a description of the world in set-theoretic terms will face difficulties with 
respect to various modal and other properties of sets, but if the world could ultimately be 
described just as easily in set-theoretic terms, then I would accept this as evidence that 
Socrates might not ground {Socrates} after all. 
 Other kinds of cases are more problematic for a reduction of dependence to 
explanation.  One paradigmatic kind of explanation is that of explaining the present state of 
the universe by citing a previous state and the laws: some state of the universe at t0, in 
conjunction with the laws of physics, explains a latter state of the universe at t1. Yet it does 
not seem right to say that some previous state of the universe (along with the laws) grounds a 
latter state of the universe; there is a causal and explanatory connection between the past and 
the present, but not a connection of metaphysical grounding.  Thus, it seems that even if the 
notions of explanation and dependence are related, they are not equivalent; explanation is 
not a sufficient condition for dependence.   
 Of course, the advocate of a view of dependence as explanation has a number of 
ways of revising the theory to accommodate this challenge.  One could attempt to combine 
the explanation requirement with a modal requirement, or one could attempt to focus on a 
particular kind of explanation that is not present in the past-present case.  I will discuss both 
of these options in turn.   
If explanation is not sufficient for metaphysical dependence, then perhaps the 
account should be supplemented with one of the modal notions discussed above.  The most 
straightforward strategy would be to combine the requirements of explanation and 
supervenience, which would result in something close to Horgan’s relation of 
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superdupervenience:74 such an approach, however, would still wrongly hold that the past and 
the laws ground the present state of the universe.  At least if determinism is true, the state of 
the world at some earlier time t0 and the laws explain and entail some subsequent state of the 
world at time t1, and thus the state of the world at t1 also supervenes on the state at t0 and the 
laws.  This is because if some previous state (at t0) and the laws entail the present state (at t1), 
it then follows that the state of the world at t1 could not be different unless either the laws or 
the state at t0 were also different.
 75   
It also will not help to analyze metaphysical dependence in terms of explanation and 
asymmetrical supervenience.  Such an approach would still wrongly hold that the present 
metaphysically depends on the past and the laws, since some state of the world asymmetrically 
supervenes on the laws and a past state of the world.  This is because one cannot alter the 
present without altering the laws or the past, but the opposite is not true: state of the world 
at t1 could be derived from more than one set of initial conditions and dynamic laws.
76  
Furthermore, recall that other paradigmatic cases of grounding do not meet the asymmetrical 
supervenience requirement: the existence of {Socrates} supervenes on the existence 
                                                        
74 Horgan discusses this relation is his [1993], and defines it as “ontological supervenience 
that is robustly explainable in a materialistically explainable way,” where to give a robust 
explanation of supervenience “is to explain it qua ontological, rather than explaining it 
merely as a feature of the “logic” of the higher-order terms and concepts.”  Such an account 
is meant to make sense of physicalist-friendly reductions (or pseudo-reductions) of higher-
order properties to lower-order properties.  If we are to approach metaphysical dependence 
in full generality without commitment to physicalism, we need not hold that the explanations 
in question need to be “materialistically explainable.” 
75 What if determinism is false?  If the laws are merely stochastic, then our theory of 
explanation would also have be different so as to make sense some previous state of the 
world and laws making some latter state highly probable, rather than being guaranteed.  The 
supervenience claim would then return, restated as a claim about probability: there can be no 
change in the objective chance of the current state obtaining without some change in the 
previous state of the world or the laws. 
76 This is not to be confused with the claim that the past supervenes on the present state and 
the laws, which may be true depending on how the physical laws are formulated. 
124 
 
Socrates, and the existence of Socrates supervenes on the existence of {Socrates}, and thus, 
according to such a proposal, Socrates will not ground {Socrates}. 
   Perhaps the dependence relation cannot be analyzed as explanation per se, but rather 
as some non-causal kind of explanation.  Assume that there is some sense to be made of a 
specifically non-causal notion of explanation: could this kind of explanation (perhaps in 
concert with a further modal requirement) be capable of analyzing the relation of 
metaphysical dependence?  Such a theory would not hold that the present depends on the 
past and the physical laws, since such an explanation would certainly be causal.  Yet there are 
also cases of non-causal explanation that do not seem to be cases of metaphysical 
dependence.   
 One might attempt to explain why, in some population, for each male born, there are 
1.04 females born.  One could attempt to explain this causally, by citing facts about sperm 
and egg cells, but one could also offer a non-causal explanation that cites evolutionary 
factors: it is advantageous to the population to have a 1:1 ratio of males to females at 
reproductive age, and, for various reasons, males are somewhat more likely than females to 
die before reproducing.  This explanation is not causal: rather than citing earlier facts about 
features of the population and relevant dynamic laws, we cite certain facts about features of 
the population in the future to explain the sex ratio.  Yet perhaps one could argue that this 
evolutionary kind of explanation is simply not a real explanation, as the evolutionary 
explanation appealed to is plausibly a stand-in for a far more complex explanation about past 
populations and their genetic features and reproductive successes.77 
                                                        
77 This example is discussed in Kitcher [1989], and a closely-related example is discussed in 
Sober [1983]. 
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A clearer example is Hempel’s pendulum [1965]: consider that the period of a 
pendulum is explained by the length of its rod, as well as the formula t = 2πl/G.  This 
explanation is not causal: the length of the rod is not a cause of its period having a certain 
value; the pendulum’s period is simply a function of the length of the rod and gravity.  In 
this case, there seems to be a non-causal explanation of the period of pendulum from its 
length and from gravity; there is also (asymmetrical) supervenience of the period of the 
pendulum on the length of the rod and the force of gravity, but we should not say that the 
length of the rod, the force of gravity, and the equation above ground the pendulum’s period.  
The length of the rod is not  metaphysically prior to the period of the pendulum, nor is the 
period of the pendulum prior to the length of the rod. 
We could also consider another kind of example.  One might try to explain why a 
star has ceased collapsing by citing the Pauli Exclusion principle: given constraints on the 
properties that collections of subatomic particles can have, there is simply no possible state 
in which the star collapses further.  Such an explanation cites certain nomic laws, but it does 
not refer to any causal or dynamic law; there is no claim about how the system develops 
given some previous state, but rather a claim that a certain range of states of the system are 
simply not possible.78  Yet we would not want to say that the failure of the star to collapse 
further metaphysically depends on the Pauli exclusion principle.  Once again, there can be a non-
causal explanation, (asymmetrical) supervenience, but not metaphysical grounding.79  
                                                        
78 Note that Lewis [1986b] holds that this is not an example of genuine explanation; rather, 
stating that the Pauli exclusion principle holds that the star cannot collapse further merely 
denies that there is any possible explanation for why the star cannot continue to collapse.   
79 Note that the pendulum example and the collapsing star example are also cases of 
synchronic explanation: we need not appeal to some system at different points in time to give 
an explanation of the explanandum.  Thus, it does not seem possible to gloss ‘non-causal 
explanation’ as ‘synchronic explanation.’ 
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 This notion of non-causal explanation is not the only option on the table for the 
defender of the explanation view of grounding.  Perhaps the kind of explanation in question 
should be a version of what Cummins refers to as a property theory or what Poland refers to as 
a realization theory.  For Cummins, a property theory is best viewed in contrast to a transition 
theory: a transition theory explains why a system is in the state that it is in, given some 
previous state; a property theory, however, explains “What it is for S to instantiate P, or in 
virtue of what does S have P” [Cummins 1985: 15].  For Poland, a realization theory is 
something that, for some higher-level attributes N, “abstractly characterizes the kinds of 
attributes that are sufficient for the realization of N and that shows how such attributes can 
combine to actually constitute N in particular cases.” [Poland 1994: 210]. Note that both of 
these views of explanation are very difficult to state without slipping into locutions such as 
‘in virtue of’ or ‘realizes,’ and ‘constitute,’ which are themselves the very target of this 
discussion.  This is not to say that there is no way of making sense of a notion of explanation 
that is capable of making sense of the dependence relation, but it does not seem that any of 
the plausible contenders are up to the task. 
 
5.2.4 Against Primitivism 
 One tempting response to worries about the nature of the dependence relation is 
simply to take it as primitive.  Rosen [2010] and Schaffer [2009] hold that the notion of 
metaphysical dependence is clear enough to use in without an analysis.  After all, we have a 
reasonably intuitive grasp of what is meant by the kinds of locutions of dependence 
mentioned above, even if they are difficult to explain in a perspicuous fashion.  We agree on 
certain paradigm cases, such as that the existence of {Socrates} depends on the existence of 
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Socrates.  If we have availed ourselves of the notion of dependence for thousands of years, it 
would seem odd to now hold that the notion is too mysterious on its own. 
 While I am rather sympathetic with these remarks, it simply does not follow that we 
should abandon our pursuit of an analysis of the grounding relation.  After all, we have 
reasonably robust intuitions of what knowledge is, and there is broad agreement about the 
paradigm cases of knowing and not knowing.  Yet this fact does not stop philosophers from 
attempting to better understand knowledge in other terms (pace Williamson).  
Epistemologists are still in business, and still providing accounts that seek to provide 
plausible and informative theories of knowledge that could then be used to better 
understand the concept and settle other debates in and around epistemology. 
 Furthermore, we might hope that an analysis of the dependence relation in other 
terms might illuminate why it functions in the way it does.  Perhaps a successful analysis 
would give us some guidance in understanding more contentious examples of grounding; a 
good account of grounding might then be useful in determining whether, for example, the 
existence of a heart depends on a body, or if the existence of a body depends on the heart 
(inter alia).  More interestingly, an account of grounding could then be used to help settle a 
debate such as that between the priority monism and pluralism, or between the reductive 
and non-reductive materialist.  If this is too much to ask of our theory, we might also have a 
more modest task for our analysis of dependence.  If the analysis determines why the 
dependence relation seems vague or contentious in certain kinds of cases, then that too 
would be an interesting result.  Even if the proper analysis of dependence cannot resolve 
long-standing debates, it could still explain why these debates seem so difficult, and point 
toward the deeper sources of disagreement that spur these arguments. 
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 To be sure, if our best attempts at analyzing the dependence relation fail, we could 
adopt primitivism about grounding as a kind of fallback position.  It would be misguided to 
stop providing philosophical analyses of phenomena in terms of other phenomena just 
because we cannot explain the grounding relation.  Nonetheless, if some account of 
grounding does seem plausible, and provides guidance in more problematic cases, then such 
an account would be a welcome improvement over primitivism about grounding.    
 
5.2.5 A Simple Counterfactual Approach 
 Schaffer, in his [2009], suggests (though does not endorse) a counterfactual strategy 
for dependence.  According to such a strategy, metaphysical dependence is a species of 
counterfactual dependence: 
(Counterfactual) A depends on B iff, if B were not true, then A would not be true, 
but if A were not true, then B might still be true. 
This proposal could either be construed as an independent account of dependence, or as an 
additional requirement to shore up the supervenience account.  In either case, such an 
account has some clear advantages: it provides the asymmetry required of the metaphysical 
dependence relation and it casts metaphysical dependence in a similar light to that of 
counterfactual dependence.  Perhaps the dependence relation is similar to, or even a 
generalization of, causation, and perhaps (something like) a counterfactual analysis is 
appropriate for causation.  Thus, a kind of counterfactual analysis should be on offer for 
metaphysical dependence. 
 Of course, Schaffer does not endorse anything like this counterfactual account of 
dependence.  For one thing, such an account would clearly require the use of 
counterpossibles, or counterfactuals with necessarily false antecedents: the antecedents of 
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both the ‘might’ and ‘would’ conditionals will often be metaphysical impossibilities.  For 
example, it is quite plausible that {} depends on the empty set.  It is, however, 
metaphysically impossible that either {} or the empty set does not exist, so both 
counterfactuals have necessarily false antecedents.  Schaffer assumes that such 
counterfactuals are either vacuous (as Lewis, Stalnaker, and others do), or otherwise 
unsuitable for use in a theory of dependence.  By this point, however, such worries might 
not move us deeply.  I have argued at length that a non-vacuous account of counterpossibles 
is necessary, and even if the particular account offered here fails, it seems that some non-
trivial account is needed to make sense of our linguistic and philosophical practice.   
 Setting aside worries related to the proper analysis of counterpossibles, the question 
of whether the simple counterfactual analysis is adequate remains.  Consider again the case 
of Socrates and his singleton.  Since they exist in the same possible worlds, the existence of 
either one supervenes on the existence of the other.  But it does not seem that the 
counterfactual account suggested here will provide the correct result, either.  
 Consider the first part of Counterfactual: If Socrates were to not exist, then 
{Socrates} would not exist.  This is presumably true, since it seems plausible that if Socrates 
did not exist, then his singleton would not exist, either.  The nearest worlds where Socrates 
does not exist are presumably worlds where philosophy develops differently, worlds where 
the history of Greece and Greek culture diverge from ours, and so on; they are not worlds 
where impure sets get formed differently.  Since Socrates does not exist, the set composed of 
Socrates does not exist, either, as there is no individual to form that set.  So far, so good. 
 Consider now the second part of Counterfactual: If {Socrates} were to not exist, 
then Socrates might still exist.  Is this ‘might’ counterfactual true?  It does not seem so.  If 
{Socrates} were to fail to exist, then Socrates would not exist, either.  All of the nearest 
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worlds without singleton Socrates are worlds without Socrates around to form the set; again, 
they are worlds with different historical or cultural truths, but not worlds with different 
mathematical truths.  Worlds without the singleton are worlds without the philosopher to 
create the set, rather than worlds where set theory somehow does not allow one to create a 
set out of some individual.80 
 Something like Nolan's doctrine of the Strangeness of Impossibility81 could be 
driving these intuitions: no impossible world is closer than any possible world.  Since there is 
a sphere of possible worlds where {Socrates} does not exist – the worlds that lacks both 
Socrates and {Socrates} – we need not consider any of the impossible worlds that contain 
Socrates but not {Socrates} when evaluating these conditionals.  The Strangeness of 
Impossibility doctrine is quite plausible, but nothing so strong is required here.  The only 
thing to note here is our firm intuitions about the truth values of the counterfactuals being 
employed: it simply does not seem that, if {Socrates} were to fail to exist, Socrates himself 
might still exist. 
 Consider the similarity metric for counterfactuals discussed in chapter 3.  According 
to such a view, a world is nearby to the extent that it matches the laws of the actual world 
and the facts of the actual world, with greater weight placed on matches of law.  Locating the 
closest sphere of worlds where {Socrates} does not exist means locating worlds without 
{Socrates}, but that preserve our laws and facts as much as possible.  There are, to be sure, 
                                                        
80 There is, to be sure, some disagreement about how to understand the semantics of the 
‘might’ counterfactual used here.  For Lewis, a ‘might’ counterfactual is the dual of a ‘would’ 
counterfactual, so to say that, if {Socrates} were to fail to exist, then Socrates might still exist 
is to say, ‘It is not the case that, if {Socrates} were to fail to exist, then it is not the case that 
Socrates would still exist.’  For Stalnaker, a ‘might’ counterfactual is to be understood as an 
epistemic modal operating on a ‘would’ counterfactual, so we should read the sentence as 
(something like) ‘For all I know, if {Socrates} were to fail to exist, then Socrates would still 
exist.’  Both of these might claims seem false. 
81 See [Nolan, 1997] 
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impossible worlds that lack {Socrates} but contain Socrates, but these worlds would achieve 
a match in matters of fact (viz, facts about the philosopher) at the expense of altering set-
theoretic laws about how impure sets can be formed.  Thus, all the closest worlds that lack 
{Socrates} will also lack Socrates, and so the ‘might’ counterfactual is false. 
 
5.3 Counterfactual Exclusion 
5.3.1 The Counterfactual Exclusion Requirement 
 There is an important role for counterfactuals to play in the analysis of dependence, 
but as we have seen above, it cannot be the one that Schaffer suggests. The failure of the 
counterfactual approach to dependence seen above could be attributed to the fact that we 
are simply using the wrong counterfactuals.  A counterfactual analysis can, after all, give us 
the tools required to meet the challenges faced by an account of dependence that relies on 
supervenience.  Recall that metaphysical dependence cannot be analyzed by supervenience 
alone, since dependence is asymmetric and irreflexive, while supervenience can be symmetric 
and is reflexive.  A counterfactual analysis of the metaphysical dependence relation will allow 
it to be hyperintensional in a way that supervenience is not.  That is, if two propositions P 
and Q are true in the same possible worlds, then P and Q will supervene on each other, and 
thus (if the supervenience account of dependence is true) metaphysically depend on each 
other.  But, as I have argued previously, counterfactuals are hyperintensional: counterfactuals 
with impossible antecedents have non-trivial truth conditions, for example.  Thus, if two 
propositions P and Q are true in the same possible worlds, it does not follow that they 
would behave the same way as antecedents in counterfactuals.82  
                                                        
82 There are other ways that counterfactuals are hyperintensional.  Consider, for example, the 
pair, ‘If I were the President, then I would live in the White House’ and, ‘If the President 
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 The problem with the counterfactual account sketched above is that, at least in many 
cases of metaphysical dependence, the more- and less- fundamental entities exist at the same 
possible worlds.  Thus, if either one were to fail to exist, then so too would the other.  But it 
would be a mistake to conclude that this is a problem for every counterfactual account of 
dependence.  Rather than making use of the kinds of counterfactuals mentioned above, the 
right theory of dependence must use counterfactuals to highlight some other modal property 
of the entities in question.  The requirement I favor can be called counterfactual exclusion: rather 
than ask what would happen if the more fundamental proposition were to be false, we 
should ask what would happen if only one, but not the other proposition were to hold: 
(Counterfactual Exclusion) A depends on B iff, if exactly one of either A or B were 
true, then B would be true. 
According to Counterfactual Exclusion, for one proposition to depend on another, we must 
determine what would happen if one of those propositions were true and the other false.  In 
the language of the nearness of worlds, if A depends on B, then the nearest worlds where A 
is false and B is true are closer (according to some plausible metric of the similarity of 
worlds) than worlds where A is true and B is false.  In such cases, we could say that A is 
more “modally fragile” than B.  This modal fragility introduces the kind of asymmetry and 
hyperintensionality required for our analysis, and does so in a way that suggests the right 
kind of modal relationship between the grounded and grounding entities.83 
                                                                                                                                                                     
were me, then I would live in the White House.’  Even though the antecedents are logically 
equivalent, the truth values of these counterfactuals are different.   
83 Asserting that A is more modally fragile than B is not to assert that B might exist without 
A, at least on the most natural reading of ‘might.’  I do not doubt that there are contexts 
according to which the nearest sphere of worlds where A is false is one that contains some 
worlds where B is nonetheless true, but this is not to say that, in ordinary contexts, a claim 
such as ‘If either A or B were to be false, then A would be false’ entails ‘If A were false, B 
might be true.’  The former counterfactual forces us to evaluate the worlds at a sphere where 
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 How would this account handle the case of the dependence of {Socrates} on 
Socrates?  According to the counterfactual requirement, for {Socrates} to depend on 
Socrates, it should be that, if only one of the two were to exist, then it would be Socrates 
that would exist.  This seems quite plausible.  After all, {Socrates} seems more “modally 
fragile” that Socrates; it is easier to delete a set from a world than a human being; the world 
without Socrates would look far more different to us than the world without {Socrates}.  Of 
course, this is no true defense of the claim, and one might hold that there is no real 
difference in “ease of deletion” or that it is mere bias to hold that differences in how a world 
“looks” physically are more important than differences in how it looks set theoretically.  I 
will attempt to defend this judgment about similarity at below.  Nonetheless, it is plausible 
that the impossible worlds that differ only with respect to set theory are smaller deviations 
from actuality than those that differ only with respect to the history of the physical world. 
It is also clear that there is no threat of Socrates also depending of {Socrates} 
according to the counterfactual account of dependence.  The counterfactual requirement is 
not met in this direction: if exactly one of either Socrates or {Socrates} were to exist, it 
would surely be Socrates, and not {Socrates} that would exist. 
  
5.3.2 Similarity and Counterfactual Exclusion 
                                                                                                                                                                     
either A is true and B is false, or A is false and B is true; the later counterfactual makes no 
such demand.  To put the point in a more concrete manner, I am not committed to the claim 
that Socrates might have existed without {Socrates}.  Claims about what is possible and 
impossible are understood in the ordinary way, by what is true at various possible worlds.  
There is no possible world where Socrates exists without {Socrates}.  When one evaluates a 
conditional such as, ‘If exactly one of Socrates or {Socrates} were to fail to exist, then it 
would be {Socrates} that would not exist,’ one is forced to evaluate the conditional with a 
different system of spheres of worlds that contains impossible worlds; we are thus not 
committed to any corresponding claim about possibility. 
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 This account of dependence faces an immediate challenge: we must be able to 
provide a reasonable account of the truth conditions of counterfactuals with necessarily false 
antecedents.  Many of the conditionals expressed by the counterfactual exclusion 
requirement will be counterpossibles.  In the case of Socrates and {Socrates}, for example, it 
is impossible that Socrates should exist without {Socrates} or vice versa, since (presumably) 
the laws of set theory are metaphysically necessary, and would entail that {Socrates} exists 
whenever Socrates exists.84  Furthermore, such a theory of the truth conditions of 
counterpossibles should be at least at least as objective as the metaphysical dependence 
relation: counterfactuals, after all, are famously vague and context-sensitive, while 
dependence is not.  Even if there are some cases where the facts about dependence seem 
unclear, it would be a mistake to think that we can make something more or less 
fundamental merely by re-describing it or raising a question of dependence in a different 
conversational context.  It is, therefore, important that there be a “default” reading of the 
counterfactuals, and that, at least in most cases, we can use this default metric to analyze the 
truth of dependence claims.  
 Such an account was offered in chapter 3; the standard similarity metric for 
counterpossibles discussed is a descendent of Lewis’s similarity metric for counterpossibles, 
from his [1979].  Lewis’s standard metric is generalized so as to make sense of the kinds of 
laws and matters of fact that are relevant to the similarity of impossible worlds.  We determine 
the logical and mathematical laws of a world by determining the best logico-mathematical 
system for a world, and then hold that a world is nearby to the extent that, first, it matches 
the logical and metaphysical laws of the actual world; second, that it matches the logical and 
                                                        
84 The (restricted) axiom of comprehension would guarantee that {Socrates} exists whenever 
Socrates exists, since Socrates would satisfy the predicate ‘is Socrates.’  
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metaphysical matters of fact of the actual world; and third, that is nearby according to 
Lewis’s metric for the relative nearness of possible worlds.  On such a view, no world which 
contains {Socrates} but not Socrates will be closer than any world that contains Socrates but 
not {Socrates}.     
 Consider the world that contains Socrates but not {Socrates}; call this world w1.  
This world contains a violation of mathematical law, since in this world, there is no set 
created out of Socrates; the (restricted) comprehension principle has an exception with 
respect to Socrates.  Nonetheless, this need not be a “large” miracle.  There is no reason to 
think that this violation of the principle of comprehension will require any further changes 
to set theory in general.  And while there is at least one change in the space of mathematical 
facts (viz., the existence of {Socrates}), it is unclear to what extent this change will ramify 
through the rest of set theory.85  However the facts of set theory work out in these worlds, 
none of the facts about history or culture or physics would change. 
 Compare this world to the nearest world that contains {Socrates} but not Socrates; 
call this world w2.  This world will have violations of mathematical law analogous to those 
mentioned above, since there will be a set such that its sole element does not exist.86  But 
this is not the only way in which this world is different from ours: it diverges from our world 
in all the historical and cultural ways that would come along with the disappearance of the 
philosopher Socrates.  This world would diverge radically from the history of the actual 
world at 469BCE. Thus, w2 contains not only a small logical “miracle” required to create a 
set with a member that does not exist – much like w1 – but also a very large divergence in 
                                                        
85 We may remain neutral on the question of whether, say, {{Socrates}} would exist at the 
nearest worlds where Socrates exists without {Socrates}. 
86 This world might also require iterating this violation of law in such a way as to eliminate 
the existence of sets such as {{Socrates}}.  See the previous footnote. 
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matters of fact.  The worlds, then, are alike with respect to the size of logical miracles, 
analogous with respect to matches of mathematical fact, but w1 achieves a match of matters 
of historical fact that w2 does not. 
 In short, the world that contains Socrates but not {Socrates} contains a "small" 
violation of mathematical law, so as to block for the formation of the set {Socrates}.  The 
world that contains {Socrates} but not Socrates also contains a similar "small" violation of 
mathematical law, so as to create a set out of non-existing members.  At this point, our 
similarity ledger is even between these two worlds, since their laws depart from the actual 
world in analogous ways.  However, world w1, like the actual world, is a world that contains 
Socrates, and has a history influenced by Socrates; world w2 does not have such a history like 
ours.  Both worlds contain a similar “small” miracle, but w1 matches the actual world in a 
way that w2 does not.  Thus, the world w1 will be closer to the actual world than w2. 
 It should be noted that, even if the present analysis of counterpossibles fails, our 
intuitions about counterfactuals with necessarily false antecedents are robust enough to at 
least be a guide to dependence.  That is, insofar as we are inclined to agree that, if either 
Socrates or {Socrates} were to fail to exist, then it would be {Socrates} that did not exist, 
the counterfactual exclusion analysis of dependence is on the right track.    
 We are now in a position to see how this theory of dependence can handle other 
examples of grounding.  We have an intuition that the empty set grounds the existence of 
the set composed of the empty set, that {} grounds the existence of {{}}, and so on.  
The analysis of dependence as counterfactuals supports this judgment: if only one of either 
 or {} were exist, then it would be  that would exist.  The nearest worlds that contain 
 but not {} are closer than any world that contains {} but not .  This 
counterfactual, to be sure, is somewhat less intuitive than the analogous counterfactual about 
137 
 
Socrates and {Socrates}.  Nonetheless, the default similarity metric might be called on to 
provide some guidance. 
 Call a nearby impossible world that contains  but not {} w3; call a nearby 
impossible world that contains {} but not  w4.  Both of these worlds must contain some 
kind of violation of mathematical law, either to prevent the creation of {} from , or to 
allow a set to exist without one of its elements.  Thus, both of these worlds contain an 
analogous violation of mathematical law.  However, the violation of law in w4 extends much 
farther than just the creation of some set from a non-existent element.  After all, a 
systematization of the mathematical facts of this world must look quite different from a 
systematization of our mathematical facts, since our mathematical facts make use of the set 
theoretic hierarchy, which is itself founded on the null set.  Since there is no null set in w4, 
some other way of systematizing the natural numbers and other facts related to them is 
necessary.  By comparison, a world such as w3 will still have different mathematical laws by 
virtue of lacking {}, but this change need not result in changes to how we understand the 
set-theoretic hierarchy.  Other natural numbers, for example, need not be built from {}, 
and the non-existence of {} need not mean that {{}} is problematic.  Thus, a world 
like w3 will be closer to the actual world than w4; the existence of {} is more “modally 
fragile” than the existence of .  The counterfactual requirement is met, and so it is true 
that {} depends on , and not vice versa.87  
 
5.4 Explanation and Counterfactual Exclusion 
                                                        
87 Can we say that {{}} depends on {}?  This seems more difficult to show.  Perhaps it 
is still more difficult to systematize the mathematical fact of a world that lacks {} than it is 
to systematize the facts of a world that lacks {{}}, but it is unclear that this judgment can 
be sustained.  More would have to be said about how simple mathematical facts ground 
more complex mathematical facts. 
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 This theory of dependence is not complete as it stands.  The counterfactual 
exclusion requirement tracks a relation that I have referred to as “modal fragility,” which is 
not the same as dependence.  That is, counterfactual exclusion is only useful in determining 
which of some pair of propositions can more easily be true without the other; this seems to 
correspond to which proposition of this pair is more basic than the other.  But one 
proposition can be more basic than the other without the more basic proposition grounding 
the less basic proposition: consider the propositions that the moon exists and that 2 + 2 = 4.  
Perhaps we could wed the supervenience requirement to counterfactual exclusion so as to 
capture the idea that the grounded and grounding propositions are properly related to one 
another: the supervenience requirement, after all, would rule this out as a case of grounding, 
since the existence of the moon does not supervene on the truth of 2 + 2 = 4.  Thus, the 
supervenience requirement handles the above case, since one can alter whether the moon 
exists without altering whether 2 + 2 = 4.  However, we can consider another pair, such as 
that 2 + 2 = 4 and that properties are universals (assuming that properties are universals).  The 
supervenience requirement is met, because there is no possible world that differs with 
respect to the truth of arithmetic but does not differ with respect to the truth of the nature 
of properties; the counterfactual exclusion requirement is met since, plausibly, the nearest 
impossible world where one of these is true but not the other is a world where properties are 
not universals, but 2 + 2 = 4.  Thus, according to a hybrid theory of dependence that 
combines supervenience with counterfactual exclusion, the truth of properties as universals 
depends on the truth that 2 + 2 = 4, but this seems obviously false.  If supervenience cannot 
be called upon to solve this problem, how are we to understand these examples? 
 This challenge can be met, but only with some additional machinery.  It is not 
enough that the grounded propositions are more “modally fragile” than the grounding 
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propositions, and adding a supervenience requirement does not seem to help.  In the kinds 
of cases described above, the counterfactual exclusion account goes wrong because the 
relation between propositions in the grounding relation needs to be stronger than that of 
relative modal fragility; the dependence relation must also capture the intuition that the less 
fundamental proposition is true because (in some sense of because) of the more fundamental 
propositions.  The notion of explanation discussed above in section 1.3 capture this sense of 
“because.”  Thus, our final analysis of metaphysical dependence is a combination of 
counterfactual exclusion with explanation: 
(Counterfactual Exclusion With Explanation) A depends on B iff, a) if exactly one of 
either A or B were true, then B would be true, and b) A is explained by B. 
This approach combines the counterfactual exclusion requirement with the modal 
requirement; the explanation requirement provides the requisite “because” link between the 
explanandum and explanans, while the counterfactual exclusion requirement provides the right 
kind of modal link between the two.  
Consider once again the case of Socrates and his singleton.  We have seen above that 
the counterfactual exclusion requirement is met: if only one of Socrates or his singleton were 
to exist, then it would be Socrates, and not {Socrates}, that would exist.  We have also seen 
that the explanation requirement is met as well: describing the world in terms of physical 
objects and their properties, and using those to then derive truths about set theoretic entities 
is more economical than a description of the world in terms of set theoretic entities that 
attempts to derive facts about physical objects from facts about sets.  Thus, the present 
theory preserves the result that {Socrates} depends on Socrates.   
Such an approach provides an answer to the worry that complex truths about 
properties should not turn out to be grounded in simple truths about arithmetic.  Even 
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though the truth of some theory of properties is more modally fragile than some simple 
truth of arithmetic, there is no relation of dependence between them because truths about 
arithmetic do not explain truths about the nature of properties.  That is, even if the 
counterfactual part of the analysis of dependence is met in this case, the requirement than 
the more-fundamental proposition explains the less-fundamental proposition is clearly not 
met.88 
Analyzing dependence as counterfactual exclusion and explanation is also an 
improvement over an account of dependence as explanation alone.  Recall that at least some 
of these accounts wrongly hold that the present depends on the past and the laws, since the 
past and the laws explain the present.  This is not a problem for dependence as 
counterfactual exclusion and explanation: though the state of the world at some time t1 is 
explained by the laws and some previous state at t0, the counterfactual exclusion requirement 
is not met.  Is the world where the state of the world at t1 does not obtain, but the laws and 
the state of the world at t0 are held fixed closer than the world where state of the world at t1 
is held fixed, but the state of the world at t0 or the dynamic laws are different?  It seems that 
there is no basis to favor one result over the other.  Assuming that determinism is true, the 
first scenario represents a failure of some state of the world and dynamic laws to produce 
some subsequent state of the world, while the second scenario represents a failure of some 
later state of the world and the dynamic laws (run backward) to produce a previous state of 
the world, and thus both worlds represent the same kind of failure of some state of the 
world and dynamic laws to derive other states of the world.89  Furthermore, both of these 
                                                        
88 The same reply can be given to the challenge that the truth of that 2 + 2 = 4 should not 
ground the truth that the moon exists. 
89 I assume that, when we hold fixed the state of the world at t1 but change the state of the 
world at t0 or the dynamic laws, we will, at least in the default context, change the state of the 
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worlds would provide the same degree of match of matters of fact, either from t1 into the 
future, or from t0 into the past.  Since the counterfactual exclusion requirement is not met, 
we need not say that the some state of the world depends on a previous state and the laws. 
Non-causal versions of the explanation theory seem to be committed to the claim 
that facts about the period of a pendulum are grounded in facts about the length of the rod, 
the force of gravity, and math, or that facts about the collapse of a star are grounded in its 
state and the Pauli exclusion principle.  The present theory does not face these difficulties 
because, once again, the counterfactual exclusion requirement is not met.  There is no reason 
to think that that there is any clear answer about what would be the case if we were to either 
change the period of a pendulum but hold fixed facts about the length of the rod and the 
relevant laws, or change the length of the rod or relevant laws but hold fixed facts about the 
period of the pendulum: there seems to be no reason to favor one kind of change over 
another.  Similarly, there is no reason to think that we should change facts about the present 
state of the collapsing star and hold fixed the Pauli exclusion principle and the star’s previous 
state, rather than changing facts about the previous state of the star and hold fixed the Pauli 
exclusion principle and the star’s present state.  This proposal, then, represents an advance 
over our previous theories of dependence in so far as it gets the central cases right and 
avoids the counterexamples discussed above. 
 
5.5 Physicalism 
 One of the central examples of metaphysical dependence is the dependence of the 
mind on the body.  The Counterfactual Exclusion with Explanation account faces at least 
                                                                                                                                                                     
world at t0 and hold the laws fixed.  On the current way of talking about the comparative 
similarity of worlds, gratuitous changes in laws represent larger divergence from the actual 
world than changes of matters of fact. 
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two problems with respect to the treatment of this kind of case.  First, when we say that the 
mind depends on the body, we are making a counterfactual exclusion claim that, if only one 
of either the mental facts or physical facts were to obtain, then it would be the physical facts 
that would obtain.  In the language of the similarity of worlds, we should say that the worlds 
that contain our mental facts, but not physical facts are not as similar to the actual world as 
the worlds that contain our physical facts, but not our mental facts.  But how can one argue 
for this claim?  Perhaps zombie worlds are closer than ghost worlds, but this would mean 
rejecting the claim that ghosts are metaphysically possible while ghosts are not or the claim 
that metaphysically impossible worlds are more distant than metaphysically possible worlds.  
Though one certainly could reject either of these claims, doing so would represent a 
significant cost for the theory.   
Another worry arises from the multiple realizability of mental states.  For example, 
some mental state might depend on a corresponding physical state, such as when my pain 
depends on my brain being in a certain physical state.  But the moral of the multiple 
realizability arguments is that a creature might experience pain, even though it does not have 
the particular brain state associated with the way that some other creatures experiences pain; 
a mental state such as pain could be realized in the way that it actually is in humans (say, as c-
fiber stimulation), or it could be realized in other ways in non-human animals or aliens.  But 
recall the counterfactual exclusion claim:  if my pain depends on my brain state, it would 
follow that, if I were to either to have the particular brain state that I have and not be in pain 
or be in pain but not have the particular brain state, then I would have the brain state but 
not be in pain.  Is this true?  Not according to the multiple realizability argument: after all, I 
might still be in pain but be in some other brain state, e.g. if I were a Martian experiencing 
Martian-pain.  Such a world is presumably closer than one in which I have the brain state 
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that I actually have, but am somehow not in pain.  If this is the case, then the counterfactual 
exclusion analysis fails, because my experience of pain would not depend on my particular 
brain state.   
 Maybe such a change in my biological make-up is a great change indeed, and would 
result in a drastically different kind of world with different kinds of laws related to physics 
and biology.  If I am essentially the kind of being that I am, and thus necessarily experience 
pain in the way that I do, then such a world is metaphysically impossible.  Thus, even though 
pain could be realized in many different ways, my pain (or, more generally, the mental state of 
any being capable of mental states) could only be realized in the way that it actually is.  
Worlds where I experience pain without c-fiber stimulation, then, are quite distant indeed, 
and could well be more distant than worlds where I experience c-fiber stimulation without 
experiencing pain.  Perhaps an account along these lines could ultimately be developed and 
defended, though these essentialist claims do not strike me as highly plausible, and I do not 
attempt to mount such a defense at present. 
 If this theory of dependence is to be extended to such cases, then the counterfactual 
exclusion requirement would have to be changed in some way.  Either the requirement 
would have to be re-written in such a way as to get around these problems, or the similarity 
metric associated with these counterfactuals will have to allow that (say) zombie worlds will 
be closer than ghost worlds and that worlds where pain is instantiated by some other 
physical system are quite distant.  Both ways of amending the theory could be spelled out, 
but would significantly complicate the theory.  Further work along these lines is necessary 
before such a theory of dependence can be applied to the case of mental states depending on 
physical states.  
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5.6 Conclusion 
 It is possible to analyze the relation of metaphysical dependence in terms of 
counterfactuals and explanation.  Thus, when we say that A depends on B, we say that, first, 
that if only one of either A or B were to be true, it would be B that would be true, and 
second, that the truth of B explains the truth of A.  Note that this account puts a large 
weight on our ability to understand and evaluate these counterfactuals, as well as the notion 
of explanation.  At least in many of the paradigmatic cases of dependence, however, our 
intuitions about counterfactuals and explanation are firm enough to bear this weight.  In 
other cases, the standard similarity metric for worlds discussed in chapter 3 might be relied 
upon to illuminate the truth of these counterfactuals. 
 On the account of similarity proposed in chapter 3, the notion of lawhood plays a 
very important role.  In addition, the notion of explanation is required to make sense of 
many of these cases of dependence.  Thus, it is plausible then debates about grounding and 
dependence will turn out to be debates about laws or debates about explanation.  Arguments 
about reductionism in mind or morality, or about priority in mereology, then, are really 
arguments about how the laws function or about what the facts of explanation are: 
evaluating these claims involves determining what the best systematization of the laws are in 
this world, or in some impossible world, and determining what role these laws may play in 
providing explanations for the various things that are true at this world.     
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